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SUMMARY
Side-channel signals are referred to any analog-domain or digital-domain by-product of
computation on electronic devices. They act as additional, and often unwanted, sources of
information about the device and its activities. With the proliferation of computing systems
in our world, from servers to internet-of-things devices, side-channel signals have become
significantly more available and accessible to measure and leverage. This availability pro-
vides both opportunities and security threats. On one hand, these side-channels may “leak”
sensitive information about the system, and if exploited by an adversary, it would pose se-
curity threats to the system. On the other hand, however, these signals can be leveraged
as extra sources of information that can be used for benign and useful purposes such as
debugging/profiling, malware/intrusion detection, and even establishing trust.
Given these opportunities and threats, understanding how these side-channels are cre-
ated and developing frameworks to (a) discover, model, and mitigate side-channel signals
on modern systems, and (b) leverage side-channel signals for useful purposes (e.g., profil-
ing, intrusion detection, establishing trust) to improve the security and/or performance of
resource-constrained devices have become an important and active area of research.
To address these challenges, this thesis addresses both possible use-cases of (analog)
side-channels: leveraging side-channels for benign applications (Chapters 1-6), and ex-
ploiting (and mitigating) side-channels for information leakage (Chapters 7-8).
Specifically, this thesis develops methods and frameworks to identify, model, and lever-
age side-channel signals particularly analog-domain electromagnetic (EM) emanations by
synthesizing techniques from the fields of computer architecture, security, signal process-
ing, electromagnetics, machine learning, and software engineering.
We carefully analyze EM side-channel signals from a broad range of embedded devices
and cyber-physical-systems, and demonstrate that they can be utilized for a variety of useful
applications namely profiling (Chapter 3), intrusion detection (Chapter 4-5), and establish-
xviii
ing trust through software attestation (Chapter 6) based on a novel method called Spectral
Profiling. Further, this thesis also investigates new methods for identifying and modeling
analog side-channel signals to create future secure and side-channel resistance systems. We
first discover a new side-channel vulnerability on modern computers (Chapter 7). Further,
a novel method to effectively and accurately model analog-domain side-channel signals is
presented (Chapter 8).
Based on these studies, my thesis statement is that “analog-domain side-channel sig-
nals can be leveraged for security and establishing trust, and can be accurately modeled




Computers are becoming increasingly pervasive and critical in our lives due to the rise of
embedded devices and cyber-physical systems. While these systems are performing their
primary task: computing, they create unwanted footprints that can leak potentially sensitive
information about the system through unconventional channels called side-channels. With
the ever-increasing reliance of our lives to computing systems, it is important, more than
ever, to deeply understand how these side-channel signals can be created, how side-channel
leakage can be mitigated and even leveraged for useful applications, and also, how future
systems should be designed to be robust against side-channel attacks?
To address these challenges, this dissertation is mainly focused on analyzing analog-
domain side-channels and proposing new methods to:
• leverage side-channel signals for useful purposes (e.g., profiling, intrusion detection,
establishing trust) to improve the security and/or performance of resource-constrained
devices such as embedded and cyber-physical systems;
• discover, model, and mitigate side-channel signals on modern systems.
1.1 Leveraging Side-Channels for Useful Purposes
Using this fact that analog side-channels are correlated with data and application being pro-
cessed in a device (e.g., an IoT), this thesis develops methods and frameworks for leverag-
ing side-channel signals (particularly electromagnetic emanations) for improving the per-
formance and security of resource-constrained systems (e.g., IoTs, CPSs, etc.). Followings
briefly describe the methods/frameworks that are developed in this work:
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1.1.1 Spectral Profiling: Observer-Effect-Free Profiling by Monitoring EM Emanations
We begin our studies by presenting a novel method on analyzing software activities using
EM side-channel signals unintentionally emanated by the target device. We then demon-
strate how this method can be used for profiling and code-tracking using our framework,
Spectral Profiling, an observer-effect-free profiler which leverages EM emanations to track
the code and determine which parts of the program have executed at what time without
instrumenting or otherwise affecting the profiled system. We will show that this framework
can be used for improving the performance or debugging purposes and is particularly attrac-
tive for resource-constrained systems with limited processing power. Our results confirm
that Spectral Profiling yields useful information about the runtime behavior of a program,
allowing it to be used for profiling in systems where profiling infrastructure is not available,
or where profiling overheads may perturb the results too much (“Observer’s Effect”).
1.1.2 EDDIE: EM-based Detection of Deviations in Program Execution
Building upon the idea of using EM emanations for profiling, we make an additional obser-
vation that EM signals can also be used to security monitor devices for intrusion/malware
detection. To demonstrate the feasibility of this idea, we develop our novel intrusion detec-
tion framework, EDDIE, which constantly monitors the target system via analyzing the EM
emanations for detecting anomalies in program execution, such as malware and other code
injections, without introducing any overheads, adding any hardware support, changing any
software, or using any resources on the monitored system itself. Since EDDIE requires
no resources on the monitored machine and no changes to the monitored software, it is
especially well-suited for security monitoring of embedded and IoT devices. We evaluate
EDDIE on a real IoT system and in a cycle-accurate simulator, and find that even relatively
brief injected bursts of activity are detected by EDDIE with high accuracy.
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1.1.3 REMOTE: Robust External Malware Detection Framework by Using Electromagnetic
Signals
To further improve the robustness and applicability of our intrusion detection framework,
EDDIE, and addressing a number of practical issues such as different sources of variability,
we develop a new robust intrusion detection framework called REMOTE by introducing a
new distance metric and comparison model (for comparing the spikes between the model
and the monitored device) and a new training method which eliminates the need for in-
strumentation. Similar to EDDIE, this framework detects malware/intrusion by externally
observing EM signals emitted by Cyber-Physical System (CPS) while running a known ap-
plication, in real-time and with a low detection latency, and without any a priori knowledge
of the malware. REMOTE does not require any resources or infrastructure on, or any mod-
ifications to, the monitored system itself, which makes it especially suitable for malware
detection on CPS where hardware and energy resources may be limited.
To demonstrate the usability of REMOTE in real-world scenarios, we port two real-
world programs (an embedded medical device and an industrial PID controller), each with
a meaningful attack (a code-reuse and a code-injection attack), to four different hardware
platforms. We also port shellcode-based DDoS and Ransomware attacks to five different
standard applications on an embedded system. To further demonstrate the applicability of
REMOTE to commercial CPS, we use it to monitor a Robotic Arm. Our results on all these
different hardware platforms show that, for all attacks on each of the platforms, REMOTE
successfully detects each instance of an attack and has <0.1% false positives. We also
systematically evaluate the robustness of REMOTE to interrupts and other system activity,
to signal variation among different physical instances of the same device design, to changes
over time, and to plastic enclosures and nearby electronic devices. This evaluation includes
hundreds of measurements and shows that REMOTE achieves excellent accuracy.
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1.1.4 EMMA: Hardware/Software Attestation Framework for Embedded Systems Using
Electromagnetic Signals
As yet another application for side-channel signals, we propose using physical side-channel
signals for other helpful applications such as establishing trust and software attestation.
Establishing trust for an execution environment relies on attestation, where a potentially
untrusted system (prover) computes a response to a challenge sent by the trusted system
(verifier). The response computation typically involves measurement (e.g., a checksum) of
the prover’s program code and execution environment, which the verifier checks against
expected values for a “clean” (trustworthy) system. The main challenge in attestation is
that, in addition to checking the response, the verifier also needs to verify the integrity of
the response computation itself, i.e., that response computation itself has not been tam-
pered with to produce expected values without measuring the verifier’s actual code and
environment. On higher-end processors, this integrity of response computation is verified
cryptographically, using dedicated trusted hardware (e.g., SGX). On embedded systems,
however, form factor, battery life, and other constraints prevent the use of such sophisti-
cated hardware support. Instead, a popular approach is to use the request-to-response time
as a way to establish some level of confidence about the integrity of the response computa-
tion itself. However, the overall request-to-response time provides only one coarse-grained
measurement from which the integrity of the attestation is to be inferred, and even this one
measurement is noisy because it includes the round-trip network latency and/or variations
due to micro-architectural events. Thus, the attestation is vulnerable to attacks where the
adversary has tampered with response computation, but the resulting additional computa-
tion time is small relative to the overall request-to-response time.
To tackle this problem, we make a key observation that the existing approach of execution-
time measurement for attestation is only one example of using externally measurable side-
channel information and that other side channels, some of which can provide much finer-
grain information about the response computation, can be used. As a proof of concept, we
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propose EMMA, a novel method for attestation that leverages EM side-channel signals that
are emanated by the system during response computation, to confirm that the embedded
device has, upon receiving the challenge, actually computed the response using the valid
program code for that computation. This new approach requires physical proximity, but
imposes no overhead to the system, and provides highly accurate monitoring during the
attestation process. We implement EMMA on a popular embedded system, Arduino UNO,
and evaluate our system with a wide range of attacks on attestation integrity, and show that
EMMA can successfully detect each instance of these attacks.
1.2 Designing Side-Channel Resistance Systems
While the above frameworks demonstrate the benefit of understanding side-channels and
their usefulness for benign applications (e.g., security, profiling, etc.), it is important to
mention that proper analysis and modeling of side-channels can also be helpful to improve
security of the system and reducing information leakages. Given the growing importance
of designing side-channel resistance systems, the last two chapters of this thesis is focused
on designing secure and side-channel resistance processors by (a) discovering a new side-
channel vulnerability on modern computers, and (b) proposing a novel simulation tool for
estimating analog side-channel leakage for a any given software/application. Followings
describe them in more details:
1.2.1 A New Side-Channel Vulnerability on Modern Computers by Exploiting Electromagnetic
Emanations from the Power Management Unit
In Chapter 7, we present a new micro-architectural vulnerability, which is created by power
management units of modern computers and can be exploited through electromagnetic, and
potentially other, side-channels. The key observations that enable us to discover this side-
channel are: 1) in an effort to manage and minimize power consumption, modern micro-
processors have a number of possible operating modes (power states), in which various
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sub-systems of the processor are powered down, 2) for some of the transitions between
power states, the processor also changes the operating mode of the voltage regulator mod-
ule (VRM) that supplies power to the affected sub-system, and 3) the EM emanations from
the VRM are heavily dependent on its operating mode. As a result, these state-dependent
EM emanations create a side-channel that can reveal which programs are currently execut-
ing, and potentially other sensitive information about the executed programs.
To demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting this vulnerability, we create a covert chan-
nel that uses changes in the processor’s power states to exfiltrate sensitive information from
a system that is otherwise secured and completely isolated (air-gapped), and then receives
that information using a compact, inexpensive receiver placed in proximity to the system.
To demonstrate the severity of this vulnerability, we also show that information can be suc-
cessfully exfiltrated even if the receiver is several meters away from the system, and even
if the system and the receiver are separated by a wall. Compared to the state-of-the-art,
the proposed covert channel has >3x higher bit-rate. Finally, to demonstrate that this new
vulnerability is not limited to being used as a covert channel, we demonstrate how it can be
used for attacks such as keystroke logging.
1.2.2 EMSim: A Microarchitecture-Level Simulation Tool for Modeling Electromagnetic
Side-Channel Signals
Side-channel attacks have become a serious security concern for computing systems, es-
pecially for embedded devices, where the device is often located in, or in proximity to, a
public place, and yet the system contains sensitive information. To design systems that are
highly resilient to such attacks, an accurate and efficient design-stage quantitative analysis
of side-channel leakage is needed. For many systems properties (e.g., performance, power,
etc.), cycle-accurate simulation can provide such an efficient-yet-accurate design-stage es-
timate. Unfortunately, for an important class of side-channels, electromagnetic emanations,
such a model does not exist, and there has not even been much quantitative evidence about
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what level of modeling detail would be needed for high accuracy.
In Chapter 8, we present EMSim, to simulate EM side-channel signals cycle-by-cycle
using a detailed micro-architectural model of the device. To evaluate EMSim, we com-
pare its signals against actual EM signals emanated from real hardware (FPGA-based
RISC-V processor), and find that they match very closely. To gain further insights, we
also experimentally identify how the accuracy of the simulation degrades when key micro-
architectural features (e.g., pipeline stall, cache-miss, etc.) and other hardware behaviors
(e.g., data-dependent switching activity) are omitted from the simulation model. We fur-
ther evaluate how robust the simulation-based results are, by comparing them to real signals
collected in different conditions (manufacturing, distance, etc.). Finally, to show the appli-
cability of EMSim, we demonstrate how it can be used to measure side-channel leakage
through simulation at design-stage.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we provide a brief back-
ground on side-channels, and then describe on our novel method for analyzing software
activities through AM-modulated frequency-domain signals using EM side-channel sig-
nals which we call Spectral Profiling. We then demonstrate how this method can be used
for profiling and debugging, and present its results in Chapter 3. Next, we propose our
novel method, EDDIE, for intrusion detection using EM signals (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5,
we discuss the shortcomings of EDDIE and propose a robust framework, REMOTE, that
can address and completely solve these issues. In Chapter 6, we present another use-case of
EM side-channel signals by demonstrating how EM emanations can be used for establish-
ing trust and software attestation. In Chapter 7, we begin our analysis on discovering and
modeling analog side-channels. We present a new side-channel vulnerability on modern
laptops. Chapter 8 presents our novel approach in modeling analog side-channels. Finally,
Chapter 9 summarizes this thesis and provide some future directions to this work.
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CHAPTER 2
SPECTRAL PROFILING: OBSERVER-EFFECT-FREE MONITORING BY
LEVERAGING ANALOG SIDE-CHANNEL SIGNALS
2.1 Motivation
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are proliferating in numbers and importance. By 2025, CPS
is expected to be a USD 6.2 trillion market globally (this is 8% of the entire world’s 2016
GDP), and most of that is expected to be in healthcare (USD 2.5 trillion) and manufacturing
(USD 2.3 trillion) [1, 2]. While the CPS world can provide many benefits for industries and
individuals, it, unfortunately, comes with new opportunities for cyber-attacks. By 2020, it
is estimated that more than 25% of known attacks in enterprises will involve the CPS while
less than 10% of IT security spending will be on CPS security, indicating that there is an
emerging need for more attention on CPS security [3].
There is a wide range of CPS security targets: cameras, cars, industrial PLCs, critical
infrastructures such as the power grid (power distribution, nuclear and other power-plants,
etc.), hospitals and embedded medical devices, etc. Many of these targets have already
been attacked (e.g., DDoS attacks [4] in DNS services occurred by Mirai malware-infected
CPS, etc.). Figure 2.1 shows a brief overview of recent attacks on cyber-physical-systems.
Because CPSs use various and customized hardware and software, they may not be
upgraded or updated as often as general-purpose systems, and software updates are even
less frequent for devices where extensive verification or regulatory approval is needed.
This makes cyber-physical systems challenging to keep up-to-date with the ever-evolving
landscape of possible vulnerabilities and threats [5]. Furthermore, existing techniques for
intrusion detection, such as those based on scanning for malware signatures [6], sandbox-
ing [7], hardware support [8, 9, 10], machine learning [11], and dynamic analysis [12],
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of recent cyber-attacks and exploits on IoT systems.
impose significant computational overhead and/or increase hardware cost, so they are dif-
ficult to adapt to CPSs that often have severe performance, resource, power, and cost con-
straints. Moreover, the low-complexity nature of CPS makes it easier to obtain full access
to the device and then disable or even coopt their monitoring functionality. Further, ex-
isting instrumentation-based approaches for profiling and/or security monitoring [13, 14,
15, 16, 17] incurs significant overhead to the system and/or significantly impact the actual
performance of the application (i.e., “observer-effect”).
To address these challenges, an alternative approach for intrusion detection and/or pro-
filing is to use side-channel signals as the source of the information for building a “refer-
ence” model of the device and its applications and leverage that model and the side-channel
signal(s) for monitoring and/or debugging the system. Such an approach has zero-overhead
on the system and completely eliminates the observer-effect while it provides an extra layer
of the security to the system.
Using insights mentioned above, this thesis develops methods and frameworks for
leveraging side-channel signals (particularly electromagnetic emanations) for improving
the performance and security of resource-constrained systems (e.g., IoTs, CPSs, etc.). Fol-
lowings provide a brief background on analog-domain side-channels, and then describe the
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main idea proposed in this thesis for side-channel monitoring.
2.2 Unintentional Amplitude-Modulated Side-Channel Signals
2.2.1 Background
Side-Channel Signals
These signals are unintentionally generated as an artifact during computation. Side-channels
can be classified into two main categories: Digital/Micro-Architectural and Analog/Phys-
ical. Digital side-channels typically rely on shared hardware resources in the computer.
Examples of these channels include caches [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24], micro-architectural
units [25, 26], DRAM and memory bus [27, 28], processor frequency settings [29], branch
predictors [30, 31, 32], GPUs [33], TLBs [34], etc. Physical side-channels, however, rely
on physical characteristics of the system such as EM emanations [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42], variation in power consumption [43, 44, 45, 46, 47], sound/acoustic [48, 49, 50,
51, 52, 53], temperature [54, 55, 56], chassis potential variation [57], crosstalk [58], pe-
ripherals [59, 60], etc.
The main difference between the two categories is that the former (digital), typically,
can be measured within the system (i.e., by another process), while the latter often re-
quires some physical proximity to the device for measurements or, alternatively, needs to
access some sensors on the board to read the desired value. Due to this limitation, physical
side-channel attacks often have much lower transmission rate. However, unlike digital side-
channels, physical side-channels are much more challenging to mitigate, and are often too
expensive and impractical to eliminate. This, makes physical side-channels particularly at-
tractive in scenarios where the system is well-protected from digital side-channels through
isolation and/or partitioning [61]. For example, a popular method for strong isolation is
creating an air-gap, where all the computer’s connections to the outside world are either
disabled or monitored. However, data can still be exfiltrated using a physical side-channel.
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Electromagnetic Side-Channel Signals
It has been well documented in the literature that electronic circuits within computers gen-
erate detectable EM emanations called side-channel EM radiation [62, 63, 64]. The exis-
tence of side-channel EM radiation, and the potential risk it poses for computer security,
was reported in the open literature as early as 1966 [62, 65], and much of this literature
refers to the even older (classified) TEMPEST work [65, 66]. Much of the early work on
EM emanations focused on information leakage created by signals from cathode-ray-tube
(CRT) computer monitors [67] and on how to reduce such risks [66]. In practice, however,
these risks were largely eliminated by the demise of CRT monitors, as their successors,
LCD monitors, create much weaker EM fields.
Research interest in compromising EM emanations has been renewed with the mass-
market introduction of smartcards (e.g., EMV “chip” credit/debit cards). A typical smart-
card has a microcontroller operating at low frequencies (<300 MHz) and usually executes
a single program (cryptographic authentication). EM emanations resulting from their pro-
gram activity can leak information about the embedded cryptographic key(s) [63, 68], both
through direct emanations that are caused by intended current flows within circuits (from
switching activity while adding two numbers in a processor) and through indirect emana-
tions caused by electromagnetic coupling among chip circuits. Numerous countermeasures
have been proposed that reduce information leakage from smartcards [66, 69, 70, 71, 72,
73, 74, 75, 76, 77], including adding low-cost shielding (e.g., metal foil), using asyn-
chronous circuits, and changing the layout of circuitry.
Side-Channel attacks on high-performance (server, desktop, and laptop) systems are
more difficult because they often require capturing signals at a sampling-rate much faster
than the devices’ clock rate, which is impractical for GHz clocks [64, 78, 79]. Despite these
difficulties, it has been shown that information can be transmitted via EM emanations [80],
even in the presence of significant countermeasures [64], and cryptographic keys can be
extracted from modern computers using EM side-channel analysis [78].
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Figure 2.2: A Sinusoidal carrier modulated by a sinusoidal signal shown in time-domain
(left) and frequency-domain (right).
Given these findings, it is only natural to wonder whether we can learn more about
a program’s behavior by observing side-channel signals. Recently, for instance, current
(power) fluctuations were used to identify webpages during browsing [81] and even find
anomalies in software activity [82, 83]. Results in existing works [79, 84, 85, 86] show that
differences between different instructions can be measured in EM analog signals across dif-
ferent devices (e.g., desktops, laptops, FPGAs) and also identify which aspects of program
activity modulate which EM-emanated signals.
2.2.2 What is Spectral Profiling?
Among all emanated signals from a real-time system, some of the strongest and farthest
propagating signals are created when an existing strong periodic signal (e.g., a clock sig-
nal) and its side-bands become stronger or weaker (amplitude-modulated) depending on
the system’s activity. These “accidental” data transmissions can propagate potentially sen-
sitive information about the system (and its applications) with high Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(SNR) thus it provides an opportunity to leverage (EM) side-channel signals more effec-
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Figure 2.3: Spectrum of an AM modulated loop activity..
To better understand this phenomenon, Figure 2.2 shows the time-domain and spectrum
of an ideal carrier signal (at frequency fc) that is modulated by an ideal sinusoidal signal
at frequency falt. In addition to the carrier signal, this spectrum has strong “side-band”
signals offset by falt , i.e., at frequencies fc − falt and fc + falt. This would be the spectral
pattern to look for when a periodic signal has a perfectly stable frequency and is modulated
by a pattern of activity with a fixed period of Talt = 1/falt with no variation in timing.
In reality, both the carrier (e.g., square-wave shaped clock signal) and the periodic
activity (e.g., loops in a program) are slightly unstable over time which causes variations
in the periodicity and hence the spectrum. An example of a “real” unintentional AM-
modulation signal can be seen in Figure 2.3 where a device with clock frequency, fc =
1.008GHz, and a loop with frequency, falt = 13MHz, is shown. As can be seen in the
figure, the carrier is slightly spread around its nominal value and this spreading is also
present (i.e., “inherited”) in the two side-band signals. The carrier is spread out mainly due
to the (intentional or unintentional) non-ideal properties of computing system (e.g., spread-
spectrum clocking, imprecise timing, etc.) and existing circuit/environmental noises.
Apart from the carrier, the side-bands (i.e., the program activity) can be also spread-
out due to the variations in the per-iteration execution time of the loop (mainly due to
the existence of different execution paths in the code). Figure 2.4 shows this variation for
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of per-iteration execution time for four different loops in a standard
benchmark application called basicmath [87].
four different loops in an application (called basicmath) from an standard benchmark suite,
MiBench [87]. As shown in the figure, while some loops have quite stable per-iteration
time, e.g., loop(b), others may have some variations, e.g., loop(a), which, in turn, causes a
spread-out signature in the spectrum.
Using this observation, by knowing the frequency of each path before runtime, during
execution we can deduce (1) which path in the program is currently active, (2) how much
time program has spent in this path, and (3) how many times this path has been executed.
Further, as we will show later, this information can be used for intrusion detection, e.g., a
change in the shape of each phase/loop indicates a possible anomaly in its execution (we
will discuss this in more details in Chapter 4).
As an application goes through different functions and loops, its spectrum is expected
to change over time. To capture this dynamic spectrum behavior of an application, we use
a short-time Fourier transform (STFT) that is defined as [88]




and then compute a spectrogram as
spectrogram(t, w) = |STFT (t, w)|2. (2.2)
In STFT, a long signal is divided into shorter, equal, and slightly overlapping segments
(windows). Computing Fourier Transform of these segments separately and plotting vari-
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Figure 2.5: Spectrogram (spectrum over time) of the basicmath application with four dif-
ferent loops.
able spectra over time allows us to capture local spectrum characteristics. Figure 2.5 shows
the spectrogram of the basicmath [87] application. The bold line at 1.008MHz is the clock
signal. The periodic program behavior amplitude-modulates this signal, and the straight
lines to the right of this line represent the upper sideband of the modulated signal, i.e.,
they have the spectrum that corresponds to program behavior but that spectrum is shifted
upward in frequency by the clock frequency. In this execution the four loops are executed
one after the other (shown by arrows). The per-iteration execution time each loop is also
shown in Figure 2.4. Comparing these two figures, it can be clearly seen that loops with
more spread-out per-iteration time, e.g., loop(a), have thicker line (i.e., more frequency
variation) in the spectrogram.
Leveraging these set of observations and using STFT, we can then develop a framework
to use these AM-modulated side-channel signals for software profiling and/or other helpful
applications. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that these unintentional EM
emanations are used for such helpful purposes. In the next chapters, we describe how such
a method can be used for a variety of helpful purposes.
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CHAPTER 3
DESIGNING A MONITORING FRAMEWORK USING SPECTRAL PROFILING
3.1 Abstract
In this Chapter, we describe how the concept of Spectral Profiling can be used for profiling
and code-tracking. This framework is an observer-effect-free profiler which leverages EM
emanations to track the code and determine which parts of the program have executed at
what time without instrumenting or otherwise affecting the profiled system. We will show
that this framework can be used for improving the performance or debugging purposes and
is particularly attractive for resource-constrained systems with limited processing power.
Our results confirm that our Spectral Profiling framework yields useful information about
the runtime behavior of a program, allowing it to be used for profiling in systems where
profiling infrastructure is not available, or where profiling overheads may perturb the results
too much (“Observer’s Effect”).
The main contributions of this work are:
• A new approach for profiling that requires no profiling-related support or activity on the
profiled system.
• A proof-of-concept implementation of this approach to demonstrate its feasibility in
practice.
• An experimental evaluation that shows our new approach achieves high profiling accu-
racy, both in a real system and in cycle-accurate simulation.
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3.2 Design Overview
Spectral Profiling monitoring framework has two phases, training and profiling. In the
training, we run the application with known training inputs to identify which spectra corre-
spond to which part of the program (mostly loops), and also to identify the valid orderings
between the parts of the program. In the profiling, we run the application with unknown
inputs, record how the spectrum change over time, and combine that with the information
from training to detect which part of the program is executing at each point in time.
Spectral Profiling’s recognition of activity is based on recognizing the corresponding
spectrum. Any spectrum fundamentally corresponds to the signal observed over some in-
terval of time (window), and the duration of this window represents a trade-off between
temporal resolution and frequency resolution. Temporal resolution corresponds to being
able to tell where exactly some program activity begins and ends. Fundamentally, a spec-
trum that corresponds to some time window “blurs together” activity for the entire window,
so spectra collected with a short window allow more precise identification of the time when
program activity has changed. This means that, to improve temporal resolution, we should
use spectra collected over very short intervals of time. However, the number of frequency
bins (i.e., the frequency resolution) in the spectrum is proportional to the duration of the
time interval, so a spectrum collected over a very brief interval “lumps together” similar fre-
quencies into one frequency bin. This means that two program activities that have spectral
“spikes” with different shapes and/or similar frequencies cannot be told apart when using
short-window spectra because the spectrum only has one bin for the entire frequency range
where both spikes are. In our setup, we use a window of 1ms with 75% overlap between
consecutive windows, which provides attribution with 0.25 ms granularity and precision
between 0.25 ms and 1 ms.
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3.3 Training Phase
The goal of the training phase is to collect spectral signatures for all regions of the pro-
gram, and also to identify the possible/probable sequence of the program’s execution, i.e.,
when one region of code is executed, which regions can possibly be executed immediately
after that. To build the training model and collect spectra, we first use instrumentation to
measure the average per-iteration execution times for each loop. Then we re-run the pro-
gram with the same training inputs but without the instrumentation to get the undistorted
spectra. Finally, we use the per-iteration execution times and the frequencies of spikes in
the spectrum to create spectrum-to-loop mappings.
3.3.1 Finding Per-Iteration Execution Time
We place instrumentation at the beginning and end of the loop body to get timestamps at
those points, compute execution time for each iteration, and store it along with information
about which loop they correspond to. When this training run ends, we compute the average
per-iteration execution time for each loop instance. Note that this per-iteration time is only
used in training to identify the frequency at which the corresponding spectrum should have
a spike: if per-iteration time of a loop is T , we will expect the corresponding spectrum to
have a spike at a frequency that is relatively close to f = 1/T .
3.3.2 Finding Spectral Signatures for Each Loop
After calculating the frequency of each loop, we re-run the application with same inputs but
without any instrumentation or profiling-related activity on the profiled device, and record
the spectra for each time window. In each spectrum, we identify the spikes, then compare
their frequencies and shapes to the histogram obtained from the previous (instrumented
run). The matches are imperfect because instrumentation perturbs the execution time of
a loop’s iteration, and thus changes the frequency and shape in the histogram. However,
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our matching is highly accurate because frequencies that correspond to different loops tend
to differ more than the instrumentation-induced errors, because the error introduced by
instrumentation is usually in the same direction (increases the per-iteration execution time),
and also because our matching approach utilizes the fact that the two runs used the same
inputs and thus have the same sequence of loops. For example, in basicmath application (cf.
Table 3.1 and Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2) phase/loop 3 and phase/loop 4 have relatively similar
frequencies, but because we know that phase/loop 3 is likely to have a lower frequency
than, and be executed before, phase/loop 4, the spectra corresponding to these phases/loops
can still be correctly “assigned”. In addition, after successfully assigning spectra to the
phases/loops, we will also have the sequences of the “assigned” phases/loops.
Table 3.1 shows the list of frequencies for four loops in basicmath. The “measured”
column in the table shows the actual frequency of the loop (i.e., in the instrumentation-
free run), and the “calculated” column shows the average frequency calculated from the
instrumentation-enabled histogram. The relative error between the calculated and measured
frequency is up to 2%, but we can still easily match them. Also note that the frequency
error introduced by instrumentation increases as the frequency increases. This is because
instrumentation has more effect on tight loops.
After matching spectra to loops, we pre-process the (instrumentation-free) spectrum
that corresponds to each loop to identify the “spectral signature” for the loop. In our im-
plementation, the signature is a list of frequencies for the strongest spikes in the spectrum,
after removing spikes that appear in all spectra (e.g., for EM signals, for example, this elim-
inates spikes caused by radio stations, etc.). Note that the signature is not just one number
Table 3.1: Measured and Calculated Frequency for loops in basicmath application
Loop Number Frequency (measured) Frequency (calculated)
Loop 1 289.12 KHz 289.1 KHz
Loop 2 720.3 KHz 721 KHz
Loop 3 2.628 MHz 2.577 MHz
Loop 4 2.733 MHz 2.69 MHz
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that corresponds to the fundamental frequency of the loop. Some loops have a group of
spikes instead of one spike, because their per-iteration execution time takes several discrete
values (with some variation around each of them). In most cases, the spectrum also con-
tains not only the spikes that correspond to the per-iteration execution time (fundamental
frequency), but also spikes at multiples (harmonics) of that frequency. These additional
spikes help differentiate spectra that correspond to different loops, so the signature we use
includes all spikes whose magnitude is sufficiently above the noise floor.
3.4 Profiling Phase
In training, we identified the spectral signature for each loop, and we have also identified
the possible/probable sequences of loops (essentially, which loops can execute immediately
after which other loops). Profiling consists of running the application with unknown inputs
and obtaining profiling information about those runs.
3.4.1 Matching of Loop Spectra
Because the profiling inputs are different from training inputs, it is natural to wonder if the
spectrum of a loop will change. We have found that many loops, primarily innermost loops,
have spectra that are nearly identical to those found in training. Intuitively, the spectrum
changes when the per-iteration execution time changes, and in many loops only the number
of iterations changes significantly from input to input, but the work of each iteration (and
the statistics of branches and architectural events) remain similar. We call these Loops with
Input-Independent Spectra (LIIS), and for these loops the spectrum can be matched to the
corresponding spectrum from training.
During profiling, we use the same time window we used during training. For each time
window during profiling, we obtain the spectrum for that window, identify the spikes in
the spectrum (the spectral signature) and compare that signature to the signatures obtained
during training. The comparison is performed by attempting to match the peaks in the
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profile-time and training-time signature. For each peak in the profile-time signature, we
find the closest peak (according to frequency) in the training-time signature. If that closest
frequency differs too much, the peak remains unmatched. If the closest frequency is very
similar, the peak is counted as matched. After attempting to match each peak, the number
of successfully matched peaks is used as the similarity metric between the signatures.
If the similarity is high between a profile-time spectral signature and the best-matching
training-time signature of a loop, we attribute the execution during that profile-time window
to that loop. For the vast majority of time-windows that belong to LIIS loops, this similarity
is very high and the execution is correctly attributed to the correct LIIS loop.
However, it is possible that none of the profile-time signatures matches the observed
signature well enough. This happens primarily because the spectrum of some loops does
change with frequency. For example, a command-line flag may cause every iteration of the
loop to take one path in one execution and a significantly different path in another execution
or a set of control flows inside the loop that can change the per-iteration execution time of
the loop. For these loops, the spectrum still indicates that a loop is executing (spikes in
the spectrum) and when the loop begins and ends (spikes appear at one time and disappear
later) but the spectrum during profiling no longer matches any of the spectra from training.
3.4.2 Sequence-Based Matching
To attribute execution time to these Non-LIIS loops (and report their per-iteration execu-
tion time during the profiling run), we rely on the model of possible loop-level sequences
constructed during profiling. Sequence-based matching begins after LIIS matching is com-
pleted for LIIS loops. The spectra from time windows that remain unmatched after LIIS
matching are first clustered according to the same similarity metric we used to match LIIS
loops to spectra from training, i.e., spectra that have many spikes at similar frequencies will
be clustered together. At this point we have clusters where each cluster corresponds to a
Non-LIIS loop, but we do not yet know which loop in the code this cluster corresponds to.
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However, for each “mystery spectrum” we know that it should be matched to a region
of code that is not a LIIS loop, and the LIIS loop spectra observed before and after the
“mystery spectrum” tell us which loops have been executed before and after each instance
of the “mystery” loop whose cluster we are considering. Fortunately, the model of the
application’s loop-to-loop transitions restricts the possibilities for matching so that usually
only a single Non-LIIS loop remains as a possible match. When there are multiple possible
matches, i.e., the “mystery spectra” in a cluster could possibly belong to more than one
Non-LIIS loop, we match the cluster to the Non-LIIS loop whose training signature has the
highest average similarity to the spectra in the cluster.
3.5 Experimental Results
3.5.1 Experimental Setup
To demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of Spectral Profiling, we used it to profile
applications running on a single-board computer (A13-OLinuXino), which has a 2-issue
in-order ARM Cortex A8 processor with 32kB L1 and 256KB L2 caches, and uses Debian
Linux as its operating system (OS). Our Spectral Profiling for this system uses electro-
magnetic (EM) emanations that are received by a commercial small electric antenna (PBS-
E1) [89] that is placed next to the profiled system’s processor. The antenna is placed where
the clock signal has the strongest Signal-to-Noise ratio (SNR).
A spectrum analyzer (Agilent MXA N9020A) is then used to record the spectra of the
signals collected by the antenna. A spectrum analyzer can be relatively costly (several tens
of thousands of dollars), but we elected to use a spectrum analyzer primarily because it
provides calibrated measurements, and already has support for automating measurements
and for saving and analyzing measured results. In additional experiments, we observed
similar spectra with less expensive (<$5,000) commercial software-defined radio receivers.
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3.5.2 Results
We apply Spectral Profiling to all 13 applications from the automotive, communications,
network, and security categories in the MiBnech suite. We used a 1 ms window size with
75% of overlap between windows in all applications.
For training, markers are inserted as described in Section 3.3, except for very tight
loops where markers are inserted before and after each loop and, if needed, only iteration-
counting is added to the loop. The per-iteration time in this case is computed by dividing
the between-markers time by the number of iterations. Each marker reads and records the
current clock cycle count from the ARM Performance Counter Unit (ARM-PMU) [90],
which provides information similar to the x86 “rdtsc” instruction [91]. The training runs
are repeated with several different command line flags, in order to identify the sequence of
loops that can occur in each application.
The insertion of markers and the identification of possible sequences for an applica-
tion are both accomplished fully automatically. Identification of loop nests and marker
insertion are implemented as a Clang tool, and identification of possible loop sequences in
implemented as a pass in LLVM 3.7.
After training, for which we used the small input set [87], we perform actual profiling
with the original unmodified code (no markers) and with the large input set [87]. The
accuracy we measure is defined as the fraction of execution time for which our method
correctly identifies the loop that is currently executing. This accuracy is not 100% because
of (1) miss-attribution, during which our algorithm matches the spectrum to a different
loop (i.e., loop A is actually executing, but the algorithm matches the spectrum to loop
B instead) at loop B, and (2) non-attribution, during which our algorithm finds that the
spectrum is too different from loop spectra observed in training, so it leaves such intervals
un-attributed. Non-attribution is typically a result of computation whose spectrum varies
widely depending on inputs, or activity that has no recognizable spectral signature (e.g.,















Figure 3.1: Correct attribution (striped portion) as a percentage of the overall profiled exe-
cution time.
Figure 3.1 shows the breakdown of profiled execution time into time that was accu-
rately attributed, time that was miss-attributed, and non-attributed time. In all benchmarks
except GSM, our method provides correct attribution during at least 90% of the execution
time, with the arithmetic mean at 93%. Miss-attribution occurs during less than 4% of
the execution time, except in QSORT, where miss-attribution occurs during 8% of the time.
The larger miss-attribution for QSORT occurs primarily because the std::qsort library
function does not have a stable signature, so it is often miss-attributed. It is possible that
the variation in std::qsort spectra is a result of having multiple loops in that function.
Unfortunately, our marker insertion did not include library code so our scheme treats the
entire std::qsort function as a single entity and expects it to have the same spectrum
throughout its execution. We expect that this problem can be overcome by also adding loop
markers to library code. Overall, the arithmetic mean for miss-recognition is 2.26%.
To provide further evidence that the ability to do Spectral Profiling is a result of a
fundamental connection between repetitive program behavior and the spectra of resulting
side-channel signals, we apply Spectral Profiling power signals produced via cycle-accurate
architectural simulation in SESC [92], a cycle accurate simulator that includes CACTI [93]
and WATTCH [94] power models. In this simulation, we model a 1.8GHz 4-issue out-of-
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order core with 32KB L1 and 64MB L2 caches. Using this simulator, we found similar
results (98% accuracy on average) to that of in real measurements. This is slightly better
than our real-system results, mainly because simulation-produced power signals are free
of radio-frequency noise and other problems that present in EM signals received from real
systems are: measurement error, frequency-dependent distortion (for some EM frequencies
the real system acts as a better “transmitter” than for others), etc. The mean for miss-
recognition in simulations is 1.19% which is again slightly better than for the real system.
Overall, Spectral Profiling remains effective in spite of differences in clock rates (1.008
GHz vs. 1.8 GHz), pipelines (In-order vs. Out-of-order), use of different signals (EM
emanations vs. power), etc. This provides strong evidence that the existence of spectral
signatures is not an anomaly of the particular system we used in our experiment, and that
Spectral Profiling is likely to be effective for a wide variety of other real computer systems.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we demonstrated how Spectral Profiling method can be used to develop a
framework which profile program execution without instrumenting or otherwise affecting
the profiled system. Spectral Profiling monitors EM emanations unintentionally produced
by the profiled system, looking for spectral “spikes” produced by periodic program activity
(e.g., loops). This allows Spectral Profiling to determine which parts of the program have
executed at what time and, by analyzing the frequency and shape of the spectral “spike”,
obtain additional information such as the per-iteration execution time of a loop. The key
advantage of Spectral Profiling is that it can monitor a system as-is, without program in-
strumentation, system activity, etc. associated with the profiling itself, i.e., it completely
eliminates the “Observer’s Effect” and allows profiling of programs whose execution is
performance-dependent and/or programs that run on even the simplest embedded systems
that have no resources or support for profiling. We evaluated the effectiveness of Spectral
Profiling by applying it to several benchmarks from MiBench suite on a real system. Our
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experimental results showed that our current implementation of Spectral Profiling on av-
erage correctly attributes 93% of execution time when applied to EM emanations from an
actual IoT device, and we confirmed the versatility of the approach by also successfully
applying it to the power signal produced through cycle-accurate simulation.
Overall, Spectral Profiling can be used for profiling in systems where infrastructure is




EDDIE: EM-BASED DETECTION OF DEVIATIONS IN PROGRAM
EXECUTION
4.1 Abstract
Building upon leveraging AM-modulated EM side-channel signals for useful purposes, in
this chapter we present our novel method called EDDIE, that leverages EM side-channels
for intrusion detection. Similar to Spectral Profiling framework, the main advantage of
this method is that it incurs zero-overhead on the system and can monitor the system ex-
ternally which makes it suitable for resource-constrained (e.g., IoTs, CPSs, etc.) or legacy
systems (which lack monitoring infrastructures). In addition, it provides a security air-gap,
i.e., it is physically separated from the monitored device thus, for a successful attack, the
attacker needs to attack both the monitored device and the intrusion detection system, and
consequently makes the entire system more secure.
Monitoring with EDDIE involves receiving EM emanations that are emitted as a side
effect of execution on the monitored system, and it relies on spikes in the EM spectrum
that are produced as a result of periodic (e.g., loop) activity in the monitored execution
(i.e., AM-modulated signals as it was described in Chapter 2). During training, EDDIE
characterizes normal execution behavior in terms of peaks in the EM spectrum that are
observed at various points in the program execution, but it does not need any characteriza-
tion of the malware or other code that might later be injected. During monitoring, EDDIE
identifies peaks in the observed EM spectrum, and compares these peaks to those learned
during training. We evaluate EDDIE on a real IoT system and in a cycle-accurate simu-
lator, and find that even relatively brief injected bursts of activity (a few milliseconds) are
detected by EDDIE with high accuracy, and that it also accurately detects when even a few
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instructions are injected into an existing loop within the application.
We believe that EDDIE would be particularly useful as a dedicated monitor for sys-
tems embedded in critical infrastructure, such as industrial, power plant, and other control
systems, or for auditing the behavior in-body medical devices when a patient visits the
doctor’s office. In both scenarios, software changes and direct manipulation of devices is
highly undesirable, while the cost of an EDDIE setup is very low compared to the total cost
of the monitored system(s).
The main contributions of this work are:
• Proposing EDDIE, a new approach to monitoring execution and detecting anomalies
without any modification to or cooperation from the monitored system.
• A proof-of-concept implementation of EDDIE that demonstrates its potentials.
• A detailed characterization of EDDIE implementation in the context of code injection,
showing that EDDIE can detect injected code even if a brief (a few milliseconds) burst
of injected code is executed, and that it can detect injections of just a few instructions
within a loop body.
4.2 Design Overview
The overall idea of EDDIE is to use the observed EM spectra over time as a surrogate for
program behavior over time, gather training data about what the EM spectra should look
like in each part of the program during correct execution, and then monitor execution by
looking for situations where the observed EM spectra statistically deviate from expected
spectra, i.e., the observed spectra are unlikely to be outcome of a correct execution.
EDDIE obtains the EM signal from an antenna, uses the Short-Term Fourier Transform
(STFT) to convert this continuous signal into a sequence of overlapping windows, and then
converts the signal in each window into its spectrum, which we call Short-Term Spectrum
(STS). All the actual training and monitoring in EDDIE is done on this sequence of Short-
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Term Spectra (STSs). Training in EDDIE consists of obtaining a number of STSs for
each loop nest and each loop-to-loop transition that is possible during a valid execution in
the program. During monitoring, EDDIE compares the observed STSs to those obtained
during training, and reports a problem when the observed sequence of STSs is unlikely to
have been produced by a valid execution.
Compared to directly using the corresponding time-domain signal values, use of STSs
in EDDIE is advantageous both in terms of efficiency and in terms of accuracy. During
monitoring, EDDIE needs to assess whether the difference between the monitoring-time
signal and the training-time signal is larger than the difference that can be expected due to
“usual” variation in the signal such as signal noise and measurement error, cache misses and
other low-level events, etc. At any given time, the program is very likely to be executing a
loop nest, so an STS is very likely to have a few prominent features (peaks) that are much
stronger than the noise at that frequency, and whose position in the spectrum (frequency) is
very resilient to “random” occurrences of low-level hardware events and completely unaf-
fected by signal noise. This means that comparisons among STSs are usually very efficient
because they involve checking only a few points (frequencies) in the spectrum, and it also
means that STSs for the same region of code tend to be very similar to each other, so even
small differences in STS peaks provide high confidence that something else is executing.
In contrast, the time-domain signal for the same time window, typically consists of fluctu-
ations that are relatively weak (compared to signal’s noise level) and whose position in the
time window shifts significantly (compared to the duration of each fluctuation) as a result
of low-level hardware events. This means that comparisons would have to include most of
the real-time samples collected in the time window, and that accuracy would suffer because
relatively large differences among signals would have to be tolerated to avoid producing
false positives.
At high-level, EDDIE has two phases: training, and monitoring. Followings describe
these two phases in more detail. We use an application, Susan, from a standard benchmark
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suite, MiBench [87], as a running example.
4.3 Training Phase
The main goal of the training phase is to (i) find the possible sequences in which loop and
inter-loop regions may execute, and (ii) collect enough sample windows that correspond to
each loop and inter-loop region of the program, along with information about which region
each of the training window corresponds to.
The possible sequences of regions are represented as a loop-level state machine that is
identified through compile-time analysis. This analysis begins with the traditional control
flow graph (CFG) of the program. Each node in the CFG is a basic block, and an edge
from some basic block, A, to some basic block, B, exists if execution of block A can im-
mediately be followed by execution of block B. Note that the CFG defines a state machine
that constrains the set of basic block sequences that may be observed in an execution of
that program. To obtain the region-level state machine, for each loop nest we merge all
the nodes in the CFG that belong to that loop nest into a single loop-region node, elimi-
nating all edges between basic blocks inside that nest and also all edges that go from that
nest directly to itself. We then eliminate each of the remaining basic-block nodes from the
graph by connecting the sources of its incoming edges directly to the destinations of its
successors, and finally we merge (into a single edge) those edges that have both the same
source node and the same destination node. The result of this is a graph that represents the
region-level state machine of the program: each state (graph node) represents a loop region
and each edge represents an inter-loop region. Note that this region-level state machine is
very compact compared to the traditional basic-block-level CFG, and that at runtime the
state transitions in the region-level state machine occur much less often because each state
represents execution of an entire loop nest.
During compilation for training runs, EDDIE adds instrumentation just before and just
after each loop nest in the code that will be used in training runs. In each EDDIE training
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run, we record the signal while the instrumentation logs the region identifier, entry time,
and exit time for each loop region that is executed. This allows us to map each part of the
signal to the region that was executing at that time. This instrumentation is light-weight
and requires very little memory to record its information. For example, only five loop nests
are instrumented in the Susan application from MiBench benchmark suite [87].
EDDIE then runs the application multiple times, each time with different inputs. Mul-
tiple runs are needed to improve coverage of the regions, i.e., to obtain signals that corre-
spond to regions that are only executed in some of the runs. Multiple runs also help gather
a representative number of signal windows for regions that exhibit variation in behavior,
e.g., due to control flow within the body of a loop. For example, our training for the Susan
benchmark consists of 50 runs (each with different inputs).
The signals collected during training are then divided into sample windows. For each
window EDDIE uses STFT to compute its spectrum, and then identifies the set of peak
frequencies in that spectrum. A peak frequency in EDDIE is defined as a frequency at
which at least 1% of the entire window’s signal energy is concentrated. The number of peak
frequencies can differ from window to window, especially if they correspond to different
regions of the program. For example, for one loop nest in the Susan benchmark our training
produces 1,200 windows, each with 15 peaks, while for another loop nest we have 750
windows, each with 7 peaks. Generally, we observe three types of STSs in the loops. (i)
loops that have very small variations per-iterations and thus they have very sharp peaks. (ii)
loops that has larger per-iteration execution time variations hence wider peaks due to these
variations (usually these variations caused by different control-flow paths in the code). (iii)
nested loops where inner loop can vary a lot thus the peak(s) for outer loop can be much
wider than the other two types. These three types are shown in Figure 4.1. Using this
observation, for each STS we take several peaks not just the strongest one.
Finally, for each region in the program, EDDIE forms the set of sample windows that
belong to that region and performs analysis to determine how many samples need to be
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of frequencies that correspond to per-iteration execution time (f =
1/T ) for three different loops: (a) fixed. (b) control flow loop. (c) nested loop.
jointly considered in statistical tests during the monitoring phase to achieve a desired level
of reporting accuracy. This number depends on the statistical test that will be used and is
explained in the following section.
In summary, EDDIE’s training obtains the application’s region-level state machine and,
for each region, a reference set of sample windows with their spikes already identified, and
the knowledge of how many samples should be used in statistical tests for that region.
4.4 Monitoring Phase
4.4.1 Distance Metric
A key aspect of EDDIE’s decision-making is that it cannot be based on whether the ob-
served (monitoring-time) STSs differ from the reference (training time) STSs. This is
because STSs that belong to the same region of code are almost never exactly the same.
Reasons for this include noise and external (e.g., radio) interference in the signal, and also
“random” variation in program behavior (e.g., a specific path through the loop body may
be taken slightly more or less often depending on the window of time we are observing),
micro-architectural events such as cache misses, branch mis-predictions, etc.
Due to variations among STSs that belong to the same region of code, EDDIE’s decision-
making is based on statistical tests. This means that EDDIE views each code region as
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Figure 4.2: Normal (green) vs. Malicious (blue) activity. Parametric test can lead to in-
evitable false positives and false negatives.
a generator of STSs that vary randomly according to some distribution that is specific to
that region. During monitoring, EDDIE uses an appropriate statistical test to compute the
probability that the region’s reference distribution (the distribution of STSs obtained for
that region during training) is the same distribution that has produced the STSs observed
during monitoring. If the same-distribution probability is high enough, EDDIE consid-
ers the observed STSs to be “as expected” and takes no further action. Conversely, if the
same-distribution probability is low enough, EDDIE considers the observed samples as
anomalous and takes further action.
The simplest statistical tests are called parametric tests because they assume that the
distribution belongs to a specific family, e.g., Gaussian (normal) distributions, and can be
fully characterized using a relatively small set of parameters (e.g., mean and standard de-
viation for a normal distribution). However, we have found that many regions of code
produce distributions that are poor matches for well-known distribution families. For ex-
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ample, Figure 4.2 uses green color to show how the frequency of the strongest spike is
distributed among reference STSs that all belong to the same loop nest. This distribu-
tion is a poor fit for a normal distribution, so for illustration purposes we show (light blue
line) the best-fitting multi-modal distribution that consists of two normal distributions. This
bi-normal fitted distribution differs significantly from the actual (green) distribution, so sta-
tistical tests that assume a bi-normal distribution would report many false positives because
the observed distribution of STSs does differ from the reference bi-normal distribution.
To overcome this problem, EDDIE uses a nonparametric test to compare the observed
and reference STS distributions. A nonparametric test can take two groups of data and
compute the probability that the two groups are both random samplings from the same pop-
ulation, without any a-priori assumptions about the nature of that population’s underlying
distribution. For EDDIE, this means that we can test the observed STSs against reference
STSs without making any assumptions about which type of distribution the reference STSs
belong to. Two best-known non-parametric tests are the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (U-
test) [95] and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test) [96]. The U-test is sensitive to the
differences in the median value in each of the two groups of data and the K-S test is sensi-
tive to any difference between the two groups of distribution. We experimented with both
tests and found that the K-S test shows better performance, so EDDIE uses that test.
In K-S test, we suppose that the reference data set has m elements with an empiri-
cal distribution function of R(x), and that the data set observed during monitoring has n
elements with an empirical distribution function of M(x). The K-S test then computes
Dm,n = maxx | R(x) −M(x) |, i.e., the largest difference between these two empirical
distributions. The null hypothesis,H0, is the reference (training-time data) and monitoring-
observed data sets were both drawn from the same population. The test rejects this H0 at





m and n, and where c(α) is the reverse of Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution at confidence
level α. Intuitively, Dm,n,α is the magnitude of the difference that can be expected to exist
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between R(x) and M(x) even when the two data sets are drawn from the same population,
and α is the fraction of test in which the test is allowed to falsely reject H0. Note that α
cannot be zero because for any value of Dm,n there exists a small possibility that it can
occur even when H0 is true.
A final consideration for K-S test is that K-S test the is a one-dimensional test, i.e., the
data sets it can compare should have elements that are scalars (numbers), while in EDDIE
a STSs are characterized by a set of peak frequencies (a vector of numbers). Thus we
apply the K-S test to each dimension separately, i.e., one test compares the STSs according
to their strongest peak, a second K-S test compares the STSs according to their second-
strongest peak, etc. The results of these tests are then combined by counting the number of
such tests that have rejected H0. Followings discuss this in more detail.
4.4.2 Non-parametric Statistical Test
A final consideration we need in order to use the K-S test in EDDIE is that the K-S test
is a one-dimensional test, i.e., the data sets it can compare should have elements that are
scalars (numbers), while in EDDIE a STSs are characterized by a set of peak frequencies (a
vector of numbers). Thus we apply the K-S test to each dimension separately, i.e., one test
compares the STSs according to their strongest peak, a second K-S test compares the STSs
according to their second-strongest peak, etc. The results of these tests are then combined
by counting the number of such tests that have rejected H0.
In the K-S test, we can choose n, the number of monitoring-observed STSs that will
be tested in each K-S test. With a small n, the K-S test uses only very recently observed
STSs so EDDIE will have a low latency between when the anomalous execution begins and
when it is detected. This detection latency can generally be expected to grow in proportion
to the value of n. However, n also affects detection accuracy, and the relationship between
accuracy and the value of n is not as straightforward. To illustrate this, Figure 4.3 shows the
false rejection rate in EDDIE’s K-S test, i.e., how often the K-S test fails in an injection-free
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Figure 4.3: Buffer size selection for three loops, one whose spectrum has one sharp peak
and its harmonics (left), one whose spectrum has several peaks and their harmonics (mid-
dle), and one whose spectrum has poorly defined peaks (right).
run, as we increase n, which is shown in terms of detection latency (in milliseconds).
When n is too small, for most regions the K-S test will rarely reject H0 even when H0
is actually false. This is not surprising because, intuitively, the test does not have enough
monitoring-observed data points to reach a sufficiently high confidence level. As n in-
creases, the rejection rate usually increases for both correct rejection (the STSs come from
the injected part of the execution, not shown in Figure 4.3) and false rejection. At some
point, the correct rejection rate becomes very high (most STS sets that include injections
are rejected by the K-S test) but the false rejection rate is also relatively high. Further in-
crease of n then results in virtually no change in correct rejections, but the false rejection
rate drops and eventually becomes very close to zero.
We want EDDIE to be useful in practice, so its reports should have very few false
positives. Although EDDIE’s overall algorithm has additional considerations beyond the
K-S test rejecting a group of STSs, it would be very hard to achieve a very low false
positive rate if the K-S test labels a significant percentage of monitoring-time STS groups
as anomalous. Thus in EDDIE we should use the K-S test with the number of monitoring-
observed STSs n that is large enough to provide a near-zero false rejection rate, but not
much larger than that because that unnecessarily sacrifices detection latency. Unfortunately,
as shown in Figure 4.3, this “sweet spot” value of n depends on the code region and differs
quite a bit from region to region.
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To accommodate this, during training EDDIE determines the desired value of n sepa-
rately for each region. We select the desired n by applying the K-S test to training-time
STSs for that region using different values of n, and selecting the smallest n that provides
the minimum false rejection rate observed across the entire range of ns (for most regions
the false rejection does reach zero at some value of n).
Note that all training runs are injection-free, so this method can only consider the false
rejection rate, but we have found that this also results in near-optimum correct rejections.
4.4.3 Monitoring Algorithm
Algorithm 1 shows (with some simplifications) how EDDIE works and switches between
regions and decides when to report an anomaly to the user.
The loop at Line 7 iterates over STSs observed during monitoring. The new STS is
added to the set that will be used in the K-S test, and the oldest STS in the set is removed
to maintain the set at the appropriate size for the current region. The K-S test is then used,
one peak at a time, to compare the monitoring-observed set (MonSet, see Line 9) to the
reference set for the current region. When the K-S test rejects the null hypothesis, ED-
DIE considers the possibility that the execution has progressed beyond the current region.
This is also done using the K-S test, by comparing the appropriate number of monitoring-
observed STSs to the reference STSs for each candidate region. Acceptances and rejections
across all peaks are counted. After all candidates have been considered, if a next-region
candidate had enough peaks accepted by the test, EDDIE’s current region is changed to
that candidate region. If multiple candidates have enough peaks accepted (this happens ex-
tremely rarely), EDDIE uses the candidate region with the most accepted peaks. If none of
the next-region candidates is acceptable, EDDIE checks if the number of recent rejections
in the K-S test is high enough (i.e., 3 in our implementation) to report an anomaly to the
user. This allows EDDIE to tolerate a few K-S test rejections without reporting anything,
which helps reduce the number of false reported anomalies that can occur in injection-
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Algorithm 1 EDDIE’s intrusion detection algorithm
1: Regions: R1...Rr
2: Current region number: c
3: Group size for K-S test: n1...nr
4: P (i, j) : jth peak in the the ith STS
5: pos← 1; counter ← 0;
6: currRegion = R1
7: while application is running do
8: for p do=1..numPeaks(Rc)
9: MonSet← P (pos− nc : pos, p)
10: if test(RefSetc,k,MonSet) = reject then
11: for Rj ∈ successors of Rc do
12: AltSet← P (pos− nj : pos, p)
13: if test(RefSetj,k, AltSet) = reject then
14: anomalyCnt← anomalyCnt+ 1
15: else
16: changeCnt(j)← changeCnt(j) + 1
17: end if
18: end for
19: elseReset anomalyCnt and changeCnt
20: end if
21: end for
22: if changeCnt > changeThreshold then
23: j ← index of max(changeCnt)
24: currRegion← j
25: end if
26: if anomalycnt > reportThreshold then
27: Report anomaly to user
28: end if
29: pos← pos+ 1
30: end while




We use two different experimental setups. One is a real IoT prototype system, a single-
board Linux computer (A13-OLinuXino-MICRO [97]) with a 2-issue in-order ARM Cor-
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tex A8 processor with a 32kB L1 and a 256kB L2 cache, with a Debian Linux operating
system. The EM signals emanated from this system are received by a commercial small
electric antenna (PBS-E1 [89]) that is placed right above the device’s processor, and the
signal is recorded using a Keysight DSOS804A oscilloscope. While this oscilloscope is rel-
atively expensive, note that we use it mainly because of its built-in features for automated
and calibrated measurements and ability for displaying the real-time signals. In additional
experiments, we have observed similar EM spectra with less expensive (<$800) commer-
cial software-defined radio receiver (USRP b200-mini) and we confirm that EDDIE can
work efficiently on such lower-cost setups. While this cost is low enough for deploying
EDDIE in some important scenarios (critical infrastructure, medical offices, etc.), for other
scenarios we envision a custom design with a specialized receiver (ASIC block for STFT
and peak finding, simple CPU for tests, and some flash for storing the model from training)
attached to an antenna, with a <$100 total cost.
Our second setup is based on the SESC [92] cycle-accurate simulator, and uses the
simulator-generated power signal for EDDIE’s analysis. This setup is used to confirm
that EDDIE is applicable across a wide range of systems, and to gain insight into which
architectural features affect EDDIE’s detection performance.
In our experiments, we use a total of 10 benchmarks from the MiBench [87] suite to test
EDDIE algorithm. For the real IoT system, we execute each benchmark 25 times during
training. The code for the training runs contains with our light-weight instrumentation,
which is implemented as a Clang tool, and the code is also subjected to a separate analysis
(which is not used to actually generate code) in LLVM [98] where we added a pass that
statically finds the regions and the possible transitions between regions. For monitoring,
we use 25 runs per benchmark, without any instrumentation and with different inputs.
In simulation-based experiments we use fewer runs (10 training and 10 monitoring runs
per benchmark) to reduce the overall simulation time.
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Table 4.1: Accuracy for EDDIE monitoring of an actual IoT device
Benchmark Detection Latency False Positives Accuracy Coverage
(ms) (%) (%) (%)
Bitcount 42 0.99 100 99.9
Basicmath 25 1.8 99.9 99.9
Susan 32 1.39 92.1 95.9
Dijkstra 25 1.08 99.9 99.7
Patricia 28 0.98 92.3 95.2
GSM 24 0.9 96.2 57.1
FFT 17 0.76 93 99
Sha 11 1.9 97.2 98.9
Rijndael 12 0.56 99.9 97.1
Stringsearch 11 0.19 99.9 99.9
4.5.2 Results on an IoT Device
In this set of experiments, we inject code into different regions of each application. The
injections are different for loop and inter-loop regions. Injections outside loops consists
of invoking a shell and then, without doing anything else, returning back to the original
application. This injection results in executing 476k injected instructions and adding about
3 ms to the execution time. When injection is made in a loop, we add an 8-instruction code
that consists of 4 integer operations and 4 memory accesses. The rationale for the shellcode
injection is that shellcode execution is often a fundamental step in many attacks, and our
empty-shellcode injection results in less injected-code execution than any real shellcode-
based attack where the attack’s intended activity (payload) must either be executed or at
least set up within the shellcode-invoked shell. The rationale for injecting only 8 instruc-
tions into a loop body is that an injection into a loop allows the injected code to be executed
repeatedly, allowing the attacker to perform significant work over time but improve stealth
by performing the work in small chunks.
The results for the IoT system are shown in Table 4.1. The first column shows the appli-
cation, and the remaining columns report EDDIE’s detection latency, false positive and ac-
curacy percentages, and coverage. The results were obtained using reportThreshold
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= 3 in EDDIE’s algorithm, i.e., EDDIE tolerates up to 3 consecutive K-S test rejections
and only reports an anomaly for a rejection that is part of a 4-long (or longer) streak of test
rejections. The average detection latency is measured as the average, among all injections
that are reported, of the difference between when execution of injected code begins and the
time when EDDIE reports it. This latency mainly reflects the number of STSs that are used
in the K-S test (n in Section 4.4.1). False positives are the number of STS groups that are
reported as anomalous but do not contain any injected execution, as a percentage of all STS
groups. The average for false positives is <1% and the highest false positive percentage
was only 1.9% (for the Sha benchmark). Accuracy is computed for each region as the total
number of STS groups with a correct reporting outcome, i.e., those that contain injections
and are reported by EDDIE plus those that contain no injections and are not reported, ex-
pressed as a percentage of all STS groups. The accuracy shown for each benchmark is
the average of its per-region accuracy results. On average, EDDIE’s accuracy is 95%. We
observed that the bulk of the inaccuracies come from borders between two regions (i.e.,
outside the loops), and further investigation has revealed two main causes for this: (i) non-
loop code during some transitions creates poorly defined peaks, so better consideration
of diffuse spectral features may improve EDDIE’s accuracy, and (ii) the actual inter-loop
transition is usually very brief and for different executions occurs at a different point in
the window on which the STS was computed, so better identification of the boundaries of
the actual inter-loop transition may help to create STSs that better represent the transition.
Finally, we define coverage as the amount of time during which the STS is attributed to the
region in the code that actually produced it. The main reason for imperfect coverage in our
implementation is that some loops have no peaks in their STSs. For example, about 40%
of the execution time in GSM is spent in one such loop, and this accounts for nearly all of
its poor coverage.
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4.5.3 Simulation Results and Sensitivity to Processor Architecture
To gain more confidence that EDDIE is a broadly applicable approach, and to get more
insight into which aspects of the system’s architecture have an effect on EDDIE’s accuracy,
we apply EDDIE to the power consumption signal generated by the SESC simulator with
integrated CACTI [93] and WATTCH [94] power models for its cache and configurable
pipeline. We first model a 1.8 GHz 4-issue out-of-order core with 32KB L1 and 64MB
L2 caches, the power signal provided to EDDIE is sampled every 20 cycles, and EDDIE’s
STFT uses 0.1ms windows with 50% overlap. The code injection in these simulations
is implemented by directly injecting dynamic instructions into the simulated instruction
stream without changing the application’s code or using any architectural registers. This
maximizes the injection’s stealth and is an idealized representative of an attack that uses
only registers that are dead at the injection point in the original application.
Table 4.2: EDDIE’s latency and accuracy when using a simulator-generated power signal
Benchmark Average False Accuracy Coverage
Latency Rejection
Bitcount 7ms 0.8% 99.9% 99.9%
Basicmath 8ms 0.2% 99.9% 100%
Susan 5ms 0.7% 91.4% 96.6%
Dijkstra 10ms 0.3% 97.02% 99.9%
Patricia 13ms 0.4% 94.14% 98%
GSM 6ms 0% 100% 68.3%
FFT 5ms 0.4% 97.8% 99.1%
Sha 0.4ms 1.83% 100% 100%
Rijndael 0.6ms 0.24% 97.1% 97.2%
Stringsearch 0.2ms 0% 100% 100%
EDDIE’s results for these simulation-based experiments are shown in Table 4.2. False
rejections occur on average in 0.7% STSs, an expected improvement over real-system ex-
periments because the simulation has no signal noise, no interrupts or other system activity,
etc. By comparing results from simulation and real-system experiments, we can also con-






















Figure 4.4: Detection latency of 15 different regions in in-order and out-of-order architec-
ture.
itself (i.e., mostly the shape of the spectrum for the code regions) than by factors such as
noise, interference, etc.
Intuitively, we expect EDDIE to perform better on systems whose architecture intro-
duces less variation in executions of the same region of code. To get more insight into
which architectural parameters have a significant impact on EDDIE’s detection perfor-
mance, we configure the simulator to model an in-order processor with 3 different issue
widths (1,2, and 4) and 2 different pipeline depths, and an out-of-order processor with 3
issue widths (1,2,4), 3 pipeline depths, and 5 ROB sizes, for a total of 51 configurations.
We then simulate execution of 3 benchmarks (Basicmath, Bitcounts, and Susan) on each
configuration and use N-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine which factors
have a significant impact on EDDIE’s results.
We found that for out-of-order and in-order architectures EDDIE achieves similar false
rejection and accuracy results, but its latency (i.e., number of STSs that need to be consid-
ered in the K-S test) is significantly higher for out-of-order architectures (see Figure 4.4)
because an out-of-order core tends to produce more variation in its dynamically constructed
instruction schedule, creating more variation among STSs and thus requiring more STSs to
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capture their distribution.
We also found that in in-order architectures pipeline depth and issue width have no
statistically significant effect on EDDIE’s results, and that in out-of-order architectures the
ROB size and issue width also have no statistically significant impact on EDDIE’s results.
However, in out-of-order processors pipeline depth has a weak but statistically significant
impact on detection latency. A closer look at the data reveals that in 27% of the code
regions pipeline length increases detection delay, and that these affected regions are all
loops with control-flow variation among iterations, so the likely explanation for increased
detection delay in EDDIE is that a deeper pipeline results in more timing variation due to
branch mis-predictions, that in turn increases the size of the STS group that representatively
captures this variation (and the n for the K-S test).
Finally, we repeated this analysis for different amounts of injected execution, and found
that the impact of pipeline depth in out-of-order processors on EDDIE’s results diminishes
as the injection size increases, and for large-enough injections the pipeline depth no longer
has a statistically significant impact of EDDIE’s detection latency. This means that large
amounts of injected activity can be detected quickly even when the processor’s pipeline is
deep, but for smaller injections longer pipelines result in longer detection latency.
4.5.4 Effect of the Execution Rate of Injected Code
An intuitive way to improve stealth is to further diffuse injected execution by injecting
the code inside a loop body such that only some loop iterations execute (a small amount
of) the injected code. To evaluate EDDIE in this context, we use our simulator-based
setup and for the targeted loop region randomly choose the iterations that will be injected
with 8 memory instructions and 8 integer operations. We use contamination rate to refer
to the percentage of iterations that contain injected execution, and we repeat this set of
experiments for contamination rates between 100% (where every iteration is injected) and
10% (where 90% of the iterations are injection-free).
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Figure 4.5: False negative rate of variable injection rates.
Figure 4.5 shows the false negatives, i.e., the percentage of injection-containing STSs
that are not reported by EDDIE, for different contamination rates. As expected, EDDIE’s
ability to detect the injection does diminish with the injection’s contamination rate, but for
most applications EDDIE still retains significant ability to detect injections even at low
contamination rates. For example, for Bitcount, EDDIE still detects >90% of injection-
containing STSs even when only 10% of loop iterations actually contain injected execu-
tion. However, in GSM, EDDIE detects only 5% of the STS at the 10% contamination
rate. Note that this does not mean that EDDIE is inherently unable to detect injections
that have low contamination rates. Indeed, Figure 4.6 shows the results in terms of detec-
tion latency (which is increased by increasing n in EDDIE’s K-S test) that is needed to
maintain EDDIE’s accuracy. This indicates that EDDIE can very accurately detect even
low-contamination-rate injections, but that detection of low-contamination-rate injections
will have a longer latency.
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Figure 4.6: Detection latency of variable injection rates.
4.5.5 Size of Injection
In this section, we analyze the impact of the number of injected instructions on EDDIE’s
detection accuracy. Our analysis considers injection inside and outside of loops separately.
This is because even a few instructions injected inside a loop can accomplish significant
work for the attacker as the injected code is executed many times during the loop. Outside
loops, however, a successful attack usually requires injection of many instructions (recall
that even an empty-payload shellcode executes over 500,000 instructions).
Figure 4.7 shows how EDDIE’s accuracy changes with the number of static instruc-
tions injected inside a loop. The smallest injection in this experiment consists of only two
instructions: a store and an add. The remaining three injection sizes consists of 4, 6, and 8
instructions with the same instruction mix (equal number of stores and adds). To show how
these results are affected by the loop’s spectrum, Figure 4.7 shows the results for the same
three loops used in Figure 4.3, i.e., a loop whose spectrum contains only one sharp peak
and its harmonics, a loop with several less well defined peaks (and their harmonics), and a
loop with a very diffuse peak that can be more accurately described as a hump. The figure
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Figure 4.7: Accuracy when changing the number of injected instructions inside loops.
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Figure 4.8: Accuracy when changing the number of injected instructions outside loops.
shows that even two-instruction injections into the loop body can be detected by EDDIE
with extremely high accuracy, but that smaller injections have longer detection latency (i.e.,
use of a larger n in EDDIE’s K-S test).
Figure 4.8 shows the results for outside the loops. We use several different size of
injections. In order to inject the code, we use an empty loop and put it between loop 2 and
3 in Bitcount application and change the number of iterations of this empty loop. As this
number increased, number of injected instructions increased too.
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Figure 4.9: False positives in EDDIE for different K-S test confidence levels.
4.5.6 Effect of Changing the Confidence Level in the K-S Test
As mentioned earlier, we use KS-test to identify when the monitoring and the reference
STSs differ too much. One important parameter in statistical tests is the confidence level,
which introduces a fundamental trade-off between the test’s false rejections (detecting an
anomaly that does not really exist) and false acceptances (not detecting a real anomaly).
Figure 4.9 shows three confidence levels in terms of how the false positive rate changes
with detection latency. As we can see, the 99% confidence level (which we use in all our
experiments except this one) results in fewer false positives and it practically eliminates
the false positives with a reasonable latency. Lower confidence levels result in many false
positives at low latencies, and even at high latencies may not reduce false positives to
acceptable levels.
4.5.7 Effect of Changing Instruction
In order to show how different types of injected instructions can affect detection latency
and accuracy, we perform experiments in which we inject two different instructions in a
loop. In the first set, we inject eight add instructions, while in the second set we inject 4
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Figure 4.10: Effect of changing the type of injected instructions on latency and accuracy.
add instructions and 4 store instructions that randomly access a relatively large array so
they often experience a cache misses.
Figure 4.10 shows the results for these two sets of experiments. These results indicate
that instructions that result in off-chip activity tend to make the injection more visible
and thus easier to detect quickly, but that even purely on-chip injections can be detected,
albeit with an increased detection latency. In additional experiments we used other on-chip
instructions like MUL, DIV, etc. but the results were very similar to those of the ADD
instruction.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented EM-Based Detection of Deviations in Program Execution
(EDDIE), a new method for detecting anomalies in program execution, such as malware
and other code injection, without introducing any overheads, adding any hardware support,
changing any software, or using any resources on the monitored system itself. Monitoring
with EDDIE involves receiving electromagnetic (EM) emanations that are emitted as a side
effect of execution on the monitored system, and it relies on peaks in the EM spectrum that
are produced as a result of periodic (e.g., loop) activity in the monitored execution. During
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training, EDDIE characterizes normal execution behavior in terms of peaks in the EM spec-
trum that are observed at various points in the program execution, but it does not need any
characterization of the virus or other code that might later be injected. During monitoring,
EDDIE identifies peaks in the observed EM spectrum, and compares these peaks to those
learned during training. Since EDDIE requires no resources on the monitored machine
and no changes to the monitored software, it is especially well suited for security moni-
toring of embedded and IoT devices. We evaluated EDDIE on a real IoT system and in a
cycle-accurate simulator, and found that even relatively brief injected bursts of activity (a
few milliseconds) were detected by EDDIE with high accuracy, and that it also accurately




REMOTE: ROBUST EXTERNAL MALWARE DETECTION FRAMEWORK BY
USING ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNALS
5.1 Abstract
As shown in the previous chapter, our presented framework, EDDIE, proposed to externally
monitor IoT devices using electromagnetic emanations generated by the device. EDDIE ap-
pears to be very effective when trained on the same device it will monitor, under the same
environmental conditions (ambient temperature, EM noise, etc.), with laboratory equip-
ment, and with full availability of the source code for the software that will be monitored.
However, to make external EM-based monitoring practical, it must support training on soft-
ware binaries (no source code available for analysis), be robust to variations introduced by
device manufacturing and environmental conditions to allow monitoring of various device
instances and in environments different from those use for training, and be applicable to
various IoT systems that have different hardware and system software.
To tackle these problems, this chapter proposes, REMOTE, a new robust framework to
detect malware by externally observing electromagnetic (EM) signals emitted by Cyber-
Physical System (CPS) while running a known application, in real-time and with a low
detection latency, and without any a priori knowledge of the malware.
To demonstrate the usability of REMOTE in real-world scenarios, we port two real-
world programs (an embedded medical device and an industrial PID controller), each with
a meaningful attack (a code-reuse and a code-injection attack), to four different hardware
platforms. We also port shellcode-based DDoS and Ransomware attacks to five different
standard applications on an embedded system. To further demonstrate the applicability of
REMOTE to commercial CPS, we use REMOTE to monitor a Robotic Arm. Our results on
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all these different hardware platforms show that, for all attacks on each of the platforms,
REMOTE successfully detects each instance of an attack and has < 0.1% false positives.
We also systematically evaluate the robustness of REMOTE to interrupts and other system
activity, to signal variation among different physical instances of the same device design, to
changes over time, and to plastic enclosures and nearby electronic devices. This evaluation
includes hundreds of measurements and shows that REMOTE achieves excellent accuracy
(< 0.1% false positive and >99.9% true positive rates) under all these conditions. We
also compare REMOTE to our prior work presented in the previous chapter, EDDIE, and
demonstrate that this prior work is unable to achieve high accuracy under these variations
and that is why REMOTE is designed.
The practical issues for monitoring of CPSs include:
• Source Code and Infrastructure Availability: application’s source code, measure-
ment, and/or instrumentation infrastructure might be unavailable,
• Hardware and Software Variability: the hardware might be based on different proces-
sor architectures and/or the device may use different operating systems or even not have
one (bare-metal),
• Physical Limitations: enclosures may prevent direct access to the device, e.g., to place
a power or EM probe very close to its processor and/or even system board,
• Environmental Noise: when using analog signals for monitoring, the environment may
change the emanated signal and/or add interference to the received signal.
To develop REMOTE, we first understand how these issues may affect the EM signal,
by carefully designing a signal measurement campaign on different systems, at different
distances, under different environmental conditions. We then analyze these signals to un-
derstand in what ways they change and what they have in common. Using insights from
this analysis, we design REMOTE to be robust to signal-related issues and to only rely on
signal analysis (not the source code, instrumentation, etc.) for its training.
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To emphasize practical applicability, our evaluation uses several real-world cyber-physical-
systems: a medical embedded device called Syringe-pump, a controller for the temperature
of a soldering iron, an IoT device while executing a set applications from a standard em-
bedded benchmark suite, and finally, a commercial industrial robotic arm. We implement
these applications on a variety of well-known CPS/embedded devices including an Arduino
UNO board, Altera’s FPGA Nios II soft-core, and two Linux mini-computers: OlimexA13
and TS-7250. For monitoring these applications, we also implement several meaningful
attacks. For SyringePump, we implement a Code Reuse Attack by exploiting a buffer-
overflow vulnerability that already existed in its open-source code. For the PID controller,
we implement a Stuxnet-like Advanced-Persistent Attack where we assume the adver-
sary has the ability to inject malicious instructions into the source code itself and modify
the firmware of the system. Furthermore, we implement a Shellcode Injection Attack
(i.e., gain shell access by overflowing a vulnerable buffer) on several applications from a
standard embedded benchmark suite, MiBench [87], which represents usual activities of
embedded /Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems in market. After hijacking the control-flow
and invoking the shell, either a DDoS payload of the IoT botnet Mirai or encryption activ-
ity of a Ransomware payload is launched by the shell. We picked these two malwares since
DDoS and Ransomware have become widespread threat and popular malware in recent
years. We then show how REMOTE can find all the instances of these attacks with excellent
accuracy. Lastly, for the Robotic-arm system, we use a commercial device (LewanSoul
LeArm 6DOF [99]) and implement a Firmware-modification/Zero-day attack where we
assumed that the libraries are compromised.
Specifically, the contributions of this work are:
• Black-box training model and a new distance metric: unlike existing approaches, our
method can be trained and monitors the execution without requiring any access to the
source code. Moreover, we propose a new distance metric that is robust against several
kinds of variability.
53
• Robustness: our method is designed to be robust against a variety of hardware (e.g.,
ISA), software (e.g., OS), and environmental (e.g., temperature) variability. We will
compare REMOTE to prior work, and show REMOTE can achieve much higher accuracy.
• Real attacks and security analysis: we present a variety of real attacks including a a
code-reuse attack, an APT, a zero-day, and a shellcode injection attack.
We envision that REMOTE can be used in scenarios where the security of the CPS is
critical, e.g., devices that control critical infrastructures, military systems, hospital equip-
ment, etc. In these scenarios, the cost for deploying REMOTE is very low compared to
the cost of the system it monitors, and the complexity of deploying REMOTE is relatively
low because it requires no changes to the monitored device and thus creates no regulatory,
safety, or disruption concerns for the system. For example, REMOTE is very suitable for
scenarios like an industrial robotic arm or a CPS in a power-plant. An additional advantage
of REMOTE over malware detectors that are implemented as part of the monitored system
is that the REMOTE monitor is an entirely separate system, so it cannot be subverted by the
same attack that succeeds in completely taking over the monitored system.
5.2 Design Overview
5.2.1 Spectral Samples (SS)
At a high level, REMOTE has two phases: training and monitoring. In both phases, the
EM signal is first transformed into a sequence of spectral samples (SS) by using short-time
Fourier transform (STFT), which divides the signal into equal-sized segments (windows),
where consecutive segments overlap to some degree. STFT then applies the Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) to each window to obtain its spectrum. In our measurements, we use
a 1ms window size1 with 75% overlap between consecutive windows, which provides a
balance between the computation complexity and frequency/time resolution. The rest of
1the window size should be determined based on sampling rate, clock frequency, and the required time
resolution.
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the training and monitoring operates on this sequence of spectra, where each spectrum
(i.e., the spectrum of one window) is referred to as a Spectral Sample (SS).
5.2.2 Distance Metric for Comparing SSs
In both training and monitoring, REMOTE will need to compare SSs to each other, and for
that, it requires a distance metric – a way to measure the “distance” between SSs in a way
that corresponds how likely/unlikely they are to have been produced by execution of the
same code. This distance metric should be sensitive to the aspects of the signal that change
when executing different code, but insensitive to aspects of the signal that change between
physical instances of the same device or over time on the same device instance. To achieve
this, we create a new distance metric, Clock-Adjusted Energy and Peaks (CAPE).
Based on the insights from our prior work, the frequencies of the peaks in the signal
around the clock frequency are an excellent foundation for constructing a distance met-
ric that is sensitive to which region of code is executing. Unfortunately, our experiments
have shown that the clock frequency can vary over time and among device instances, and
a change in clock frequency also changes the frequencies of loop-related peaks around
it. One difference is that, because the peaks’ frequencies are all relative to the carrier
frequency, any shift in the clock frequency also shifts the frequencies of the loop-related
peaks by the same amount. The second change is caused by the relationship between
clock frequency and program performance. Specifically, as the clock frequency increases,
the program executes faster, leading to a lower per-iteration time T, higher frequency of
the loop (fl = 1/T ), and thus moving the loop-related peaks away from the clock’s fre-
quency. Similarly, lower clock frequency moves the loop-related peaks closer to the clock
frequency.
Thus the first step in computing our CAPE distance metric is to, for each frequency f
that is of interest in an SS, compute the corresponding normalized frequency as fnorm =
f−fclk
fclk
, where fclk is the clock frequency for that SS. This normalized frequency is expressed
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as an offset from the clock frequency so that a shift in clock frequency does not change
fnorm with it and is normalized to the clock, so it accounts for the clock frequency’s first-
order effect on execution time.
To make CAPE robust to weak signals and/or signals that have no well-defined peaks,
we first consider the overall signal power (sum of magnitudes in the spectrum) of the signal
outside the vicinity of the clock. The power of a poorly-defined peak is spread across a
range of frequencies – visually it is a wide and not-very-tall “hump” rather than a narrow
and tall “peak”. When comparing two SSs that are different but each contain only “humps”,
if we only consider whether the SSs have power concentrations at the same (clock-adjusted)
frequencies, the overlap among their “humps” causes these SSs to match much better than
they otherwise should, and this can prevent detection of malware-induced changes in sig-
nals. Moreover, under poor signal-to-noise conditions (e.g., when the signal is received at
a distance) sharp peaks are likely to still stand out of the noise, so due to random variation
in noise, some “humps” end up below the noise level and some do not. For two SSs that
should be the same (except for the noise), this causes poor matches, and this can lead to
false positives. Thus to make our CAPE distance metric more robust against weak/noisy
signals, we use a new insight, called “non-clock-energy” test, that non-clock energy varies
very little among SSs that do belong to the same region, and that increases/decreases in a
loop’s overall per-iteration time concentrate less/more power toward the clock frequency in
an SS. Therefore, SSs whose non-clock power differs by more than 0.5 dB are considered
dissimilar by CAPE, and no further comparison between them is needed.
If the two SSs pass the “non-clock-energy” test, REMOTE compares them according
to the (clock-adjusted) frequencies of their most prominent peaks. Specifically, we take
N highest-magnitude frequency bins from the spectral sample (SS) that are each (i) not
part of the NoiseList, and (ii) not within D spectral bins of a higher-amplitude spectral bin.
The number N is determined differently for training and monitoring, as will be described
shortly. The NoiseList contains frequencies of signals that are present regardless of which
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specific region of the application is executing. For finding the NoiseList, we record the EM
signal several times and average them while no program is being executed (the system is
idle). We then choose 10 random SSs in the recorded signal, and then for each SS, sort
it and find all the spikes that are at least 5dB above the noise floor and put them in the
NoiseList. We empirically find that choosing 10 points is sufficient to find all the strong
peaks since it can accurately capture the transient behavior of the environmental noise.
It is also important to point that, using this method, our detection algorithm is robust to
interference from nearby devices (that are not identical to the monitored device), as their
clock and other frequently-occurring peaks will end up on the NoiseList. The reason for
ignoring D spectral bins that are too close to even-higher-magnitude ones is that a very
prominent peak in the spectrum typically has “slopes” whose magnitude can exceed the
magnitude of other peaks, and we found that REMOTE is more robust when its decisions
are based on separate peaks rather than just a few (possibly even one) very strong peaks
and a number of frequency bins that belong to their “slopes”.
Finally, REMOTE combines the information about the peaks’ frequencies of two SSs
into a single value that represents the distance among the SSs. For each peak in one SS,
REMOTE finds the closest-frequency peak the other. If the frequency difference is large
enough, the peak votes for a mismatch, and the ratio of the mismatch votes to the number
of all (mismatch and match) votes is used as the distance metric between the two SSs.
5.2.3 Black-Box Training
To train REMOTE, signals are collected as the unmodified monitored device emanates them.
However, care should be taken to achieve good coverage of the software behaviors, e.g., by
using the same methods that are used to test program correctness. The problem of achieving
good coverage tends to be easier for many applications in the CPS domain, especially those
where correct operation is critical, because correctness concerns and the need for easy
verification of correct operation motivates developers to produce code that has relatively
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few code regions, and with very stable patterns for how the execution transitions between
them. In such cases, normal use of the device is likely to provide good coverage of the
application’s code regions after a while.
After signals are obtained and converted into SSs, a key part of training is to associate
SSs with the code regions they correspond to. To achieve this without using instrumentation
or other on-the-monitored-device infrastructure, REMOTE relies on a general observation
that a given region of code tends to produce EM signals whose SSs are similar to each other,
while the SSs from different regions tend to differ from each other to various degrees. This
observation allows us to group SSs according to similarity, and for that we use Hierarchical
Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (HDBSCAN), a technique
that performs clustering without any a priory knowledge about which cluster (region) each
sample (SS) corresponds to, and with no a priori knowledge about the number of clusters
(regions). Like other clustering algorithms, HDBCASN needs a distance metric, and in
REMOTE that distance metric is the new CAPE metric defined in Section 5.2.2, using N =
10 peaks. Using this variation-robust metric allows training signals to be collected over
time (e.g., over many hours), and/or on multiple device instances.
Because HDBSCAN clustering is based solely on similarity among SSs, its result may
not precisely correspond to actual regions of the code, e.g., one region may produce more
than one cluster if there are several distinct ways in which the region can execute, or two
regions may end up in the same cluster if their execution produces very similar signals.
Neither of these possibilities is a problem for REMOTE, and in fact, they result in improved
sensitivity and performance. If separate clusters for distinct behaviors were forced into a
single cluster, the resulting unified cluster would allow a wide variety of SSs to match - all
the valid SS options and also everything that lays in-between in the distance-space used for
clustering. By creating a separate cluster for each distinct possibility, REMOTE will detect
anomalies that produce SSs that are not valid but lay in-between the valid ones. Conversely,
when multiple regions are clustered together, they have very similar (practically indistin-
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guishable) signals and it is more efficient and robust to treat them as one cluster. During
monitoring, a Finite-State Machine (FSM) is used to keep track of the current region of the
code. For each test, REMOTE compares the new SS to either the current region or any valid
“next region” that has been seen during training.
5.2.4 Monitoring
During monitoring, REMOTE receives the signal and converts it to SSs in the same way it
was done in training (same window size and overlap). After that, REMOTE can be viewed
as a classifier that places each spectral sample (SS) into either one of the known categories
(clusters identified during training) or into the “unknown” category that represents anoma-
lous behavior, according to our CAPE distance metric (Figure 5.1 shows the flow-chart of
REMOTE’s monitoring algorithm). Specifically, a candidate region is rejected if its distance
metric is above 50% (fewer than half of the peaks match). If all candidates are rejected, the
observed SS is categorized as “unknown,” otherwise it is categorized into the candidate cat-
egory with the lowest CAPE distance metric. The number of peaks used for each cluster is
no longer fixed at 10 – instead, it is identified for each cluster during training. We start with
ten peaks, but then remove those that occur in fewer than 10% of the SS in the cluster. If
this results in removing all peaks, we still retain the two most frequently occurring (among
SSs from that cluster) peaks. This helps matching accuracy when the SSs in a cluster have
few prominent peaks and a number of very weak peaks – in such cases it is more robust to
use only the overall non-clock energy and the prominent peaks for matching than to use the
peaks that may “disappear into the noise” due to changes in distance, antenna position, etc.
However, if the overall decision to report malware is based on only one SS, brief oc-
currences of strong transient noise can result in false positives. To avoid that, REMOTE
only reports an anomaly if N consecutive SSs are classified as “unknown.” The value of
N should be chosen depending on the noise characteristics of the environment, but we















Figure 5.1: REMOTE’s monitoring flow-chart.
because it biases REMOTE toward avoiding false positives, while still maintaining an ex-
cellent detection latency (N=5 corresponds to only 1.25 ms detection latency in our setup).
As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, an FSM is used to count N .
Finally, we found that in the presence of an OS, interrupts and other system activity that
occurs during an SS can make that SS dissimilar to those from training. For example, an
interrupt that lasts < 1ms can affect four consecutive SSs (recall that we use 1ms windows
with 75% overlap), so a naive solution would be to add 4 to N (number of consecutive
“unknown” SSs that are needed to trigger anomaly reporting). Using N = 9 indeed elimi-
nates interrupt-induced false positives, but also prevents detection of attacks that are brief.
Unfortunately, real-world malware (e.g., the attack on Syringe-pump that will be described
in Section 5.3) can introduce only a short burst of activity into the otherwise-normal activ-
ity of the application. Fortunately, our experiments indicate that spectral features of inter-
rupt activity are similar to each other, so during training interrupt activity can be isolated,
and a separate set of clusters formed for various interrupts. During monitoring, REMOTE
includes these clusters as candidates, allowing it to tolerate interrupts without becoming




In this section, we evaluate our framework using three set of experiments to show the
effectiveness of REMOTE to detect different types of attack on variety of devices.
In the first set of experiments, we use two real-world CPS. The first CPS we use is
an embedded medical device called Syringe-pump which is a representative of a medical
cyber-physical system. The second system is a PID controller that is used for controlling
the temperature of a soldering Iron. This type of system could also be used to control
the temperature in other settings, such as a building or an industrial process, and thus is
representative of a large class of industrial CPS/IoT systems.
For the second set of experiments, we use five applications from an embedded bench-
mark suite, MiBench [87], running on an IoT/embedded device, which are a representative
of the computation that is needed in that market (e.g., automotive, industrial systems, etc.).
Finally, for the third part, we chose a robotic arm (LewanSoul LeArm 6DOF) [99],
which is a representative of commonly-used CPS, currently existing in the market.
5.3.2 Measurement Setup
The measurement setup is shown in Figure 5.2. Depending on the distance, either a hand-
made magnetic coil or a horn antenna is used to receive EM signals (no amplifier is used).
For all measurements, we use a cheap (<$30) software-defined radio (SDR) receiver (RTL-
SDRv3) to record the signal. Using this radio, the entire cost for the near-field measurement
setup (including the radio and a hand-made coil) is only around $35, and for the far-field
measurement setup is around $100-200 (depending on the antenna). Further cost advan-
tages can be gained if REMOTE is used in settings where multiple similar devices (with
similar vulnerabilities) are used, so a single (or a few) devices can be monitored by RE-
MOTE (especially in far-field scenario), with random changes to which specific devices are
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Figure 5.2: The near-field setup (left) consists of a small EM probe (PBS-E) [89], or a
hand-made magnetic probe (not shown) placed 5 cm above the system’s processor. A horn
antenna placed 1 m away from the board for far-field measurements (right). In all cases, a
software-defined radio (RTL-SDR [100]), priced around $30 and smaller and lighter than
most portable USB hard drives, is used to record the signal.
monitored at any given time.
Note that all of our measurements were collected in the presence of other sources of
the electromagnetic interface (EMI) including an active LCD that was intentionally placed
about 15 cm behind the board. A set of TCL scripts are used to control the monitored
system and the SDR (to record the signal). The entire REMOTE algorithm is implemented
on a PC using Matlab2017-b.
5.3.3 File-less Attacks on Cyber-Physical-Systems
The part presents the results for two real-world CPS which are implemented on four dif-
ferent devices (shown in Table 5.1). To attack these devices we implement two end-to-end
file-less attacks namely a code-reuse attack and an APT attack (advanced-persistent-threat).
Table 5.1: Boards used in this paper to evaluate REMOTE.
Device Processor Clock-rate OS
Arduino Uno ATMEGA-328p 16MHz No
DE0-CV 
Altera FPGA 
TS-7250 ARM9 200MHz Debian
A13-OLinuXino ARM Cortex A8 1GHz Debian
Nios-II softcore 50MHz No
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The first attack implemented is a Code Reuse (CR) [101, 102] attack on a medical
CPS called Syringe-pump. Syringe-pump is a medical device designed to dispense or
withdraw a precise amount of fluid, e.g., in hospitals for applying medication at frequent
interval [103].
The device typically consists of a syringe filled with medicine, an actuator (e.g., stepper
motor), and a control unit that takes commands (e.g., amount of fluid to dispense/withdraw)
and produces controls for the stepper motor. The systems must provide a high degree of
reliability and assurance (typically by using a simple MAC) since imprecise or unwanted
dispensing of medication, or failure to administer medication when needed can cause sig-
nificant damage to the patient’s health. In our evaluation, we use the Open Source Syringe
Pump from [104] which also implemented in [105]2.
Our code-reuse attack involves overflowing the input buffer in reading the serial input
function, which normally reads the input, sets a flag to indicate that new input is available,
and returns. Exploiting this vulnerability, the return address in the stack is overwritten by
a chain of gadget’s addresses to launch an attack.
Since the security-critical part of this system is moving the syringe, Attacker’s goal is
being able to call the MoveSyringe() function, which is responsible for syringe movement,
at an unwanted time while skipping the input checking part, Delay() function, which is
responsible to check the authenticity of the command (otherwise the attacker needs to hack
into the C&C server to send the commands which may not be a feasible task).
We use ROPGadget [106] for finding the proper chain of gadgets to put the address of
MoveSyringe() in a register and branching to that function (from the readInput() function
to skip the checking part).3. After branching to MoveSyringe() and executing it, PC jumps
back to the main function and resumes normal behavior of the application.
Figure 5.3 shows a spectrogram of the Syringe-pump application in (top) malware-
free run, and (bottom) when the CR attack happens. As seen in the figure, the Syringe-
2Note that the attack implemented in this paper is completely different that the one implemented in [105].
3For Nios-II we had to slightly change the ROPGadget to support the Nios-II ISA
63
Offset to Clock Frequency (KHz)






















Offset to Clock Frequency (KHz)


















Normal "moveSyringe ()" activity
Malicious activity caused by CR
attack that
calls an extra "moveSyringe ()"
Figure 5.3: Spectrogram of the Syringe pump application in malware-free (top) and
malware-afflicted (bottom) runs. Note that the differences in colors between the two spec-
trograms correspond to differences in signal magnitude which are caused by different po-
sitioning of the antenna. Such variation is common in practice and has almost no effect on
REMOTE’s functionality because REMOTE was designed to be robust to such variation.
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pump application has three distinct regions with clearly different EM signatures: print-
ing debug info and reading inputs, a delay/checker function which checks the message
authenticity (using a simple MAC), and an actual movement of the syringe. The ma-
jor difference between these two figures is the reverse order of “Delay” and MoveSy-
ringe() parts in malicious run (bottom). In normal behavior, REMOTE expects to see
readInput → Delay → MoveSyirnge however, in CR attack, since the return address
of the readInput function is overwritten by the adversary, the code immediately jumps
to MoveSyringe() and skips the “Delay” part, thus in the spectrogram, the third region
(MoveSyringe()) is seen before “Delay” (bottom), which violates the correct ordering of
regions and will be reported as “malicious” by REMOTE.
Our evaluation uses one attack per run in 25 runs, with REMOTE successfully detecting
each of these attacks (see Table 5.2). We then performed 25 attack-free runs and found that
REMOTE produced no false positives (see Table 5.2). To further evaluate our system and
find more accurate results, we performed 1000 malware-free runs and 1000 malicious run
on one device (Arduino)4 for 24 hours. For these 2000 runs, REMOTE successfully found
all the 1000 instances of malicious run and reported 997 out of 1000 malware-free runs as
normal (i.e., only 3 out of 1000 false positive = 0.3%).
Note that, depending on the size of injection, the MoveSyringe() in Syringe-pump could
be very brief in time (e.g., around 3 ms as can be seen in Figure 5.3-left), and we found
that without correctly handling the interrupts on Olimex and TS platforms (which have an
operating system), we would either get very high false positives (due to interrupts), or high
false negatives (by using large N to ignore short-term activity). However, as also discussed
in subsection 5.2.4, by adding training-time samples for interrupts, we can use small N,
while having 0% false positives.
Furthermore, we also repeated our measurement for Syringe-pump for both 50 cm and
1 m distances (using a 9 dBi horn antenna [107] connected to the SDR) and in both cases,
4To limit the amount of measurements and time for processing it, we picked only one of the four devices.
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we also get perfect accuracy. It is also important to mention that the detection latency (i.e.,
the time attack starts until REMOTE detects it), for all four devices is <2 ms.
An alternative method for attacking Syringe-pump is by changing the InjectionSize (i.e.,
Data-only attacks). This also can be done using a CR attack. REMOTE is able to protect
Syringe-pump against such attack since changing the InjectionSize will change the duration
(i.e., the number of SSs) of MoveSyringe(). Since REMOTE is checking the signal in the
granularity of SS, it can count the SSs which belong to MoveSyringe() activity and compare
it to the expected number of SSs. To check how well REMOTE can detect such an attack,
we check the number of SSs for MoveSyringe() for all the 25 attack-free runs and compare
it to the actual InjectionSize. In all the instances, REMOTE reports the correct number of
SSs. Note that we are not detecting EM emanations (RF) signal produced by the motor
movement but the change in the code execution when “data-only” attack is performed. i.e.,
we observe the signal at clock frequency of the board and observe software changes, while
motor movement signature occurs at much lower frequencies.
However, if the change is less than one SS or if the expected InjectionSize is unknown,
REMOTE is not able to detect the change. Overall, there is a tradeoff between the size of
SS and REMOTE’s ability to detect small changes. Thus to improve the effectiveness of
the system, either a higher sampling-rate setup can be used (smaller SS hence smaller de-
tection granularity) or REMOTE can be combined with other existing methods (e.g., Data
Confidentiality and Integrity (DCI) methods [108]) to protect the system against different
types of data-only attacks. Finally, it is important to mention that However, as shown in
this work (for this attack and other attacks in this section), meaningful attacks typically
have much larger signature (i.e., order of milliseconds) than the current detection limit in
REMOTE (200 microseconds).
The second attack is an advanced-persistent-threat (APT) attack on an industrial CPS
(called Soldering-iron). A well-known example of such attack for CPS is Stuxnet. Soldering-
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Table 5.2: Accuracy of REMOTE for several different systems and attack scenarios using
various boards and applications.
Board 
True Pos. False Pos. True Pos. False Pos. True Pos. False Pos. True Pos. False Pos.
>99.9% <0.3% >99.9% <0.1% >99.9% <0.1% >99.9% <0.1%Accuracy
Arduino Nios-II TS-board OLinuXino
Device 
(attack) Syringe-pump (code-reuse attack)
Board
True Pos. False Pos. True Pos. False Pos. True Pos. False Pos. True Pos. False Pos.
>99.9% <0.1% >99.9% <0.1% >99.9% <0.1% >99.9% <0.1%Accuracy
Arduino Nios-II TS-board OLinuXino
Soldering-iron (APT attack)Device (attack)
App
True Pos. False Pos. True Pos. False Pos. True Pos. False Pos. True Pos. False Pos. True Pos. False Pos.















iron is an industrial CPS that allows users to specify a desired temperature for the iron and
maintains it at that temperature using a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller.
This type of controller could also be used to control the temperature in other settings, such
as a building or an industrial process, and thus is representative of a large class of industrial
CPS. This application is significantly larger than the Syringe-pump - with 70,000 instruc-
tions in its code and 1,020 static control-flow edges [104].
The application starts by initializing all the components. It then begins to control the
Iron’s temperature: it checks all the inputs (e.g., knob, push buttons, etc.) and then based
on them decides to decrease or increase the temperature, prints new debug information on
its display, etc. and then repeats this ad infinitum. The security-critical function is where
the temperature of the iron is set keepTemp(). This function uses an iterative process (a PID
controller) to change or keep the temperature of the iron. The critical variable is temp hist –
it holds the last two temperatures of the iron and is used to calculate the difference between
the current temperature of the iron and these two last temperatures.
1 / / The main loop
2 vo id loop ( ) {
3 i n t 1 6 t o l d p o s = r e a d (& r o t E n c o d e r ) ; / / f i n d i n g t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e
c o n t r o l knob
4 boo l i r o n o n = isOn (& i r o n ) ; / / i r o n i s t h e o b j e c t f o r t h e s o l d e r i n g
i r o n
5 / / ad d i ng m a l i c i o u s a c t i v i t y
6 i f ( s o m e c o n d i t i o n ) {
7 i r o n . t e m p h i s t [ 0 ] = m a l i c i o u s V a l 0 ;
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8 i r o n . t e m p h i s t [ 1 ] = m a l i c i o u s V a l 1 ;
9 / / where t h e s e v a l u e s can be r e a d from a f i l e , memory or t h e y c o u l d
be random
10 } / / end of m a l i c i o u s a c t i v i t y
11 b y t e b S t a t u s = i n t B u t t o n S t a t u s (& r o t B u t t o n ) ; / / r e a d i n g i n p u t b u t t o n
12 showScreen ( p C u r r e n t S c r e e n ) ;
13 keepTemp(& i r o n ) ; }
Example 5.1: A code fragment from the main loop of the soldering iron application and a
possible injected malicious activity.
To implement a Stuxnet-like malware on this application, we assume that the attacker
can reprogram the device. The attacker’s goal is to change a critical value under some con-
ditions, which in turn can cause damage to the overall system. A possible modification to
the code is shown in Example 5.1 (lines 8-10), where based on one or several conditions
(e.g., in our evaluation it checks the model of the device that is stored in memory), the tem-
perature history can be changed. The key insight is that the added instructions will cause
the spectral spikes during execution of the main loop to be shifted to lower frequencies
(more time per iteration) as shown in Figure 5.4 for the A13-OLinuXino device.
To evaluate how well REMOTE can detect this type of attack, we use 7 runs for training
and then use 25 runs without malware and 25 runs with malware to evaluate monitoring.
Our results show REMOTE can successfully detect all the instances of the attack (a 100%
true positive rate) (see Table 5.2).
5.3.4 Shellcode Attack on IoTs
Another popular class of attacks on CPS/IoTs are shellcode attacks where the adversary
executes a malicious application (payload) through exploiting a software vulnerability. It is
called “shellcode” because it typically starts a command shell (e.g., by executing (/bin/sh)
binary) from which the attacker can control the compromised machine, but any piece of
code that performs a similar task can be called shellcode. Once the attacker takes the
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Figure 5.4: Adding malicious activity to the main loop of the Soldering-iron application
(red: without malware, blue: with malware).
control, she can execute any injected code such as a Denial-of-Service attack.
In this paper, we implement this attack by invoking a shell (/bin/sh) via a buffer overflow
exploit. We then run two malicious payloads on the invoked shell: a DDoS bot, and a
Ransomwmare. These attacks typically target devices with operating systems. In this work,
we implement them on an IoT device with an ARM core (A13-OLinuXino), which is a
representative of state-of-the-art IoTs.
The attacks are implemented on five representative programs from MiBench suite (bit-
count, basicmath, qsort, susan, and fft). We chose these applications among all the MiBench
applications (this benchmark is designed to represent typical behaviors of embedded sys-
tem: e.g., Security, Telecomm., Network, etc.) mainly because bitcount is a good repre-
sentative of the applications that have several different distinct regions (our HDBSCAN
clustering found 9 for this application) and has lots of different activities including nested-
loops, recursive functions, interacting with memory, etc. basicmath is chosen because it
is a good representative of unstable/weak activities since the activities in each region are
very dependent on values (it is calculating different fundamental mathematics operations

























Figure 5.5: A run (top) where exploit, shellcode, and a 100-packet payload are injected into
the execution between the original loops. A run (bottom) where exploit, shellcode, and a
Ransomware payload are injected into the execution between the original loops.
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accesses, and picked susan and fft since they are good representatives of common and pop-
ular activities in embedded system domain (i.e., image processing and telecomm.). In all
these application, first a buffer-overflow vulnerability is exploited, and using a shellcode, a
shell with same privileges as the original application is invoked. A malicious payload (i.e.,
DDoS or Ransomware) is then executed in this shell.
For the DDoS, we port the C&C and the bots from the Mirai open source to run on
our IoT. The DDoS payload execution begins right after the shell is invoked and ends after
sending 100 SYN packets. The application then resumes its normal activity. We use a
PC on the local network as the target of the DDoS attack (SYN flood), and we verify on
that PC that the attack is taking place. As another payload, we also implement a simple
Ransomware prototype payload that uses AES-128 with CBC mode to encrypt data. This
encryption represents the bulk of the execution activity created by Ransomware.
As in previous cases, we use 7 runs for training and then use 25 runs without malware
and 25 runs with each malware (i.e., DDos and Ransomware) for all five applications. Our
results (see Table 5.2) show REMOTE can successfully detect all the instances of the attack
(a >99.9% true positive rate) while none of the malware-free runs incorrectly identified as
malware (0% false positive rate).
We found that invoking a shell itself is visually detectable on our IoT device since it
takes around 8 ms (about 32 SSs), and sending 100 SYN packets adds about 4 ms to that
(see Fig. 5.5 (left) for DDoS and (right) for Ransomware).
5.3.5 APT Attack on Commercial CPS
The final system in our evaluation is a Robotic arm. It is often used for manufacturing and,
typically, a critical component of any modern factory. It usually receives inputs/commands
for a user and/or sensors and move objects based on these inputs. There is a growing
concern in security of these CPSs since they are typically connected to the network and are
exposed to cyber-threats [109]. In this work, we use a commercial robotic arm (LewanSoul
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LeArm 6DOF [99]) which uses an Arduino board as a controller and a Bluetooth module to
receive command. For this system, we implement an APT attack (firmware modification),
where we assume that the reference libraries (e.g., library for Servo) are compromised (this
can be also considered as a zero-day vulnerability). Note that, we assume that REMOTE
’s training contains the “unmodified” version of these library (baseline reference data). In
this attack, we modify a subroutine (writeMicroseconds()) in Arduino’s Servo library [110]
by adding an extra if/else condition to change the speed of Servo motor randomly
and reprogram the system with this compromised library, assuming that the adversary is
interested in causing a malfunction in arm’s movement in real-time occasionally.
We use 7 runs for training and then use 1000 runs without and 1000 runs with the
firmware modification. Our results (see Table 5.2) show REMOTE can successfully detect
the instances of the attack with very high accuracy(>98.2% true positive rate) while only
less than 0.2% of the malware-free runs incorrectly identified as malware.
5.4 Further Evaluation of Robustness
5.4.1 Interrupts and System Activity
Among the platforms we tested, the longest-duration system activity “inserted” (via an
interrupt) into the application activity tends to take a few milliseconds, and it appears to be
associated with display management/update because disabling lightdm [111], the display
manager, eliminates these interrupts (but other kinds of interrupts still occur). In contrast,
in bare-metal devices interrupts (when there are any) tend to be around a microsecond in
duration. Figure 5.6 shows the (perfect) ROC curve (solid blue line) for Syringe-pump
on Olimex (and Debian Linux OS) when using REMOTE as described in section 5.2. We
then prevented REMOTE from forming interrupt-activity clusters during training, and used
the EDDIE’s scheme, and that has resulted in a severely degraded ROC curve (red dashed
line) where many false positives are detected when 4 consecutive clusters are found to be
“unknown” (N = 4 is subsection 5.2.4), and where increasingN reduces the false positives
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Figure 5.6: Accuracy of REMOTE with its mechanism for addressing interrupt activity
(solid blue line) and EDDIE (red dashed line). The results are for the Syringe-pump soft-
ware running on the Olimex board.
but also the true positives. This confirms that our approach of addressing system activity
directly in REMOTE is significantly contributing to REMOTE’s ability to detect malware
while not reporting false positives due to system activity.
5.4.2 Hardware Platforms and Distance
Packaging and other limitations may require the EM signal to be received from some dis-
tance, which significantly weakens the signal. To evaluate the impact of distance on RE-
MOTE, we receive the signal from distances of 5 cm, 50 cm, and 1 m away from each of the
tested devices. To limit the amount of data that is recorded, we use only two representative
programs from MiBench suite (bitcount and basicmath, described in subsection 5.3.4), and
only two representative malware behaviors - one that adds a relatively small number of in-
structions inside a loop (Stuxnet-like), and another where similar malicious activity is done
all-at-once outside of loops (DDoS-like).



















Figure 5.7: True positive rate (with 0% false positives) of REMOTE with its non-clock-
power feature when comparing SSs (dark blue) and EDDIE/SYNDROME (light red). The
results are for basicmath running on the TS board.
each of the two malware activities (75 × 3 runs for each of the platforms) to obtain the
false negative (malware activity not reported in a malware-affected run) and false-positive
rates (malware reported in a malware-free run) achieved by REMOTE. Our results show
perfect accuracy (i.e., 0% false negatives and 0% false positives) for all devices and all
three distances. However, if we prevent REMOTE from using total non-clock power when
comparing SSs and use the scheme in EDDIE and/or Syndrome, on the TS board (which has
the weakest signal among the boards tested) for 50 cm and 1 m distances we only observe
80% (at 50 cm) and 55% (at 1 m) true positive rates once we adjust other parameters to
achieve 0% false positives (see Figure 5.7). This confirms that when signals are weak,
comparisons based on spectral peaks alone are insufficient and other signal features (such
as non-clock power used in REMOTE) must also be considered.
5.4.3 Manufacturing Variations
To study the effect of manufacturing variations on the EM signals and REMOTE accuracy,
i.e., to determine if training is needed for each type of device or for each physical instance
of a device, we use 30 physical instances of the Cyclone V DE0-CV Terrasic FPGA devel-
opment board (chosen primarily because we have 30 such boards), to train REMOTE on one
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Figure 5.8: Accuracy for REMOTE with frequency-adjusting, vs. EDDIE/SYNDROME for
FPGA board running bitcount.
board (randomly selected) and use that training to monitor each of the other 30 instances,
with 20 runs of bitcount on each instance, both with and without malware.
Our results show that REMOTE’s accuracy remains at 100% true positives and 0%
false positives throughout this experiment. However, when we prevent REMOTE from
frequency-adjusting the SSs used in comparisons, we still find no degradation for 17 of
the boards, but for 13 the false positive rate increases to nearly 100%. Further analysis
shows that the clock frequencies of the boards vary, with 17 of them (including the one
trained-on) were within the frequency-tolerance (parameter D in subsection 5.2.2) of the
matching, whereas the other 13 were outside the tolerance, causing none of their peaks to
vote for the cluster the signal actually should belong to. If D is then adjusted to avoid false
positives, the true positive rate is severely degraded. Figure 5.8 shows one such scenario
where we trained on board number 3, and test on board number 4. The figure shows the
ROC curve for board number 4 when frequency-adjusting is active and inactive. We also
repeated this experiment for 10 Olimex boards (we do not have 30 of those), with very
similar results with and without REMOTE’s frequency-adjustment. These results confirm
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Figure 5.9: Performance of REMOTE with its clock-frequency adjustment feature vs. ED-
DIE/SYNDROME.
the need for frequency-adjustment in REMOTE if training and monitoring do not use the
same physical instance of a device.
5.4.4 Variations Over Time
We record the signals at one-hour intervals, over a period of 24 hours, while keeping the
FPGA board and the receiver active throughout the experiment, to observe how the em-
anated signals vary over time as device temperature (and room temperature) and external
radio interference such as WiFi and cellular signals change during the day and due to the
day/night transition. The set of measurements collected each hour consists of 60 bitcount
runs, 20 without malware and 20 times with each of the two types of malware described
in subsection 5.4.2. The training data for all REMOTE analyses in this experiment was
recorded just after the device (FPGA board) and the receiver (SDR) were turned on.
We observed no deviation from REMOTE’s accuracy (100% true positives and 0% false
positives) throughout this experiment (solid blue line in Figure 5.9). We then prevent RE-
MOTE from clock-adjusting the frequencies and repeat the experiments (on the same signal
recordings), and find that the detection accuracy is dramatically degraded between hours 4
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through 13 and hours 23 and 24 (dashed red in Figure 5.9). Further analysis shows that the
clock frequency has shifted during these hours, coinciding with use of business-hours and
off-hours thermostat setting for the room5, likely because temperature affected the board’s
crystal oscillator whose signal is the basis for generating the processor’s clock frequency.
5.4.5 Multi-Tasking/Time-Sharing
In our final set of experiments, we apply REMOTE in the runs where Ransomware (see
Section 5.3.4) is executed as a separate process, without changing the application. The
OLinuXino board only has one core, so its Debian Linux OS context-switches between
the two processes until the Ransomware payload completes. Figure 5.10 shows the spec-
trogram in one such execution. In the first part of the spectrogram only the application is
running. At some point (millisecond 812 in this spectrogram), the Ransomware process
is started, and the context-switching in (approximately) 10 ms time-slices can clearly be
seen beyond this point in the spectrogram. The spectrum of the malware process is clearly
different from the spectrum produced by the application at this point in its execution, so we
expect REMOTE to detect this malware execution scenario easily.
To quantitatively assess REMOTE detection for this scenario, we use 25 application
runs, and in each run start the Ransomware process at a different point in the run. The
results of this experiment are that REMOTE successfully detects all these runs even with
the tolerance threshold that produces no false positives for malware-free executions, i.e.,
REMOTE produces an ideal ROC curve in this scenario. It should be noted here that in this
set of runs, according to our threat model, the IoT system is running only one valid ap-
plication. To successfully handle scenarios in which the system context-switches between
multiple valid applications, REMOTE must be extended to identify when context switches
are occurring and to keep track and validate spectral samples with the knowledge of which
5The actual change in clock frequency was less than one-part-per-million of the clock frequency, well
within typical design tolerances for clock signals, and with negligible impact on the processor’s overall per-
formance and power consumption
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Program is running normally
Ransomware is starting here
Context switch between Ransomware 
and original application
Figure 5.10: Spectrogram of context-switching between the unmodified Bitcount applica-
tion and the Ransomware process.
application(s) they might belong and where the “current” point is in each of those applica-
tions. Although we believe such an extension to REMOTE is possible, it will likely require
significant effort to figure out, implement, and evaluate, so we leave it for future work.
5.5 Prior Work and Practical Deployment
As described in Chapter 2, much work exists on using EM [63, 112, 113] and other phys-
ical signals [78, 114, 115] as side-channels for extracting sensitive information from a
victim system. Majority of such work has focused on extracting keys during cryptographic
activity, on countermeasures against such attacks and, more recently, on systematically
identifying and quantifying EM signals that may be useful to attackers [116, 117], and
on using EM/power analysis to identify the executed code at a per-instruction level [118,
119, 120, 121]. In addition to analog signals, contention on hardware resources such as
caches [122, 123] that are shared between concurrently running threads or processes has
been used as a side channel (extract information from a victim thread) and as a covert
78
channel (a thread secretly conveys sensitive information to another without using explicit
communication mechanisms), and numerous countermeasures have been proposed ([124,
125]). However, as we described in this thesis, recent work (including work described
in the earlier chapters) uses side-channel signals beneficially such as for profiling [126,
127], intrusion detection [Nazari:2017, 128, 105, 129], fingerprinting [130], characteriza-
tion [131], etc. Callan et al. (ZOP [126]) performed profiling by matching the time-domain
samples of the EM signal to program code at the granularity of acyclic paths6. The major
limitation of the work is that it is very computationally demanding, so it is only practical
for off-line analysis of relatively brief program runs.
Recently, Han et al. (ZEUS [128]) used spectral components of the signal as a feature,
and an artificial neural network as a classifier, to detect a control-flow deviation in a PLC.
Comparing to the prior EM-based malware detectors that leveraged EM signals, RE-
MOTE is specifically designed to be robust in the presence of, and evaluated for robustness
to weak signals, poorly defined peaks in the spectrum, and variations in clock frequency
among physical instances of the same device and over time on the same device. Further-
more, REMOTE is the first EM-based malware detector to be evaluated on real CPS applica-
tions affected by real malware prototypes (code-reuse attack, Stuxnet-like, and shellcode),
and also the first to be evaluated on several platforms, with very different processor archi-
tectures, including platforms that run the application on bare-metal and those with an OS.
Moreover, it is first to experimentally identify the specific ways in which software activity,
distance, enclosure, and antenna positioning, and variation over time and among device
instances of the same time, affect the received signal.
Another related body of work are power consumption-based malware detection frame-
works. Liu et al. [47] provide code execution tracking based on the power signal using an
HMM model to recover most likely executed instruction sequence with a revised Viterbi
algorithm. Kim et al. [132] build signatures for individual pieces of malware and later
6An acyclic path typically contains one or a few basic blocks.
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recognize them. Clark et al. (WattsUpDoc [83]) detect malware by monitoring system-
wide power consumption. Liu et al. (VirusMeter [133]) build a state machine and flags
later anomalous power consumption using a variety of classifiers. Gonzalez et al. (Power
Fingerprinting [134]) demonstrate that a specific function and its modified version can be
distinguished using LDA/PCA. Compared to these works, REMOTE has the following ad-
vantages: (i) unlike these methods, REMOTE does not require access to the source code
for training thus it’s more suitable for scenarios where the code is not available (propi-
tiatory) and/or the existing infrastructure on the device does not support instrumentation.
(ii) our evaluations show that REMOTE is applicable to a variety of systems with various
software/hardware designs. Unfortunately, existing work [47, 132, 133, 134] provide very
limited or no study on the robustness of their approach which makes it difficult to fairly
judge their scalability and usefulness on other platforms. Further, it is also unknown how
these systems behave (in therms of accuracy) under different sources of variations. Since as
shown in section 5.4, these variations may have significant impact on the overall accuracy.
(iii) these methods often suffer from non-negligible False-Positive-Rate (e.g., 3% [132],
2% [83], 5% [133]) which can significantly degrade the usefulness of the intrusion detector
as an on-line, always-on protection system. Finally, (iv) instead of leveraging the power
consumption as a side-channel, REMOTE uses the EM signal that provides locality, higher
bandwidth, and requires no physical connection to the monitored device.
We believe that the main advantages of using REMOTE in industrial CPS, as shown
in Section 5.4, are that (a) REMOTE can be trained on one device and then monitor other
devices of the same kind, (b) REMOTE is robust to the presence of EM noise and interfer-
ence from other (non-monitored) electronic devices, (c) REMOTE can be used at a distance
and without making any changes to the heavy-duty plastic enclosures that are typically
used in such settings, and without opening the enclosure (which often voids the manufac-




In this chapter we proposed REMOTE, a new robust framework to detect malware by ex-
ternally observing EM signals emitted by a CPS. REMOTE does not require any resources
or infrastructure on, or any modifications to, the monitored system itself, which makes it
especially suitable for malware detection on CPS where hardware resources may be limited
and performance and energy overheads introduced by other monitoring approaches may be
unacceptable. REMOTE can identify malicious code injection into a known application that
is running on a CPS in real time and with a low detection latency.
To develop a robust framework, we systematically explored practical concerns through
experiments and analysis. First, to demonstrate the usability of REMOTE in real-world
scenarios, we ported several real-world cyber-physical-systems each with a meaningful
attack, to different platforms. Our results showed that for all of the programs on each of the
platforms, REMOTE successfully detected the instances of attacks with high accuracy and
almost no false positives. We then systematically evaluated the robustness of REMOTE to
interrupts and other system activity, to signal variation among different physical instances
of the same device, to changes in antenna distance, and to changes over time. By selectively
disabling the robustness-oriented features of REMOTE, we also demonstrated that these
features are indeed contributing to its robustness.
Using these measurements and analysis, we showed REMOTE has several advantages
over state-of-the-art external malware detection frameworks and it is a promising candidate
for protecting CPS when implementing an internal malware detector is infeasible.
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CHAPTER 6
EMMA: HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ATTESTATION FRAMEWORK FOR
EMBEDDED SYSTEMS USING ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNALS
6.1 Abstract
Establishing trust for an execution environment is an important problem, and practical so-
lutions for it rely on attestation, where a potentially untrusted system (prover) computes a
response to a challenge sent by the trusted system (verifier). The response computation typ-
ically involves measurement (e.g., a checksum) of the prover’s program code and execution
environment, which the verifier checks against expected values for a “clean” (trustworthy)
system. The main challenge in attestation is that, in addition to checking the response, the
verifier also needs to verify the integrity of the response computation itself, i.e., that re-
sponse computation itself has not been tampered with to produce expected values without
measuring the verifier’s actual code and environment.
On higher-end processors, this integrity of response computation is verified crypto-
graphically, using dedicated trusted hardware (e.g., SGX). On embedded systems, how-
ever, form factor, battery life, and other constraints prevent the use of such sophisticated
hardware support. Instead, a popular approach is to use the request-to-response time as
a way to establish some level of confidence about the integrity of the response computa-
tion itself. However, the overall request-to-response time provides only one coarse-grained
measurement from which the integrity of the attestation is to be inferred, and even this one
measurement is noisy because it includes the round-trip network latency and/or variations
due to micro-architectural events. Thus, the attestation is vulnerable to attacks where the
adversary has tampered with response computation, but the resulting additional computa-
tion time is small relative to the overall request-to-response time.
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To develop an effective software attestation framework, we make a key observation that
the existing approach of execution-time measurement for attestation is only one example of
using externally measurable side-channel information and that other side channels, some
of which can provide much finer-grain information about the response computation, can
be used. As a proof of concept, we propose EMMA, a novel method for attestation that
leverages electromagnetic side-channel signals that are emanated by the embedded system
during response computation, to confirm that the embedded device has, upon receiving the
challenge, actually computed the response using the valid program code for that compu-
tation. This new approach requires physical proximity, but imposes no overhead to the
system, and provides highly accurate monitoring during the attestation process. We imple-
ment EMMA on a popular embedded system, Arduino UNO, and evaluate our system with
a wide range of attacks on attestation integrity, including memory-copy, return-oriented
rootkit, and proxy attacks. Our results show that EMMA can successfully detect each in-
stance of these attacks, with no false positives, in contrast to existing methods where many
of the attacks succeed without detection. Further, we show how EMMA can be scaled
to attest multiple devices simultaneously and/or systems with different and more complex
architectures, and demonstrate its robustness against different sources of variability.
Followings are the contributions of this work:
• A new attestation method based on electromagnetic emanations of the prover,
• A proof-of-concept implementation of this attestation method, which we call EMMA,
• Evaluation of EMMA on five different types of attacks,
• Further analysis on EMMA for its applicability on other platforms and its robustness




Attestation is a security primitive that allows a trusted system (verifier) to verify the in-
tegrity of program code, execution environment, data values, etc. in a potentially untrusted
system (prover). Attestation typically relies on a challenge-response paradigm, where
the prover is asked to calculate a checksum over verifier-requested parts of a program/-
data memory contents. The response computation typically involves measurement (e.g.,
a checksum) of the prover’s program code and execution environment, which the verifier
checks against expected values for a “clean” (trustworthy) system. The verifier considers
the prover’s integrity to not be compromised if (i) the checksum provided by the prover
matched with the expected value computed by the verifier, and (ii) the computation that
produced the response itself has not been tampered with, e.g., to falsify the expected values
without actually computing them from the verifier’s actual code and data.
In high-end processors, the assurance that the response computation itself was not tam-
pered with is typically provided by using a hardware-supported Trusted Execution Envi-
ronment (TEE), which uses dedicated hardware (e.g., SGX, TPM, etc.) within the prover.
On embedded systems, however, form factor, battery life, and other constraints prevent
the use of hardware-supported enclaves or other sophisticated hardware support. Instead, a
popular approach, Software Attestation ([135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140]), is to compute the
checksum in software, using ordinary execution on the prover, and to leverage measurement
of the request-to-response time as a way to establish some level of confidence about the
integrity of the response computation itself.
To implement this method, the verifier utilizes the challenge-response paradigm by
asking the embedded system (prover) to compute a checksum of its program memory, while
measuring the response time to prevent the adversary from computing a correct response,
e.g., by temporarily restoring the program memory while the response is computed, by
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using a copy of the program data to compute the response, by forwarding the challenge to
another system that computes the response, etc. The prover passes the attestation test only
if it provides the correct response to the challenge (i.e., Responseprover = Responseexpected )
without violating the timing requirement (i.e., tresponse < tthreshold ).
Unfortunately, the overall request-to-response time provides only one coarse-grained
measurement, and this method is not able to monitor the prover during the attestation pro-
cedure without imposing a significant performance and/or cost overhead to the system.
This, in turn, makes the software attestation schemes vulnerable to attacks which have very
low-latency compared to the overall response time (i.e., tattack << tthreshold ). Moreover,
due to the network limitations and/or micro-architectural events, this request-to-response
time may be noisy since it includes the round-trip network latency and/or variations caused
by the micro-architectural events (e.g., cache miss) which consequently, causes a further
increase in tthreshold (to tolerate the variance and reduce the false positive rate), and hence,
potentially makes these schemes even more vulnerable to low-latency attacks.
To address this limitation, in this work, by analyzing EM side-channel signals in the
frequency domain, we develop an EM-Monitoring algorithm that can (a) infer the time
point when attestation activity begins and ends in the prover by checking when the spikes
correspond to the checksum loop appear and disappear, (b) check whether the attestation
process matches with a known-good model (to ensure that this process is not modified by
an adversary) by checking the frequency of the spikes.
6.2.2 Threat Model and Assumptions
We assume that the adversary has installed malicious code on the target embedded sys-
tem, with full control over the hardware and software of the device, including the ability
to arbitrarily modify program and data memory, or any other memories available on the
device. The attack succeeds if the device passes the attestation despite the presence of a
malicious code. Note that attestation does not depend on how malicious code was origi-
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nally installed on the device, and methods for doing so are abundantly represented in the
research literature, although we do not discuss them in detail in this chapter.
Unlike most prior software-based methods, we assume that the prover (attested device)
can send messages to and collude with other faster malicious peers, e.g., to use them as
proxies for calculating the checksum faster. Finally, we assume that the verifier has full
information about the prover’s architecture (e.g., address space, memory architecture, etc.).
6.3 Design Overview
An overview of the EMMA framework is shown in Figure 6.1. This framework consists of
a Verifier, V , (e.g., a trusted PC) and a Prover, P , (e.g., an embedded system). The Verifier
includes, or is connected to, a monitoring system (EM-MON) that can receive and analyze
the EM signals unintentionally emanated by P . Attestation begins with V preparing a
challenge locally ( 1 ). The challenge includes a seed value (which will be used later to
initialize a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) in P), an address range, the total
number of iterations for checksum loop, a random value to initialize the checksum in P ,
and a random nonce. The challenge is then sent to the P via a communication link ( 2 )
which invokes the verification function, attest(), and starts the “attestation procedure”
by causing an interrupt on P . Note that this function runs at the highest prover’s processor
privilege level with interrupts turned off. In software attestation, the dynamic root of trust
is instantiated through the verification function, a self-checking function that computes a
checksum over its own instructions and sends it to the verifier.
Upon sending the challenge to P , V also starts the “monitoring process” ( 3 ) on EM-
MON. Through analysis of EM signals emanated from P , EM-MON determines three
critical values about P’s checksum computation and reports an error if any of them deviates
from a known-good model (reference model). These tasks/values include (i) the delay
between reception of the challenge and start of the checksum loop (initialization phase).























Figure 6.1: Overview of EMMA framework.
time on V . These values/tasks are primarily chosen because fundamentally, there are two
critical durations in the execution of the attestation process on the prover: (a) the time that
is taken between receipt of the command to perform attestation and the start of the actual
checksum process (because an adversary could contact another device during this period,
for the proxy attack, or quickly hide the malicious code before starting the procedure), and
(b) the time taken for the checksum process itself (because an adversary could try to do
“extra work” during checksumming to hide the malicious code).
After sending the challenge, the verifier, independently, calculates the “expected” check-
sum on its own (known-good) copy of the embedded system’s program memory ( 4 ). At
the same time, the self-checking verification function starts with initializing its local vari-
ables based on the received challenge ( 4 ), and then it starts the “checksum calculation”,
Checksum() ( 5 ). This function is an optimized loop which, in each iteration, reads a
memory line in a pseudo-random fashion, and updates the checksum based on the con-
tent of that address. The address range and the total number of iterations of the loop are
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determined by the challenge.
Once Checksum() is finished, P forms a response ( 6 ) that includes the calculated
checksum and the random nonce which initially was sent by V , and sends this response
to V ( 7 ). The original nonce acts as an identification and helps to increase the overhead
for a proxy attack. Finally, V compares the information received from P with its pre-
computed checksum and the original challenge and compares the results from EM-MON
to the expected ones. If they all match, one trial of attestation will finish successfully ( 8 ).
At this point the dynamic root of trust has been established; thus, the verification func-
tion can either invoke an executable, and hence, provides a TEE, or invoke a hash com-
putation function to compute the hash value over the prover’s memory contents (entirely
or partially). This hash value can then be sent back, which in turn, provides the current
state of the prover to the verifier. Note that all of these functionalities are still part of the
verification function; thus, they have been used in computing the checksum, which means
it is guaranteed that the hash function or invoking the executable is also untampered with.
6.3.1 Verification Function
This function has three main phases: a prologue which is responsible to initialize some
values based on the received challenge, checksum computation, and an epilogue which is
responsible for sending the response back to the verifier and invoking the executable or
hash computation function. It is important to point out that almost all of the execution time
is spent in the checksum computation phase, where the prover repeatedly reads different
lines of its memory and updates the checksum based on that.
To attack this function, the adversary has two options: she can either modify the
checksum calculation function (e.g., to change the requested addresses) or modify the pro-
logue/epilogue phases (e.g., to forward the challenge to another device). The main chal-
lenge for the adversary is that while changing the checksum calculation is desired and more
effective, any change (even single instruction) in the checksum computation phase will be
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significantly magnified due to a large number of iterations of the checksum loop. Thus, the
adversary will be faced with a fundamental choice between having either a large but short-
term malicious activity in the epilogue/prologue, or alternatively, a small, but long-term
malicious activity in the checksum phase. Hence, to detect attacks on the verification func-
tion, an ideal detection framework should be able to detect single-instruction modifications
in the checksum loop, and tiny1 changes in the epilogue and/or prologue phases.
Knowing these facts, the attestation procedure has to be designed carefully so that it
significantly degrades the ability of the malicious code to remain undetected during attes-
tation. To achieve such a robust attestation procedure, there are several important factors
that need to be considered. In this paper, we will briefly mention the key factors, but we
refer the readers to these prior proposals [137, 138, 139, 140, 141] for more details on
why these factors are important, and how they provide a strong security guarantee. Partic-
ularly, we chose the method used in [140] due to its simplicity and robustness. Following
briefly overviews the important factors considered in designing such a secure checksum
computation function:
• The checksum computed by the device should be a function of the challenge sent by the
verifier to prevent pre-computation and replay attacks.
• To prevent the adversary from predicting and redirecting the memory requests, the ad-
dresses should be generated in a pseudo-random fashion.
• The checksum function should be strongly-ordered. A strongly-ordered function is a
function whose output differs with high probability if the operations are evaluated in a
different order. A strongly-ordered function requires an adversary to perform the same
operations on the same data in the same sequence as the original function to obtain the
correct result.
• The checksum function should have a low variance execution time so that the adversary
can not exploit the variation to her advantage. Furthermore, the code should be optimized
1the size of this detection depends on how small a meaningful attack could be.
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Algorithm 2 The checksum computation algorithm used in EMMA.
1: Initialization:
2: PRNG = seed
3: Set MASK based on beginAddress and endAddress
4: memOffset = beginAddr
5: cSum = seed
6: Checksum: // checksum main loop (Checksum())
7: for i=1 to totIter do
8: for j=1 to 10 do
9: PRNG = PRNG+ (PRNG2 ∨ 5)mod 216
10: memAddr = memAddr ⊕ PRNG
11: memAddr = (memAddr ∧MASK) + memOffset
12: cSumj = cSumj + (Mem[memAddr]⊕ cSumj−1)
13: cSumj = cSumj + (i⊕ PC)
14: cSumj = cSumj + (PRNG⊕memAddr)
15: cSumj = cSumj + (SR⊕ cSumj−2)




Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code for our checksum computation based on the scheme
proposed in [140]. The main checksum loop consists of a series of alternating XOR and
ADD instructions. This series has the property of being strongly-ordered [141]; thus, none
of the operations can be re-ordered or removed. Furthermore, using this sequence prevents
parallelization and out-of-order execution since, at any step, the current value is needed to
compute the succeeding values. As suggested in [140], we use a 160-bit long checksum to
keep all the registers busy and to significantly reduce the collision probability. The check-
sum is stored as a vector in a set of 8/16-bit general purpose registers (blocks) depending
on the architecture of the processor (i.e., AVR, ARM, etc.). As mentioned earlier, memory
is traversed in a pseudo-random fashion by using a PRNG. Similar to previous work, we
use a 16-bit T-function [142] to generate these random numbers. Each partial checksum
block is also dependent on (a) the last two calculated partial sums; to avoid parallelization
and pre-computation attack, (b) a key; to avoid replay attack, (c) current memory address
(data pointer) and PC (if available depending on the architecture); to avoid memory copy
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attack, (d) the content of the program memory; to avoid changing the attestation code, and
(e) the Status Register (SR) to check the status of the interrupt-disable flag.
Note that our checksum loop is designed such that it is not vulnerable to the attack
introduced by Castelluccia et al. [143], where changing PC andmemAddr simultaneously
will result in the same checksum. To optimize the performance and avoid possible branch
mis-predictions, in the actual implementation of the checksum, the inner loop is unrolled
to calculate all the partial sums in one iteration. The detailed implementation of this code
on an Arduino Uno will be shown in Section 6.4.
6.3.2 Security Analysis
The adversary model in software attestation is fundamentally different from classical cryp-
tographic adversary models. Typically, the adversary is modeled by a polynomially bounded
algorithm that aims to achieve a certain goal without having certain knowledge (e.g., cryp-
tographic keys). In contrast, an adversary against a software attestation scheme can be
unbounded in principle, and has complete knowledge of the prover device configuration
and state. However, during the attack, it has to specify (or program) a malicious prover de-
vice with tight resource constraints. In other words, the adversary has unbound resources
for preparing the attack but only a tight time-bound and limited computational and memory
resources for executing the attack.
Due to these differences, and the fact that software attestation methods cannot rely on
any trusted secret on the prover (or verifier), software attestation follows a fundamentally
different approach, and leverages time side-channel information. A basic requirement of
this approach is that the verifier, V , specifies a practically optimal implementation of the
algorithm that processes the challenge according to the attestation algorithm. This means
that it should be hard to find any other implementation of this algorithm that can be executed
by a prover, P , in significantly less time than tthreshold. Otherwise, a malicious prover
could use a faster implementation and exploit the time difference to perform additional
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computations, e.g., to lie about its state. Hence, to ensure that V can measure also slight
changes to the prover’s code, V needs to amplify the effect of such changes. The most
promising approach to realize this in practice is designing the attestation protocol as an
iterative algorithm with a large number of rounds.
The core components of any software attestation algorithm are the address generation
algorithm (Gen) and the checksum calculation/compression scheme (ChK). To prevent a
malicious prover, P̃ , from using pre-computed attestation responses, the memory addresses
ai generated by the random address generator, Gen, should be “sufficiently random” [144].
Ideally, Gen should be able to generate any number for (a1, ..., aN), where N is the max-
imum achievable number for an m-bit address space. While this is impossible from an
information-theoretic point of view, the best one may ask for is that the memory addresses
ai generated by Gen should be computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random
values within a certain time-bound, t, (assuming that P̃ does not know the seed in advance).
In principle, nothing prevents P̃ from using an arbitrary seed value to compute all the
possible addresses (i.e., (a1, ..., aN)) on its own, making them easily distinguishable from
random values. The best can be done is to require that P̃ cannot derive any meaningful
information about ai+1 from ai and the seed without investing a certain minimum amount
of time. Specifically, we assume that an algorithm with input s that does not execute Gen
cannot distinguish ai+1 = Gen(ai) from uniformly random values. This property holds
true for the T-functions as shown in [142], since either the adversary needs to spend the
same amount of time as Gen to compute the next address or save all possible addresses,
and read them one by one when necessary. However, the latter ends up taking much more
time than the former since for a 16-bit T-function, the adversary needs to save more than
128KB of data which clearly doesn’t fit in an L1 cache; thus, the adversary needs to pay
the L2 (or main memory) delay penalty, which is significantly larger than computing the
random value using T-function. In short, the size and bijection property of the T-function
used in our algorithm satisfies the security requirements for Gen.
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The purpose of the checksum function, ChK, is to map the memory state of the prover,
P , to a smaller attestation response, r, which reduces the amount of data to be sent from
P to the verifier V . Note that the output of ChK depends also on the challenge sent by the
verifier to avoid replay and/or pre-computation attacks. A necessary security requirement
on Chk is that it should be hard for a malicious prover, P̃ , to replace the correct input, S,
to Chk with some other value, S̃ 6= S, that yields the same attestation response r. This is
similar to the common notion of second pre-image resistance of cryptographic hash func-
tions. However, due to the time-bound property of the software attestation scheme, it is
sufficient that ChK fulfills only a much weaker form of the second pre-image resistance
since we need to consider only “blind” adversaries who (in contrast to the classical defini-
tion of second pre-image resistance) do not even know the correct response to the verifier’s
challenge. The reason is that, as soon as P̃ knows the correct response, he could send it to
V , and would not bother to determine a second pre-image.
Using this fact, our checksum is chosen large enough (160-bit) to significantly reduce
the chance of the collision and make it computationally hard for a second pre-image attack.
This can be proven, as shown in [145], that ChK used in this paper provides an almost full
coverage (i.e., almost all possible numbers in [0, 216) for a 16-bit partial checksum), which,
in turn, makesChK resistant to blind pre-image attacks. As a result, to break the checksum
function, the adversary can either remember all possible challenge-response pairs (called
“challenge-buffering” attack) or modify the checksum calculation function in real-time to
produce the correct response even in the presence of the malicious code.
In our setup, implementing the “challenge-buffering” attack is not feasible in practice
due to the significantly large size of the input space (i.e., > 232 possibilities). Further-
more, as extensively shown in this paper, any attempt in changing the checksum loop will
cause a shift in the loop’s spectral signature, and hence, will be detected by EMMA. Thus,
using EMMA will make both Gen and ChK components, and hence the entire system
cryptographically secure against cyber-attacks.
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Figure 6.2: Overview of EM monitoring framework.
6.3.3 EM-Monitoring
The EM-MON component ensures that the attestation computation in V was not tampered
with. Figure 6.2 shows this monitoring framework. Using an antenna (e.g., a magnetic
probe) and a signal acquisition device (e.g., a software-defined-radio), the EM signal is cap-
tured and received as a time-series ( 1 ). The signal is then transformed into a sequence of
Short Frequency-Domain Samples (SFDS) using a Short-Time Fourier Transform (STFT).
This transformation consists of dividing the EM signals into consecutive, equal-length, and
overlapping segments of size t and then computing the STFT from each of these segments
to obtain the corresponding SFDS ( 2 and 3 ). Segment size, t, has to be chosen such that
it provides a balance between the time resolution and EM-MON’s computational needs.
Also, t should be long enough to capture several iterations of the checksum loop - while
the per-iteration execution time of the loop might vary slightly from iteration to iteration,
its average execution time over several iterations should be very stable. Each block in the
main checksum loop on Arduino Uno takes about 20 machine cycles, and calculating the
entire 160-bit checksum takes ≈ 400 cycles (about 25µs). Therefore, in this paper, we use
1ms segment size with 80% overlap so that each segment corresponds to about 40 itera-
tions of the checksum calculation, and consecutive segments differ only in 8 iterations of
the checksum calculation.
Each SFDS then goes into the findPeaks()module ( 4 ) where n spikes are selected
and later used as “signatures” for each SFDS. In findPeaks(), the first step in finding
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a spike is that for each frequency, f , that is of interest in an SFDS, we first compute
the corresponding normalized frequency as fnorm = (f − fclk)/fclk, where fclk is the
clock frequency for that SFDS. This normalized frequency is expressed as an offset from
the clock frequency so that a shift in clock frequency does not change fnorm with it and
is normalized to the clock, so it accounts for the clock frequency’s first-order effect on
execution time. We call this technique “clock-adjustment”. The criteria for selecting
spikes are choosing the n largest amplitude local maxima (peaks), excluding the spike for
the clock, that are not part of the noise. To find the noise, we record the spectrum once
without executing the attestation function and save all the spikes that are 3-dB above the
noise floor as noise. For our evaluations, we select n = 6, to capture the checksum loop’s
fundamental frequency and its second and third harmonics (in both sidebands).
The output of findPeaks() is a vector of n numbers (i.e., frequency bins). To
check the correctness of the execution, we need to check this vector to a known refer-
ence model (also a list of size n) that is achieved and saved during the secure execution of
Checksum(). Note that the reference model needs to be created only once. We assume
that either the embedded system’s manufacturer or the end-user is able to achieve a correct
reference model. The reference model vs. SFDS comparison is a simple Euclidean dis-
tance comparison where all n peaks should be compared to the all peaks in the reference
model ( 5 ). For each comparison, if the distance is smaller than a threshold we increment
a counter. Finally, if the counter is larger than n− 1, it means we are in the checksum main
loop state. Based on the distance comparison, findDistance() outputs a boolean value
showing whether we are in the checksum main loop or not.
The final stage of EM-MON is a Finite-State Machine (FSM 6 ). The default state
for the FSM is when EM-MON is waiting for the attestation to start (state = 0). Upon
receiving a challenge from V , FSM switches to state = 1, and starts a timer called
challengeTimer. Once the boolean value from findDistance() becomes one
(i.e., checksum loop starts), the FSM switches to state = 2 if the timer is less than a
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threshold, otherwise it throws an error. Checking this value ensures that the system can be
protected against proxy, code compression, and return-oriented rootkit attacks, where the
attacker needs to spend some (non-negligible) time to set up the attack before actually start-
ing the Checksum(). Note that this is an important and unique feature of EMMA since
existing software-based methods [137, 138, 140, 141] are all unable to measure this delay
(even when they are directly connected to the verifier by a cable), and can only measure the
time between sending the challenge and receiving the checksum value. Thus, if the extra
time overhead caused by these attacks is relatively smaller than the total attestation time,
time-based methods will fail to detect these attacks.
The output of findDistance() becomes zero when the checksum loop completes,
so the FSM switches to state = 3, and checks the challengeTimer once again. This
check ensures that the total execution time of attestation does not exceed a threshold which
is defined by initT ime+perIteration×totIter, where perIteration is the checksum loop
per-iteration time, totIter is the total number of iterations for calculating the checksum,
and initT ime is a constant.
Lastly, in state = 3, EM-MON starts a timer called checksumTimer and waits for
an acknowledge from V that the checksum is received. At this point, if checksumTimer
is larger than a constant, FSM again throws an error. Otherwise, it successfully switches
back to state = 0 and waits for the new attestation challenge. This check ensures that
the adversary can not spend any extra time after the checksum calculation is finished and
before actually sending the checksum to V . Note that in all cases, FSM can only transit
from state n to n+ 1 to enforce the correct ordering in attestation.
6.4 Evaluations
6.4.1 Measurement Setup
To evaluate the effectiveness of our method, we implemented EMMA on a widely used and
popular embedded system, Arduino Uno, with an ATMEGA328p microprocessor clocked
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at 16MHz. To receive EM signals, the tip of a small magnetic probe [89] was placed about
10 cm above the Arduino’s microprocessor (with no amplifier). To record the signal, we
used a commercially available compact software-defined radio (USRP B200 Mini-i [100]).
We recorded the signals at 112 MHz (i.e., the 7th harmonic of the Arduino’s clock), with a
10 MHz sampling rate. Note that all of our measurements were collected in the presence of
the other sources of EM interference including an active LCD that was intentionally placed
about 15 cm behind the board. A set of TCL scripts were used to control the attestation
process (e.g., sending a challenge, recording a signal, etc.). The real-time EM-Monitoring
algorithm was implemented in MATLAB2017b.
6.4.2 Implementation
Arduino Uno uses an ATMEGA328p microprocessor, an Atmel 8-bit AVR RISC-based
architecture, with a 16KB Program memory and a separate Data memory (unlike most other
architectures where a single memory is used for both data and for executable instructions).
This micro-controller has 32 8-bit general purpose registers where the last 6 registers can
be combined in groups of two, and form three 16-bit registers (namely X , Y , and Z).
The Z register can be used to access/read the program memory using LPM Z assembly
instruction. Note that, unlike most of the micro-controller architectures, AVR does not
provide direct access to the Program Counter (PC) register, so the value of the PC cannot
be used during checksum calculation.
As mentioned in Section 6.3, we use a 160-bit checksum which is saved as a vector in
20 8-bit registers (r0−r19). Z register (r31 : r30) is used for reading the program memory
(memAddr), Y register is used to store the random number generated by PRNG. Inputs
from the challenge are pushed to the stack prior to invoking attest(), and later are read
in the initialization phase. r25 : r24 are used to save the MASK value. r23 : 21 is used to
save the nonce, and r20 is used to store the content of the memory. Finally, X is used for
saving the current index (i). In our framework, each partial checksum calculation (cSUM )
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takes 20 cycles. Hence, adding an extra one-cycle instruction (e.g., an ADD) to the partial
checksum block should increase the per-iteration time (and the corresponding spike in the
frequency domain) by about 5%.
6.4.3 Attacks
In this part, we evaluate the security of EMMA by implementing several known attacks
on software-based attestation framework and showing that EMMA can indeed detect these
attacks, and protect the system against them.
1- Memory-Copy Attack:
The most straightforward attack against software attestation is memory-copy attack, where
the adversary has created a copy of the original code elsewhere in memory, and the check-
sum code is modified to use that range of addresses instead of the original ones. Since the
challenge sent by V could request to read any memory line in the program memory address
space, potentially including the supposedly “empty” memory space where the “clean” copy
of the original code is kept, to avoid detection this modified code must check addresses that
are used during checksum computation, and then perform accesses without modification for
unmodified memory ranges, redirect them to “clean” copies for modified memory ranges
or use override values for supposedly empty ranges that now actually contain the attacker’s
data (including “clean” copies of original values from program memory).
This checking and redirection of memory requests introduce overheads during check-
sum computation. Specifically, the adversary needs to change memAddr register (register
Z in our implementation) to point to another address in the memory (at least one added in-
struction). Moreover, since we are using memAddr in the checksum calculation, the value
itself has to be changed back to the correct value (another one instruction). Note that, in
our implementation, since accessing the program memory is only possible through Z, the
adversary’s only option is changing Z. Even for program/data location that are unchanged
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Figure 6.3: EM spectrum during checksum computation for the original code (gray) and
Memory-Copy attack code (red). The x-axis is the frequency offset relative tot he proces-
sor’s clock frequency.
by the adversary, the checksum code must suffer overheads of checking (a compare and a
branch instruction) that the address falls in a range that still contains original instruction-
s/data. Overall, to implement this attack, the adversary has to add at least two instructions
per check-summed location.
In this work, to model a more stealthy attack, we relax the assumption that “free” space
is filled with random values and allow all “free” memory locations to be filled with the same
value (e.g., 0xFF). This allows the attacker to store malicious code in an empty region of
program memory, and to modify checksum computation so that LPMRd, Z (i.e., load from
program memory) for that region of the memory is replaced with SERRd (setRd to 0xFF).
On the architecture used in our experiments, an LPM instruction uses 2 more cycles than
SER does, thus removing 2 cycles from the 4-cycle performance penalty introduced by
the compare-and-branch check, that is still needed to determine which region of program
memory is being addressed. The reduced additional latency makes the modification of the
checksum computation more difficult to detect.
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To evaluate our framework, we implemented the Memory-Copy attack, and we trained
EMMA on (only one) attack-free instance of attestation. We then applied EMMA to both
attack-afflicted and attack-free instances of the attestation. The spectra of the resulting
signals (Figure 6.3) show the spikes that correspond to the original checksum computation
loop, and also the spikes that correspond to the modified checksum computation (red),
which are shifted closer to the processor clock’s frequency because the per-iteration time of
the loop has increased. Figure 6.4 shows the spike’s frequency for 20 attestation instances,
10 attack-afflicted, and 10 attack-free, showing a consistent difference among them. We
find that EMMA successfully labels all these instances, i.e. all attack-afflicted instances are
labeled by EMMA as attack-afflicted (successful detection), and all attack-free are labeled
as attack-free (no false positives). The “measurement-limit” line refers to the threshold that
was used in EMMA for the labeling decision.























Figure 6.4: Frequency of the checksum computation loop for (a) attack-free, (b) memory-
shadow attack, and (c) memory copy attack code.
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2- Memory-Shadow Attack:
Castelluccia et al. [143] showed that, instead of adding a branch and compare instructions
to compare the address, the adversary can reduce the number of added cycles by one (2 in-
stead of 3) by copying the malicious code into a specific “free” area of the program memory
(assuming it is not filled with random values) and called it Memory-Shadow Attack.
This attack leverages the fact that most of the program memory available on an em-
bedded system is usually empty. In this case, if the second half of the program memory
(addresses with MSB = 1) is empty, all accesses to the last quarter of the memory (ad-
dresses 11x...x) could be redirected to the third quarter (addresses 10xx...x) by just flipping
one bit in the address. The last quarter of the program memory would then be shadowed
and could be used to hide the malicious code. To implement this attack, the adversary sim-
ply needs to check the highest bit, and if it is one, then sets the second highest bit to zero.
This can be implemented in an AVR micro-controller with two instructions “sbrs r31, 7”
and “cbr r31, 6” which takes two cycles; thus, the overall number of added cycles will be
three which is only one cycle more than the actual checksum loop (recall that the adversary
does not need to read from the memory so that gives him an extra two cycles).
To further show that adding even an extra cycle to the main loop would significantly
shift the frequency of the loop, Figure 6.5 shows the frequency shift for adding a simple
one cycle ALU instruction where we added a CBR (clearing a single bit in a register)
instruction to the main loop. This confirms that the adversary cannot add any instructions
to the main loop of the code, a very strong security guarantee. Furthermore, similar to
memory-copy attack, we used 10 trials for this attack and showed that its frequency is well
below the actual frequency of the main loop (see Figure 6.4). Similar to memory-copy,
here we also got 0% false positive and 100% true-positive rate accuracy.
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Figure 6.5: EM spectrum while executing the original checksum computation code (gray)
and Memory-Shadow attack code (red).
3- Code Compression Attack:
An alternative method for hiding the malicious code is to apply compression (e.g., Canon-
ical Huffman Encoding [146]) to the original code in the program memory, and then use
the freed space to store malicious code. The compressed original code can then be de-
compressed on-the-fly as needed during the checksum computation (for each memAddr,
decompress the corresponding block and use the decompressed value to update the check-
sum). However, decompression in the main loop significantly increases the loop’s per-
iteration time. Indeed, we have implemented the code-compression attack from [143] and
found that the per-iteration time of the checksum loop increases by more than 300%. Af-
ter applying EMMA to 10 instances of this attack, we found that EMMA detects all 10
instances as attack-afflicted, with no false positives in attack-free runs.
4- Rootkit-Based Attack:
Another class of attacks leaves the original checksum loop unchanged, but adds work be-
fore and/or after it, e.g., by hiding/removing the modified code before the checksum com-
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Figure 6.6: Spectrogram of the attestation code in normal (top) and rootkit-attack (bottom)
runs. Note that the slight differences in colors between the two spectrograms correspond
to variations in signal magnitude which are caused by different positioning of the antenna.
Such variation is common in practice and has almost no effect on EMMA’s functionality
because EMMA was designed to be robust to such variation.
putation, and restoring it after the (unmodified) checksum computation. These types of
attacks are extremely difficult to detect for existing timing-based schemes since the time
overhead introduced by these attacks are typically tens of milliseconds which is less than
1% of the overall execution time of the attestation procedure. However, for EMMA, these
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attacks are not difficult to detect, as they add many cycles of work between when the check-
sum computation is supposed to start and when it actually starts.
We implement the Rootkit-Based Attack [143] as an example, which leverages Return-
Oriented Programming (ROP) technique [101]. In this attack, a hook (jump instruction)
replaces the first instruction in the attestation. When attestation is initiated, this results in
a jump to the malware’s hiding functionality, which deletes the attacker’s code (including
itself) from program memory, but leaves a series of ROP gadgets so that, after the (unmod-
ified) attestation code sends its response, the malware is re-installed on the device.
The deleting procedure is the most time-consuming part of the attack, where the adver-
sary needs to copy the malware hiding functionality and the modified checksum loop to the
data-memory, and replace them with the original code. Figure 6.6 shows the spectrogram
of the attestation procedure with and without the rootkit-based attack. As can be seen in
the figure, for the normal behavior of the attestation code, initialization takes about 1ms
which includes receiving the challenge and invoking attest(). Note that based on the
initialization time, we set the threshold for challengeTimer to 2ms or 8 samples (i.e.
the maximum delay between sending the challenge and starting the checksum main loop is
smaller than 2ms). As can be seen in Figure 6.6, in the presence of rootkit attack though,
there is an extra phase between the initialization and the start of the main checksum loop
that takes about 8ms, which is larger than the timer’s threshold and thus triggers an error
caused by checking the challengeTimer.
To evaluate EMMA against this attack, similar to previous attacks, we used 10 trial
runs for the rootkit attack, and found that EMMA can successfully detect all the instances
of the attack. i.e., our detection algorithm successfully found that there is a delay between
the initialization and the beginning of the loop, and throws an error without having any
false positives.
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Figure 6.7: Spectrogram for the proxy attack. An extra region (sending message) can be
seen in the figure.
5- Proxy Attack:
In a proxy attack, instead of calculating the checksum on its own system, the prover con-
tacts another often faster device (the proxy) to compute the correct answer (checksum) to
the time-sensitive checksum computation, which enables malware on the device to go un-
detected. In this case, similar to a rootkit-based attack, the adversary needs some time after
receiving the challenge to properly set up the attack. For proxy, this time is used for send-
ing (forwarding) the challenge and any other necessary information (e.g., nonce) required
to correctly compute the checksum in the proxy.
The major limitation in the existing software-based attestation methods for detecting
proxy attacks is that the adversary can simply hide this attack if tsend << tthreshold.
EMMA, however, is not limited by the overall attestation time and can distinguish the
initialization phase from checksum calculation very accurately.
Figure 6.7 shows the spectrogram of the attestation procedure with and without the
proxy attack. In our proxy attack, we sent the challenge through the serial link back to
the PC to imitate sending message operation of the proxy attack. As can be seen in the
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figure, sending the challenge added approximately extra 4ms to the initialization phase,
and has a spectral signature that is completely different from that of in the initialization or
the checksum calculation phases.
To evaluate EMMA against this attack, we used 10 trial runs for the proxy attack, and
found that EMMA can successfully detect all the instances of the attack. i.e., EMMA
successfully found that there is a delay between the initialization and the beginning of the
loop, and throws an error while having no false positives.
6.5 Further Analysis on Scalability and Robustness
6.5.1 Scalability to Other Platforms
To show EMMA is applicable to other embedded systems with a different processor and/or
architecture, and even can be used at different frequency ranges, we tested our checksum
main loop, Checksum() (an un-optimized form), on three other embedded systems in-
cluding a TI MSP430 Launchpad with a processor clocked at 16MHz, an STM32 ARM
Cortex-M Nucleo Board also clocked at 16MHz, and an Intel Altera’s Nios-II soft-core
implemented on a Terrasic DE0-CV FPGA development board clocked at 50MHz. The
criteria for choosing these boards were to pick the embedded systems that are popular and
widely used, and have different architectures than Arduino’s processor (i.e., AVR).
Running the same attestation code on these boards, we then confirmed that by using
the same setup used in the previous section, EM-MON receives EM signals similar to that
of for Arduino board (i.e., spikes at the frequency of the loop), and further, we confirmed
that our detection algorithm can successfully detect when this loop starts and when it ends
by adding the training information (i.e., the position and the number of spikes) for each
board to our framework. Finally, to further show that even single added instruction to
the loop’s code is detectable by EMMA, we added a single-cycle “ADD” instruction to
the checksum’s assembly code for each of the mentioned boards (i.e., similar to memory-
shadow attack). Figure 6.8 shows the spectrum for the checksum loop once with this extra
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loop with added 'if' statement
Figure 6.8: The spectrum for the Nios-II processor with (red) and without (gray) adding
malicious “ADD” instruction.
added instruction and once without it. As can be seen, adding an extra instruction has
shifted the frequency by about 100KHz. We then used EMMA, to label malware-free
and malware-afflicted (i.e., runs with the extra instruction) checksum runs (10 each) for all
the three boards. Our results showed that, in all cases, EMMA successfully detected the
malicious runs.
6.5.2 Scalability to More Complex Systems
We tested our framework on a more complex system, A13-OLinuXino Single-Board-Computer.
This board has an ARM A8 in-order core clocked at 1GHz, with 2 level of caches, a branch
predictor, and a prefetcher. It also runs a Debian Linux OS. We ran our checksum loop on
this board and measured the beginning/end time and the loop’s per-iteration time.
Our measurements showed that while having caches, a branch predictor, and a prefetcher
introduces some variation in the per-iteration time of the loop, in practice this variation is
not significant. For the cache, since the checksum code is small, it fits completely inside the
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CPU’s L1 instruction cache. Furthermore, the memory region containing the verification
function is small enough to fit inside the CPU’s L1 data cache. Thus, once the CPU caches
are warmed up, no more cache misses occur. The time taken to warm up the CPU caches is
a very small fraction of the total execution time. As a result, the variance in the execution
time caused by cache misses during the cache warm-up period is negligible.
For the branch predictor, we observed that in our code, the branch mis-prediction only
happens in the last iteration (recall that the inner loop was enrolled), when the checksum
computation is finished; thus, it doesn’t have any impact on the execution time of the
checksum loop. Furthermore, due to the memory’s random access pattern in the checksum
loop, the prefetcher’s accuracy is inevitably low.
To further analyze the effect of having cache, branch predictor, and prefetcher on the
timing, we used gem5 [147] simulator, to simulate the checksum code on an in-order ARM
core machine with similar configurations to that of in A13-OLinuXino board. Our simu-
lation results showed that for a 1.2KB size checksum code, our code accessed the cache
about 7000 times, out of which only 21 accesses were L1 miss (i.e., > 99.5% hit-rate), and
only about 800 more cycles (mostly due to L2 misses) were added to the overall execution
time (i.e., < 0.01%). Note that this extra delay only happens inside the checksum loop,
and does not affect the delay for the proxy and/or rootkit attacks since those attacks happen
before the beginning of the checksum. Furthermore, our results showed no mis-prediction
for the branch predictor, and < 1% prefetching accuracy for the checksum loop.
To evaluate EMMA on this board, we ran the same experiment (adding an extra “ADD”
instruction) discussed in the previous section, and found that our detection algorithm suc-
cessfully detected all instances of the attack with no false positive.
Overall, the goal of evaluating EMMA on multiple different boards was showing that
the ability to use EM signals for monitoring the attestation procedure is a result of a funda-
mental connection between repetitive program behavior and the spectra of resulting side-
channel signals, and is not dependent to a specific architecture. Furthermore, these experi-
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Figure 6.9: EMMA false positive rate (lower is better) with (solid blue) clock-adjusted
feature and without it (dashed red) over 24 hours interval.
ments confirmed that EMMA is scalable to different and more complex architectures.
6.5.3 Robustness and Variations Over Time
To test the robustness of our algorithm over time and against environment variations (e.g.,
temperature, external radio interference, etc.), we repeat the attestation procedure at one-
hour intervals, over a period of 24 hours, while keeping the Arduino board and the receiver
active throughout the experiment, to observe how the emanated signals vary over time as
device temperature (and room temperature) and external radio interference such as WiFi
and cellular signals change during the day and due to the day/night transition. At each
hour we ran the attestation once (without any malicious behavior). The training data was
collected before the first hour of the experiment. The goal of the experiment was to show
how the false positive rate changes over time. We observed a significant increase in false
positive rate after hour 2 (see Figure 6.9) when we were not using the clock-adjustment
feature (see Section 6.3). However, adding this feature, EMMA achieved perfect accuracy
(i.e., 0% false positive). The major reason for this dramatic degradation in accuracy was due
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to the fact that the clock rate for Arduino began to drift after about one hour of continuous
usage. Without associating this drift to our detection algorithm, EMMA was unable to
correctly predict that the shift in the frequency of the checksum main loop was due to the
clock drift, and not because of a potential malicious activity.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter proposed a new approach for hardware-software attestation on embedded sys-
tems, and described and evaluated EMMA, a proof-of-concept implementation of this ap-
proach. Unlike prior attestation schemes, EMMA uses EM side-channel signals emanated
by the embedded system during response computation, to confirm that the device has, upon
receiving the challenge, actually computed the response using the valid program code for
that computation. This new approach requires physical proximity, but imposes no overhead
to the system, and provides accurate monitoring during the attestation. We implemented
EMMA on a popular embedded system, Arduino UNO, and evaluated our system with a
wide range of attacks on attestation integrity. Our results showed that EMMA can success-
fully detect these attacks with high accuracy, and that it outperforms existing systems in
terms of security guarantees, scalability, and robustness. Further, we showed that EMMA
can be scaled to attest multiple embedded devices, that is can support other embedded
systems/platforms, and that it is robust against various sources of variability.
We envision that EMMA can be used to attest a group of embedded systems that are
mostly dedicated to a specific task. This includes, but is not limited to, a network of sen-
sors or peripherals that are connected to a main controlling unit, cyber-physical systems
in hospitals and/or factories, industrial IoT (IIoT) systems, etc. In these scenarios, the
cost (per device) and complexity of deploying EMMA is relatively low because it requires
no changes to the monitored device, and thus creates no regulatory, safety, or disruption
concerns for the system. More importantly, it has zero-overhead on the monitored system
and is physically separated from the monitored device. In a practical scenario, EMMA can
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leverage an already existing infrastructure for controlling the CPS such as industrial control
systems (ICS), SCADA, etc. which further simplifies its implementation and reduces the
costs. Furthermore, we envision EMMA is being useful in other scenarios such as check-
ing the integrity of legacy systems (which are notoriously difficult to manage and verify),
providing a secure execution environment on sensor nodes and/or IoT devices for secure
code update, error recovery, key exchange, etc. Finally, EMMA can be used as a portable
setup to occasionally monitor one or a small group of devices. In this scenario, EMMA
can be used as a low-cost, powerful tool to debug under-the-test systems.
111
CHAPTER 7
A NEW SIDE-CHANNEL VULNERABILITY ON MODERN COMPUTERS BY
EXPLOITING ELECTROMAGNETIC EMANATIONS FROM THE POWER
MANAGEMENT UNIT
7.1 Abstract
This Chapter presents a new micro-architectural vulnerability, which is created by power
management units of modern computers and can be exploited through electromagnetic,
and potentially other, side-channels. The key observations that enable us to discover this
side-channel are: 1) in an effort to manage and minimize power consumption, modern mi-
croprocessors have a number of possible operating modes (power states), in which various
sub-systems of the processor are powered down, 2) for some of the transitions between
power states, the processor also changes the operating mode of the voltage regulator mod-
ule (VRM) that supplies power to the affected sub-system, and 3) the EM emanations from
the VRM are heavily dependent on its operating mode. As a result, these state-dependent
EM emanations create a side-channel that can reveal which programs are currently execut-
ing, and potentially other sensitive information about the executed programs.
To demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting this vulnerability, we create a covert chan-
nel that uses changes in the processor’s power states to exfiltrate sensitive information from
a system that is otherwise secured and completely isolated (air-gapped), and then receives
that information using a compact, inexpensive receiver placed in proximity to the system.
To demonstrate the severity of this vulnerability, we also show that information can be suc-
cessfully exfiltrated even if the receiver is several meters away from the system, and even
if the system and the receiver are separated by a wall. Compared to the state-of-the-art,
the proposed covert channel has >3x higher bit-rate. Finally, to demonstrate that this new
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vulnerability is not limited to being used as a covert channel, we demonstrate how it can be
used for attacks such as keystroke logging.
Compared to prior attacks on PMUs [148, 149, 29], which could be carried out re-
motely, the proposed side-channel has a different attack model - prior attacks are practical
mostly for cloud servers where unrelated (potentially hostile) services/VMs end up being
co-located on the same physical server, while the vulnerability we present is mostly ap-
plicable to mobile devices, computers used in offices adjacent to public spaces, etc. Given
these differences, our findings are important since the discovered side-channel is applicable
even when a computer is highly secured from untrusted users, e.g., when it is physically
isolated (air-gapped) from other networks. Moreover, as we will show in this paper, com-
pared to the existing physical side/covert channel attacks [29, 41, 55, 149, 150, 151, 152]
that can successfully attack an isolated system, the discovered side-channel can exfiltrate
data with much higher data-rate, and in many cases, it can be received from much further
distances.
This work makes the following contributions:
• Describes a new physical side-channel vulnerability that exploits the signals (e.g., EM
emanations) produced by the system’s voltage regulator module to infer the processor’s
power-states,
• A proof-of-concept exploitation of this vulnerability by creating a covert channel with
low bit-error-rate, and with a high data-rate to exfiltrate data from an air-gapped com-
puter,
• A practical demonstration of data exfiltration at a distance and through a wall in an office
environment.
• A proof-of-concept design and implementation of a keystroke logging framework by
exploiting the proposed side-channel.
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7.2 Background
7.2.1 Power Management in Modern Systems
To improve energy efficiency, modern computer systems, especially mobile ones where en-
ergy efficiency directly affects battery life, employ a number of power-management tech-
niques. One of the most popular such techniques is dynamic voltage-frequency scaling
(DVFS) [153, 154], where the processor’s clock frequency can be adjusted dynamically
depending on the level of performance that is required. The reduced clock frequency re-
duces power consumption by executing fewer instructions (and thus spending less energy)
per unit time. Furthermore, the speed at which the processor’s circuitry can operate is
dependent on its operating voltage, so the processor’s operating voltage can be lowered
as its operating frequency is reduced, which (dramatically) reduces the energy consumed
per instruction executed. Another very popular technique consists of placing unused units
within the processor into a low-power state, typically by no longer clocking the unit (clock
gating [155]), but in some cases also by further reducing the unit’s voltage level or even
completely powering it down. Most modern processors deploy both sets of techniques. For
example, the Demand Based Switching (DBS) [156] technology in Intel’s processors pro-
vides the processor with a number of performance states (P-states), each with a different
voltage-frequency value, and also a number of processor states (C-states) which correspond
to different levels of low-power idleness. Recent processors can have more than 10 different
P-states, where P0 is the highest-performance state, and higher state numbers correspond
to lower voltage-frequency settings (and thus lower performance). For Intel processors up
to Haswell/Broadwell architecture, the desired P-state is specified by the operating system,
by writing the corresponding value into a special processor register, and the processor’s
hardware simply implements the specified voltage-frequency settings [157]. More recently
(starting with the Skylake architecture [158]), the operating system can leave the control
of the P-states to the processor’s hardware (called Speed-Shift technology [156] by Intel),
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and this is the default behavior in recent operating system releases because it enables more
rapid P-state adjustments as the processor’s workload changes.
Whereas P-states allow management of the tradeoff between the processor’s perfor-
mance and energy consumption while active, the C-states are a set of low-power modes
that the processor can switch to when it is idle. The C0 state corresponds to the processor’s
normal operation (execution of instructions), whereas C1, C2, etc. states correspond to
idleness with increasing levels of clock- and power-gating for the units within the proces-
sor. Thus higher-numbered C-states save more energy while the processor is idle, but also
take more time to “wake up” the processor. Typically, states C1 through C3 only apply
clock-gating, C4 through C6 reduce the voltage, and new Enhanced C-states can do both
at the same time. The transition between C-states relies on a set of sensors that monitor
utilization of the cores, but the actual algorithm for choosing when and which C-state to use
is not publicly available (and may change from one generation of processors to the next).
The P- and C-states are enabled by default but, on all recent laptops we examined,
the BIOS has settings for disabling them (at significant cost in terms of power-efficiency).
Further, P-states can also be controlled through the OS using tools provided by the kernel
(e.g., cpufrequtils in Ubuntu).
7.2.2 Voltage Regulator Module (VRM)
VRM supplies power to the cores. The processor uses a set of Voltage Identification (VID)
hardware signals to inform the VRM which voltage-level to provide [159]. The VRM
is typically an integrated circuit that is soldered onto the system’s motherboard, but in
some recent processors (e.g., Intel’s Haswell architecture) the voltage regulator is integrated
into the processor’s package (an Integrated Voltage Regulator, or IVR), or even into the
processor’s silicon die (a Fully Integrated Voltage Regulator, or FIVR).
In laptops (and desktops, too), the most commonly used style of a voltage regulator is a
Buck [160] converter (also called step-down converter). It is a DC-to-DC power converter
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which is connected at its input to a higher-voltage DC supply (e.g., the laptop’s battery
pack or AC-power adapter, which typically supply 10-20 V), and outputs a lower voltage,
typically between 0.7 V to 1.4 V to its load.
Intuitively, a Buck converter consists of a capacitor at its output that it tries to keep
filled to the desired voltage level. Since the load draws current from this capacitor, the
charge it holds drains over time, causing its voltage to drop. To compensate for this drop,
the converter periodically connects the capacitor to its input, causing a burst of current that
replenishes the capacitor’s charge, thus bringing the output voltage back to the desired level.
The amount of time between these replenishments (switching period) in computer-system
VRMs is typically a few (1-4) microseconds.
The VRM must be capable of supplying enough current under maximum-load condi-
tions, so its switching period must be short enough that even the maximum output current
does not drain the output capacitor below the minimum required level. At low load currents
(e.g., when the processor core is idle), however, the voltage regulator becomes less efficient
– it switches just as often as under full load, thus wasting a similar amount of power on
switching losses, while the power actually provided to the load is very small, so the switch-
ing losses become a much larger fraction of the overall power consumption. Since the low
load current also means that the VRM’s output capacitor is still almost fully charged at
the end of each switching period, a typical VRM improves its low-load efficiency using a
technique called phase shedding [161, 162, 163], where for some of the switching periods
the VRM does not switch, skipping the replenishment of the still-almost-full capacitor and
saving the energy that would have been wasted to do so.
7.3 Side-Channel Vulnerability on the Power Management States
To demonstrate that switching between active and idle power states (i.e., P-states and C-
states) creates a distinguishable signal, we perform a simple experiment where the system
is alternating between an idle and an active state, and the received EM signal is analyzed
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1 vo id microbenchmark ( i n t t1 , i n t t 2 ) {
2 i n t dummy ;
3 w h i l e ( 1 ) {
4 / / a c t i v e s t a t e
5 f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i<t 1 ; i ++)
6 dummy += dummy + i ;
7 / / i d l e s t a t e
8 u s l e e p ( t 2 ) ;
9 }
10 }
Figure 7.1: The micro-benchmark used in this paper to generate ACTIVE and IDLE states




Figure 7.2: Alternation between active/idle states and the spikes (and its first harmonic)
created by the emanated EM signals from PMU shown in the frequency domain over time.
to find whether this alternation can also be found in the signal. As described in section 7.2,
due to the way VRM operates, during the active state, we expect to observe strong (in terms
of magnitude) spikes, and weak spikes during the idle states. We use a program shown in
Figure 7.1 to create such alternations. This program creates an infinite loop that continu-
ously performs some activity (e.g., addition) for a while followed by a period of idleness.
The duration of the active period is controlled by the value of t1, while the duration of
idleness periods is controlled by the value of t2. Note that the actual activity (lines 5-6) can
be any processor-intensive activity. Similarly, the idle periods can be implemented in any
way that leads the OS to believe that the processor will be inactive for a while.
The resulting EM signals emanated from the PMU is depicted in Figure 7.2. This
figure shows how the measured signals change over time in the frequency domain (i.e. a
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spectrogram), where the higher intensity illustrates higher signal amplitude. A repeated
pattern of strong/weak spikes is present, as expected for this side-channel. The frequency
of the spikes also matches with the expected frequency of the PMU (i.e., around 970KHz)
for the tested laptop1. To further examine the received signals, we changed the lengths of
active and idle periods by changing t1 and t2, and observed that the length of the spikes
(i.e., the red lines shown in Figure 7.2) do change as periods change.
To further confirm that these spikes are indeed related to the VRM and caused by the
changes in the processor’s power states (i.e., P- and C-states in Intel’s processors), we re-
peat experiment with disabling/re-enabling of P-states and C-states in the system’s BIOS
(i.e., changing DVFS settings) and examine how that affects the received EM signals and
their spectra. We found that, even when either C-states or P-states (but not both) are dis-
abled, we observe a signal spectrum similar to that in Figure 7.2, i.e., the spikes in the spec-
trum appear and disappear (with no change in the data transmission rate). However, when
both C-states and P-states are disabled, the spikes in the spectrum have a much stronger
magnitude but are continuously present regardless of the program activity. This is consis-
tent with our expectations - when the processor’s management of power states is disabled,
the processor is forced to operate at its nominal operating voltage and frequency regardless
of its workload, even when the system is “idle” 2. This forces the VRM to continuously
remain in its high-power mode. The results of experiments where only C-states or only P-
states were disabled are also consistent with our expectations - in those cases, the processor
can still switch between idle and active states (e.g., C0 and CN for C-states, or PN and PM
where M > N for P-states). This observation indicates that, fundamentally, to observe
this side-channel, the processor needs to be able to switch between at least one high-power
and at least one low-power state (which can be different C-states, different P-states, or a
combination of both).
1These emanations are around the clock frequency of PMU and not processor’s clock frequency since it
is created by PMU and not the CPU.
2When the system is idle while the C-states are disabled, it actually runs the operating system’s “idle”
process, usually an infinite loop, so the system’s processor is not actually idle.
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Attack Model. Based on the observations above, an attacker, A , can exploit these sig-
nals in two meaningful ways: (i) The attacker can create a covert channel by intentionally
forcing the processor to alternate between periods of high activity and periods of idleness,
according to the values of (secret) data bits she desires to exfiltrate. Section 7.4 describes, in
detail, how such a covert channel can be created. (ii) The attacker can monitor the emanated
signals to infer (a) whether the processor has become active or not. Such information can
be particularly helpful to find, for example, whether a key is pressed. Further, the attacker
can monitor these signals to infer (b) how long the processor was active. Such information,
for example, can be used for website fingerprinting (i.e., by measuring how long it takes to
load a webpage, the attacker can infer which website was loaded). Section 7.5 describes
how this side-channel can be leveraged for keylogging in details.
7.4 Covert Channel Communication
7.4.1 Transmitter Design
To create a covert channel, the transmitter (also called source or data sender) application,
which has access to the secret data, should create the side-channel signal depending on
this sensitive information. The transmitter code is shown in Figure 7.3. For each bit of
data, depending on the value of the bit, the code either performs some activity for a while
followed by a period of idleness (i.e., return-to-zero encoding [19]) or only a (longer)
period of idleness. In this code, the duration of the active and idleness periods are controlled
by the value of LOOP PERIOD and SLEEP PERIOD respectively.
Note that none of this code requires elevated (e.g., root-level) privileges, i.e., in our
threat model, the attacker’s program runs as a user-level process that (i) has access to the
data it desires to exfiltrate, but (ii) is denied access to any I/O that would allow it to send
that data out of the system. Given the simplicity and brevity of the code, any number of
programming languages can be used for this purpose, including most scripting languages
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1 vo id t r a n s m i t t e r ( ) {
2 c h a r b i t ; i n t dummy1 ;
3 FILE ∗ f i l e = fopen ( ” s e c r e t ” , ” r ” ) ;
4 w h i l e ( ( b i t = g e t c ( f i l e ) ) != EOF) {
5 i f ( b i t == ’ 1 ’ ) {
6 f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i<LOOP PERIOD ; i ++)
7 dummy1 += dummy1 + i ;
8 / / k e e p i n g t h e p r o c e s s o r a c t i v e
9 u s l e e p ( SLEEP PERIOD ) ;}
10 / / r e t u r n−to−z e r o co d in g
11 e l s e u s l e e p ( SLEEP PERIOD ∗ 2) ;
12 }
13 f c l o s e ( f i l e ) ;
14 }
Figure 7.3: The “transmitter” code for the covert channel communication.
or even shell scripts. Also, note that methods for creating such a malicious code inside
an air-gap computer are abundantly represented in the research literature (e.g., advanced
persistent threat [164]), although we do not discuss them in this paper.
The LOOP PERIOD and SLEEP PERIOD parameters in this code determine the bit-
rate of the channel - in general, smaller values result in higher data rates. However, in
practice, the bit-rate is limited by several practical constraints. First, the active period also
includes the execution of the library and system code that implements the actual call to
usleep and its house-keeping activity, so even when LOOP PERIOD is zero the actual
active period includes execution of tens or hundreds of instructions. The usable values
of the SLEEP PERIOD are also limited, mostly due to the granularity and precision of
time measurement for usleep and the variability in the time needed to exit the idle state.
Finally, the duration of the active and the idle phase should be roughly similar. Based on
our experiments, we found that around 10µs is the limit below which the actual idleness
period of usleep() becomes highly variable3.
3Even the manual page for usleep() states that the sleep time may be lengthened slightly due to other




In conventional communication systems, the transmitter, the receiver, and the signal trans-
mitted between them, are all carefully engineered to achieve a low bit-error-rate (BER)
while sustaining high throughput. This includes maintaining good synchronization between
the transmitter and receiver to minimize insertion and deletion of bits, a sophisticated en-
coding of data bits into the amplitude and phase of the transmitted signal, etc. Furthermore,
the carrier frequency at the transmitter is chosen carefully to support the desired range of
distances between the transmitter and receiver. However, covert channels rely on signals
that are produced unintentionally, thus, there is no control over the transmitter design, i.e.,
the carrier frequency and its stability, the range in which the signal’s amplitude and phase
can be changed depending on the activity, how stable the duration of these changes is, etc.
Therefore, after the signal is received, the detection algorithm must deal with the problems
of discovering when each transmitted bit begins, changes in the signal’s amplitude, etc.
As discussed in Section 7.3, the observed signal patterns when the transmitter code is
executing is similar to Figure 7.2. The key observation from this figure is that the received
signal in frequency domain behaves like on-off keying (OOK) for the considered frequency
components. Therefore, signal power level for each bit will be enough to identify the
received bit. Leveraging the knowledge that there exist many frequency components related




abs (Fn[k]) , (7.1)
where Y[n] is the signal of interest, abs(•) takes the absolute value of its argument, S is
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Figure 7.4: Average magnitude of the considered frequency components and the corre-
sponding bit sequence.




r[m−M + 1 + n]e−2iπkm/M ,
M is the size of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) function and r[m] is mth sample of the
received signal. The goal here is to increase the difference in magnitude between bit 0 and
bit 1 to minimize the error-rate of the covert communication.
An example for Y[n] is given in Figure 7.4 where we only used the fundamental fre-
quency and its first harmonic from the actual signal. We also plot the time-interval for each
signal (called signal timing) and the transmitted bit. The main observations from this figure
are the following:
• The signal exhibits a sharp increase whenever a new bit is transmitted, even when the bit
is a zero, because processor activity is needed to execute the program code that cleans
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up at the end of a previous usleep, reads a new bit of data, and begins a new interval.
• The magnitudes are affected by not only the additive noise but also by the variations in
the execution of the transmitter.
• Due to these variations (especially the sleep time), the duration of a signal that corre-
sponds to one “transmitted” bit varies among instances of these bits, even when the bits
have the same value.
It is a common practice for the conventional communication systems to use a matched
filter and sample the filtered signal at each symbol (bit), but that approach assumes that
the symbols have practically no variation in their duration, i.e., the transitions from sym-
bol to symbol are synchronous with a highly stable clock, and can thus be re-created at
the receiver accurately. We found that, when applying the matched filter approach to our
received signal, the BER was high, and upon further investigation we found that the main
reason for this is the asynchronous nature of the signal - the actual bit positions in the signal
quickly become misaligned with the clock created by the receiver in an attempt to match
the transmitter’s symbol-rate. Therefore, we had to devise a more robust (but also more
computationally intensive) method for determining the timing of each bit.
2) Signal Timing for the Covert Communication
We determine signal timing (i.e., the time interval for each bit) using batch processing, i.e.,
we determine the timing of the bit by examining not only the signal that corresponds to that
bit, but, also by considering a number of bit periods that precede and follow it which, in
turn, reduce error-rate significantly while adding negligible detection latency.
The first step for batch processing is to find the starting locations of each bit by knowing
that the derivative on these edges is almost infinity. To mimic the derivative operation, we
convolve the batch signal with a vector of length, ld (which depends on the sampling-rate).
Half of the vector is set to one and the rest is set to minus one. This convolution is followed
by finding the local maximum points of the convolution. An example of the process is
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Figure 7.5: Obtaining the start points of each bit by exploiting that sharp increase whenever
a bit is transmitted.
shown in Figure 7.5 where the black dotted line shows the result of the convolution oper-
ation. As seen from the figure, the resulting points of the convolution peak at the edges of
Y[n] which indicate the starting points of a bit transmission.
Obtaining the starting points of the transmitted bits helps to find the expected signaling
time of each bit. Next, we calculate the distances between the starting points of subsequent
bits. The probability density function (PDF) of the distances between subsequent bits are
given in Figure 7.6. This figure illustrates that the signal time has a Rayleigh distribution.
The tails of the distribution indicate that some of the bit locations could not be captured
because the distances between points have a positive-skewed distribution (which results in
detection errors that will be discussed later).
Having the signaling time of the transmitted bits helps to fill the gaps that the detection
algorithm could not find at its first attempt. We choose the signaling time of the covert
communication as the point whose cumulative probability distribution equals to 0.5 since
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Figure 7.6: Pulse width variation of the covert communication system.
the distance distributions accumulate around this point and using the median value can
minimize the false insertion and deletion rate of bits.
3) Signal Labeling Based on Average Signal Power
The variation in signal timing can also cause incorrect labeling of the received bits. The
total power of the received signal could be high only because the usually very short active
part of the signaling period has lasted much longer than usual. Therefore, while decod-
ing the received signal, the algorithm also needs to take into account the variation of the
signaling period’s duration.
Specifically, the receiver detection algorithm utilizes the average power of the received
signal samples for each bit. Let’s assume we have the samples s[n] ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}
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Figure 7.7: The power distribution of the pulses generated by the power management unit
for IDLE (left) and ACTIVE (right) states.





|s[n]|2 > thr, (7.2)
where thr is the threshold value. However, the threshold value must be chosen carefully
to minimize the error-rate. Figure 7.7 illustrates the distribution for the average signal
magnitude for each bit. We observe that there exist two peaks which indicate the power
of bit zero and bit one. Therefore, the algorithm selects the threshold as the mean of the
points corresponding to these two peaks. This threshold selection process is also illustrated
in Figure 7.7. Red lines in the figure correspond to the local maximum of average power
distribution, and the dotted black line is the selected threshold value for the batch. The
equal signs on the arrows mean that the distances indicated by these arrows are equal.
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Figure 7.8: Bit deletion (top) and insertion (bottom) in the covert communication channel
due to variations in signal timing.
4) Bit Deletion/Insertion
This covert channel presents many challenges not only because its signaling periods are not
explicitly synchronized, but also because of occurrences of other system activity, such as
interrupts and micro-architectural events (e.g., page faults, cache misses). These events can
cause errors in the signaling periods they occur in, and also, in a sort of “domino effect”,
make errors much more likely for other signaling periods in the same batch.
An example of the bit deletion and insertion is shown in Figure 7.8. In the figure (top),
the blue line represents the received signal, black lines correspond to the estimation of the
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detection algorithm for the possible bit starting location. The dashed black lines (bottom)
represent the starting location of a bit signal and the red box contains the region where the
insertion occurs due to an interrupt. The actual bit starting points are given with red dotted
lines (top). We observe that one of the bits is deleted. We also provide three sequences
labeled with S1, S2 and S3, which correspond to an actual transmitted bit sequence, ac-
tual transmitted bit sequence after deletion, and the estimated bit sequence, respectively.
Here, the receiver’s detection algorithm fails because the edges at the beginning of each
transmitted bit completely disappear. The reason behind this disappearing is that other sys-
tem activities get activated which suppresses the effect of the designed micro-benchmark.
However, we observe that the deletion probability of the system is pretty low (<0.2%).
Therefore, this problem can be addressed by employing even relatively simple error cor-
recting codes in the “transmitter” application. In our experiments, we use a very simple
(parity) code, which keeps our “transmitter” application simple enough to manually imple-
ment on a target machine in a few minutes.
7.4.3 Experimental Evaluation
Measurement Setup
To show the feasibility of exploiting this covert channel, we present our experimental re-
sults in two practically relevant scenarios: when a compact and stealthy receiver apparatus
is placed in close proximity to the target system, and when a larger (briefcase-sized) an-
tenna is placed up to 2.5 meters away, and also when the antenna is in an adjacent room,
1.5 m away but with a structural 35 cm thick wall included in that distance.
We used a software-defined-radio (RTL-SDRv3 [165], commercially available for $25)
for signal acquisition which is as large as a small flash drive. For proximity measurements,
we used a coin-shaped handmade 33-turn coil magnetic field probe with a radius of 5 mm
which costs <$5 (no amplifier is used). For the distance and non-line-of-sight (NLoS)
measurements, we used the same SDR with a magnetic loop antenna (AOR-LA390 [166])
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with a radius of 30 cm which costs $200, including a built-in 20dB amplifier.
For the transmitter, we used usleep() for UNIX-based machines, and Sleep() for
Windows-based machines. The sampling-rate for the SDR was set to 2.4 million samples
per second, which is the maximum this SDR is capable of. We used 1024 point FFT with
maximum overlapping. The receiver’s detection algorithm was implemented in MATLAB
2017-b. For synchronization between the transmitter and receiver at the start of the com-
munication, the transmitter sends a pre-defined bit-stream of interleaved ones and zeros
followed by a known short bit-stream of zeros only. The transmitter then sends a preamble
to indicate the start of the transmission, and then sends the actual data. Depending on the
requirement, the data can be sent in packets or continuously. Unless otherwise indicated,
we used SLEEP PERIOD= 100µs (for UNIX-based machines) or = 1ms (minimum pos-
sible for Windows-based machines) and set LOOP PERIOD such that the active and idle
periods have (almost) equal lengths.
We used 6 laptops from 5 different vendors (see Table 7.1), various processor architec-
ture generations, and three popular OS families (Linux, MacOS, and Windows). To receive
the EM signals, we placed the probe 10 cm away from the computer. To find the position
where the signal power is the strongest, we manually localized the source of the signal. We
found that the position which the signal is strongest is slightly different from one laptop to
another but they are mostly concentrated in the middle and/or the bottom right quarter of
the laptop (on top of the keyboard). Note that all these measurements were done without
making any changes to the laptop’s package. Also, all the measurements were done in the
presence of other system’s normal activities (i.e., handling interrupts, context-switch, etc.).
Near-Field Measurements
To measure the BER and bit-rate, we created a randomly-generated sequence of bits. Also,
to decrease the BER, the transmitter application inserts parity bits such that the minimum
Hamming distance between different codewords was at least three (to correct one error).
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Table 7.1: List of laptops and their OS and (Intel) processor architecture used in our exper-
iments.
Model OS Architecture
Dell Precision 7290 Windows 10 Kaby Lake
MacBookPro-2015 macOS (Mojave) Broadwell
Dell Inspiron 15-3537 Linux (Debian) Haswell
MacBookPro-2018 macOS (Mojave) Coffee Lake
Lenovo Thinkpad Linux (Ubuntu) SkyLake




























Figure 7.9: Transmission-rate comparison (higher is faster) between the proposed covert
channel and the state-of-the-art (shown in log-scale). Each bar represents an existing attack.
The proposed work achieve more than 3x higher TR compared to the fastest attack.
In Table 7.2, we provide the experimental results for six laptops. The columns of the table
correspond to the average number (for 5 runs) of BER, transmission rate (TR), insertion
probability (IP), and deletion probability (DP). To calculate the IP and DP, we compared the
actual transmitted sequence with the received sequence based on the algorithm described
in Section 7.4.
As shown in the table, the proposed covert channel can achieve up to 3.7 kbps (kilo-bits
per second) while having less than 0.1% BER with a low-cost and compact setup, and that
the main determinant of the bit-rate is the operating system, i.e., the precision with which
the transmitter application can control idleness time - the usleep in Linux and MacOS is
significantly more precise than sleep used in Windows, so the TR in Linux and MacOS
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Table 7.2: Experimental results for close proximity. The results include the bit-error-rate
(BER), transmission-rate (TR), insertion probability (IP), and deletion probability (DP) for
the proposed covert channel on different laptops.
BER TR (bps) IP DP
DELL
2× 10−3 982 0 0
Precision
MacBookPro
3× 10−2 3700 0 3× 10−3
(2015)
DELL
8× 10−3 3162 4.5× 10−3 6.3× 10−3
Inspiron
MacBookPro
2.8× 10−2 3640 0 2.9× 10−3
(2018)
Lenovo
5× 10−3 3020 0 1× 10−3
Thinkpad
Sony
4× 10−3 974 0 5× 10−3
Ultrabook
systems is 3-4 kbps while the TR for Windows systems is slightly below 1 kbps.
Figure 7.9 compares the maximum TR of the proposed covert channel to the state-of-
the-art. Specifically we compared our method to 7 different attacks that leveraged physical
side-channels to establish a covert channel. As can be seen from the figure, the proposed
covert channel can achieve more than 3x faster TR compared to the fastest existing covert
channel attack, GSMem [150]. Note that, to provide a fair comparison, for each work we
only report the TR with a similar measurement setup (if available), i.e., similar distance
and/or measurement equipment.
To study the effect of background activity on the TR, we repeated our measurements,
this time with adding a resource-intensive background activity (in addition to normal OS
background activities which were present in all the results showed in Table 7.2 and Fig-
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Table 7.3: Experimental results with distance. The results include the bit-error-rate (BER),
transmission-rate (TR), insertion probability (IP), and deletion probability (DP).
Distance BER TR (bps) IP DP
1 m 9 × 10
−3 1872 5 × 10−3 0
9 × 10−4 1645 1 × 10−3 0
1.5 m 5 × 10−3 1454 0 0
2.5 m 8 × 10−3 1110 0 0
ure 7.9). We observed that to handle background activities, the OS tends to produce short
bursts of activity which do not affect our covert-channel detection much since they are
smaller than one sleep/active period. Longer bursts of activity do create some errors in our
detection, but these are fixed/corrected using parity-bits (c.f. §7.4.2). However, if there
are longer periods of activity, e.g., intense activities by other processes, the covert-channel
transmission can either lower the transmission-rate or even pause temporarily. Using this
new measurement, we found that to achieve similar BER to that of Table 7.2 in the presence
of resource-intensive background activity, the TR has to be decreased (only for UNIX and
macOS laptops), on average, by 15% (with worst-case of 21%).
Distance Measurements
LoS Measurements. To study the effect of distance on TR, we computed the BER and TR
while the loop antenna was put 1, 1.5, and then 2.5 meters away from the target laptop. We
manually set the antenna’s orientation to maximize the signal SNR. As mentioned in §7.4.3,
the loop antenna has about a 30 cm diameter and it can be easily hidden in a briefcase.
Table 7.3 shows the results for these 3 distances for the DELL Inspiron laptop. As
can be seen from this table, the TR can be approximately 2 kbps when the distance for
the communication link is around 1m. Additionally, we decrease TR so that BER of the
system at different distances is almost the same for a fair evaluation of the performance of
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Figure 7.10: Experimental setup when an attacker and a victim are separated by a wall.
the communication link.
It can be observed that having smaller TR for larger distances makes the communica-
tion more reliable. Although the rate decreases as the distance increases, we can receive
1110 bps when the distance is about 2.5m.
NLoS Measurements (through the wall). The setup for NLoS measurements is shown in
Figure 7.10 where the transmitter and receiver are separated by an office wall which has
about 35 cm thickness. Moreover, as can be seen, there are other electronic devices such
as a printer in the transmitter’s room and a refrigerator in the receiver’s room which also
generates unintentional EM emanations which can interfere with the laptop’s emanations
and hence makes the signal noisier. Note that we intentionally chose this setup to show that
the proposed covert communication can work reliably even in the presence of other sources
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of EM emanations.
To maintain a low BER compared to the near-field measurements, the bit-rate had to be
decreased to 821 bps while having 6× 10−3 BER. However, as the signaling period is now
significantly longer than the typical duration of an interrupt, the detection algorithm is bet-
ter able to tolerate these system events, and so deletion and/or insertion of bits occurs less
often or not at all. Overall, the NLoS measurements show that the covert communications
are still possible (although at the lower rate) even when the transmitter and receiver are in
two separate rooms which makes the attack more stealthy.
7.5 Keylogging
7.5.1 Overview
The goal in keystroke logging, or keylogging, is to find when and which key has been
pressed on a computer keyboard. This, in turn, can lead to stealing sensitive information,
passwords, etc. In general, every keystroke can be shown as a 3-tuple [167], (tp, tr, k),
where tp is when the key is pressed, tr is when the key is released, and k is the physical
key identifier. Using this definition, keylogging becomes a two-phase problem: keystroke
detection (i.e., correctly finding tp and tr) and key identification (i.e., finding k). It is im-
portant to mention that while, ideally, the goal for keylogging is to find the exact character
for each keystroke, realistic attacks [167] typically provide a significantly reduced possible
states for a keystroke/word. Using this reduced state space, an attacker can then leverage a
brute-force attack to eventually find the actual characters. In this section, we show how EM
emanations from PMU can be leveraged to provide highly accurate keystroke detection.
Compared to the existing works that leveraged digital (e.g., cache usage) [168, 169, 170,
171] and/or physical [51, 59, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176] for keylogging, the main advantage
of using the proposed side-channel for keylogging is that it enables the attackers to perform
an attack from a distance behind a wall even on an isolated air-gapped computer.
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Figure 7.11: PMU’s EM emanations over time when the user is typing: “can you hear
me ”.
7.5.2 Keylogging Side-Channel Attack
The main idea behind this attack is that pressing a key creates a burst of activity on the
processor which, in turn, causes the (otherwise idle) processor to briefly switch to an active
state, hence creates (stronger) EM emanations from the PMU.
Figure 7.11 shows the spectrogram for the EM emanations received from the PMU
(using the setup used in §7.4.3) when the user is typing a sentence/password: can you
hear me. As can be seen in the figure, each character (including the white-spaces shown
as ‘ ’) has a distinguishable pattern which means the total number of characters can be
found with high accuracy using a simple-yet-effective detection algorithm. Moreover, as
can be observed in Figure 7.11, the number of words and their length can also be inferred
by grouping relatively close spikes (lines in the spectrogram) together.
Apart from the number of characters, words, and the length of each word, existing
work [177, 178] has shown that the duration of each keystroke and the time difference be-
tween two consecutive keys can also be leveraged to further reduce the search space for
key identification. Salthouse [177] has empirically shown that (i) keys that are far apart are
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pressed in quicker succession than keys that are close together (e.g., see you vs. can in
Figure 7.11). (ii) letter pairs that occur frequently in language are typed in quicker succes-
sion than infrequent letter pairs (e.g., see hear in Figure 7.11). (iii) practicing a specific
keystroke sequence can significantly reduce inter-key timings (e.g., compare the timing
for the white-space character in the first word, can, vs. the rest of the sentence). Using
these findings, after properly detecting each keystroke’s timing, supervised or unsupervised
classifiers can be used to identify the keystrokes/words and/or to reduce the search space.
7.5.3 Experimental Evaluation
Setup. We used the same setup discussed in subsection 7.4.3 for near-field and distance
measurements and performed our measurements at three distances: 10cm, 2m, and 1.5m
through the wall while the DELL Precision laptop was used. For each distance, a randomly-
generated text with 1000 words4 is typed (by the same person) in the Chrome browser while
the signal was recorded. It is important to mention that all the measurements were done in
the presence of other system’s normal activities, including activities related to the browser.
Keystroke/Character Detection. To find the total number of characters (i.e., total number
of keystrokes), we first normalized and then transformed the signal into a sequence of (non-
overlapping) spectral samples (SS) by using short-time Fourier transform (STFT), which
divides the signal into equal-sized segments (windows) each 5ms long. STFT then applied
the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to each window to obtain its spectrum. We then chose
a frequency band which contains the spikes related to PMU (the band is typically known
for each device, but can also be easily found using standard peak detection techniques).
We then used a simple thresholding technique (cf. §7.4.2) to decide whether the particular
window contains a keystroke or not. To reduce false-positives, our detection algorithm
then filtered out keystrokes that are shorter than a threshold (i.e., 30 ms in our experiments)
4obtained from https://www.livechatinc.com/typing-speed-test/#/
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Table 7.4: Experimental results for keylogging in different distances. Results show the
accuracy of correctly detecting characters and word lengths.
Distance Char. Acc. Word Acc.
TPR FPR Precision Recall
10 cm 100% 3% 71% 100%
2m 99% 1.8% 70% 100%
1.5m (with wall) 97% 0.7% 70% 98%
knowing that a valid keystroke should take longer than this threshold.
Table 7.4 shows the accuracy (in terms of true-positive and false-positive rates, de-
noted as TPR and FPR) of detecting characters for the three distances. False positives are
mainly caused by other system activity, such as handling of the browser requests, which
also appeared as a (typically much shorter) bursts of activity. As the distance increased,
such activity became less prominent (i.e., lower signal amplitude) which, in turn, caused
a reduction in FPR. However, this reduction in the amplitude also affected the TPR as the
emanations caused by keystrokes also became weaker.
Word Detection. Once characters are correctly detected, the next step is to group the
characters into the words. There are numerous techniques to reconstruct words based on
individual characters. Particularly, we used the method proposed by Berger et al. [174].
Table 7.4 shows the accuracy. Since word-length is a multi-class classification problem,
instead of TPR and FPR, we report precision percentage as the fraction of correctly labeled
words (i.e., words with correctly predicted length) among the retrieved words, and also
report recall as the fraction of words that have been retrieved over the total amount of
existing words in the text. As the table shows, we were able to detect almost all the words
while keeping the precision accuracy above 70%. The distance did not have a significant
impact on either of these two metrics.
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7.6 Prior Work and Countermeasures
Electromagnetic Side-Channels. Prior work on EM side-channel mainly focused on the
extraction of small amounts of highly sensitive data (such as cryptographic keys) from the
system [35, 42, 179, 180, 181, 42]. Beyond extracting sensitive data values, EM emana-
tions have also been used to learn more about program behavior, e.g., for identifying web
pages during browsing [182], program execution profiling [127, 183], finding anomalies in
software activity [184, 105, 185, 129], establishing trust [186], etc.
While existing works have shown the existence of side-channel EM emanations from
different electronic components within a computer, to the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that identifies the EM-based vulnerability created by the power management unit
and exploits this vulnerability to establish a covert channel and/or a keylogging framework.
Also related to this work, are the methods based on the variations on the voltage and
their corresponding EM emanations [37, 45, 57]. The main difference between the pro-
posed side-channel and these works is that voltage-variation is instruction-dependent while
the VRM side-channel is a micro-architecture vulnerability. Note that while the EM ema-
nations for the voltage-variation are the strongest close to the VRM (because VRM spends
most of the power) its existence is unrelated to how the VRM operates (i.e., the created
side-channel is application-dependent, not VRM-dependent). Due to this difference, the
proposed side-channel creates much stronger signals which can be received several meters
away. Moreover, unlike other methods, it is resistant against techniques like randomiza-
tion/blinding.
Physical Side-Channels. Exploiting other physical side-channels such as acoustic, tem-
perature, etc. [43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60] to create
a covert channel/keylogging, is another groups of related work. Overall, depending on the
setup, different physical side-channels can be used. The main differences between them
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are a) measurement requirements (i.e., cost and size of the receiver, signal-to-noise ratio
and maximum achievable distance, etc.), and b) the maximum achievable bit-rate which
indicates how severe and stealthy the attack could be. As shown in §7.4.3, compared to the
state-of-the-art, the proposed side-channel can achieve more than 3x faster bit-rate mainly
because it relies on the fast switches between idle and active states on PMU.
Yet another related work to this paper are the methods to exploit the power management
unit by leveraging digital side-channels [148, 149, 29, 187]. Most recently, Khatamifard
et al. [149] proposed POWERT, a new method to leverage the power budget for creating
a covert channel. To transmit data, POWERT either creates power-intensive activities or
remains idle. To infer the transmitted data, the Sink process (also located on the same
physical device), measures its own performance by running a known application. The key
idea is that due to the limitation in the power budget, the Sink’s performance is directly
impacted (modulated) by the source activity. In this paper, we showed that compared to
POWERT [149], our proposed covert channel can achieve significantly higher data-rate
(>20x) since it does not rely on the indirect measurement of the performance while it is
less susceptible to the noises generated by the system. Moreover, as mentioned in sec-
tion 7.2, the threat model for these attacks are different from the one used in this paper
since they are leveraging digital side-channels.
Circuit-Level Methods. Another related body of work to this Chapter are circuit-level
techniques to improve the EM/Power side-channel resistance, especially for integrated
cryptographic accelerators on the chip such as AES engines [188, 189, 190, 191]. These
techniques are mainly focused on using on-chip integrated voltage regulators [192] (hence
reducing the amount of pin accessibility to the attacker) and adding randomness to the volt-
age regulator which, in turn, creates random patterns in the side-channel signals [193].
Countermeasures. There are multiple possible countermeasures to mitigate the discovered
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vulnerability. At the system-level, the system software and/or user can disable P/C-states
to perform highly-sensitive computation (briefly, because the energy overheads are signifi-
cant and/or because of the temperature-control requirements). Another solution in this vein
would be to use methods like architecture-blinking [194] (processor is briefly disconnected
from the PMU during sensitive computation to avoid PMU-related leakage of information).
A more fundamental solution, however, would involve adding pre-determinism, random-
ness, and/or noise to the operation of the PMU which, mainly, should be performed at the
circuit-level. Finally, traditional EMI-shielding methods can be used to reduce the SNR
and increase the BER (with their own limitations/overheads).
7.7 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we presented a new, previously unexplored, physical side-channel vulner-
ability caused by the design, implementation, and typical use of the power management
unit (and its main component, the voltage regulator module) in modern computers. Specif-
ically, we showed that different power states on the system (which are primarily utilized to
optimize the energy efficiency) and the way existing PMUs create these states can lead to
a side-channel which can leak sensitive information about the current state of the system.
To exploit this side-channel, we demonstrated two real exploits: a) a covert channel
which leveraged an inexpensive and compact setup to establish the covert communication
and b) a keylogging framework which can accurately detect the keystrokes even when the
receiver was behind a wall on a separate room.
In our experimental evaluation, we used a number of laptop systems, from various ven-
dors, as the target system. We also performed our measurements under realistic conditions
that include environmental EM noise and having other applications run on the target system
concurrently with our data-exfiltration applications.
Our results showed that this newly-discovered side-channel exists on all systems we
evaluated, regardless of hardware platform, operating system, and vendor. Further, we
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showed that, compared to the state-of-the-art, exploiting this side-channel can lead to a
much faster covert channel (when a physical side-channel is used).
We believe that our discovery and detailed analysis of this new side-channel vulner-
ability will help raise professional awareness and academic awareness about security im-
plications of power management, and help existing and future generations of computers




EMSIM - A MICROARCHITECTURE-LEVEL SIMULATION TOOL FOR
ACCURATELY MODELING ELECTROMAGNETIC SIDE-CHANNEL SIGNALS
8.1 Abstract
Physical side-channel attacks have become a serious security concern for computing sys-
tems, especially for embedded and Internet-of-Things devices, where the device is often
located in, or in close proximity to, a public place, and yet the system contains sensitive
information. To design hardware and/or software that is highly resilient to such physical
side-channel attacks, there is a need for accurate and efficient design-stage quantitative
analysis of side-channel leakage. For many system properties (e.g., performance, power,
etc.), cycle-accurate simulation can provide such an an efficient-yet- accurate design-stage
estimate. Unfortunately, for an important class of physical side-channels, electromagnetic
(EM) emanations, an accurate and efficient simulation model does not exist, and there has
not even been much quantitative evidence about what level of modeling detail would be
needed for high accuracy, and/or how much accuracy is sacrificed when not modeling cer-
tain aspects of the hardware, underlying physics, and/or microarchitecture.
While there are tools to identify leaks and metrics to calculate EM side-channel leak-
ages, they are limited due to three main reasons: First, they are mainly focused on de-
veloping metrics to estimate the leakage rather than simulating the original analog signal.
Unfortunately, relying only on these metrics rather than analyzing the actual physical sig-
nal may not be sufficient since they may not reveal the entire true mutual information.
Secondly, existing methods only model the system at architecture-level, i.e., associating a
(leakage) value to individual instructions based on the ISA (e.g., depending on the previous
state of the system, values, etc.), and ignore the micro-architecture events and activities of
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the system such as pipeline stages, stall cycles, cache miss, branch mis-prediction, etc. on
the signal. Unfortunately, these approximations can lead to a significant inaccuracy since
these events may have noticeable effect on the EM analog signal thus can leak extra in-
formation about the application. In other words, by staying at the ISA-level, the model
neglects to account for how that instruction interacts with other instructions and the under-
lying hardware. Third, due to neglecting the impact of micro-architecture, these methods
assume the entire hardware as a single source, and then only model the EM emanations
based on this single source. Unfortunately, such an assumption can lead to large inaccura-
cies since different micro-architecture components (e.g., cache, register-file, etc.) generate
different electromagnetic waves with different polarization and/or phase, and hence, they
may have constructive or destructive impacts on each other and the overall received signal.
To address these challenges, we will develop a new method that enables simulation of
the EM side-channels cycle-by-cycle using the detailed micro-architectural model of the
device. We then will quantitatively assess the accuracy of simulator-generated signals by
comparing them to actual EM signals collected while an actual processor executes the same
program code, and we will further identify how much accuracy suffers when key micro-
architectural features and hardware behaviors are omitted from the simulation model.
The outcome of our work will be an open-source side-channel simulator tool and can
be used for leakage estimation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first micro-
architecture-level EM side-channel model, which allows it to provide much more precise
estimates of leakage not only for individual instructions, but also for sequences of instruc-
tions (when the goal is to assess and improve leakage from a particular piece of code on a
set of hardware platforms), and also the first model that can asses leakage from a particular
part of the processor and/or the memory system (when the goal is to make the hardware
design less “leaky”) while maintaining the performance advantages of a cycle-accurate
simulation relative to a physics-based model.
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8.2 Background
Information leakage through side-channels has become a serious concern in securing com-
puting systems that are located where potential attackers may gain enough physical access
to carry out the attack [42, 49, 195, 196, 197, 198]. This is especially a problem for em-
bedded and Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems which often contain sensitive data, such as
sensor data, login information for over-the-network management of the system and/or ac-
cessing back-end cloud infrastructure, and are often placed in publicly accessible locations.
For some side-channels, such as electromagnetic (EM) emanations, physical proximity can
be leveraged to attack systems that are considered to be physically secure but are located
near publicly accessible locations, e.g., in-wall “smart building” sensors, security cameras,
etc. [37, 38, 180, 131, 199].
To design these systems to be highly resilient to side-channel attacks, side-channel
leakage needs to be quantitatively assessed and attributed to specific hardware and software
components, relatively early in the design of the system. For other system properties such
as performance, power consumption, reliability, etc., such early quantitative assessment
and attribution typically relies on cycle-accurate simulation [92, 147, 200, 201, 202, 203,
204, 205] that models the relevant activities in the system with enough detail to achieve
good accuracy, but without modeling most of the low-level activities that would render
the simulation too slow to be useful for evaluating relevant scenarios. If such efficient-
yet-highly-accurate simulation would exist for EM emanations, hardware designers and
architects could include EM side-channel leakage among their design considerations [194,
206, 207, 208, 209, 210], compilers could use simulation models to optimize for reduced
leakage [211, 212, 213], software designers could detect and mitigate information leakage
problems for security-sensitive applications [214, 215, 216], etc.
Unfortunately, for assessment and attribution of EM side-channel emanations, no such
efficient-yet-highly-accurate simulation exists, and there has not even been much quanti-
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tative evidence about what level of modeling detail would be needed for high accuracy;
how much accuracy is sacrificed when not modeling certain aspects of the hardware and
hardware-software interaction; whether high accuracy for estimating EM emanations can
be achieved without modeling the underlying physics - how magnetic and electric fields
change in response to current flows through semiconductor and metal structures that form
the circuitry of a system; whether it is sufficient to model ISA-level properties without
modeling the microarchitecture; etc.
While there are some tools and metrics to quantify EM side-channel leakages [217, 36,
218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223], they are limited due to three main reasons: First, they
are mainly focused on developing metrics to estimate the information leakage itself, i.e.,
mutual information between the signal and program secrets, rather than modeling the actual
analog signal. Relying only on these metrics rather than analyzing the actual signal, may
not be sufficient since these metrics inherently make assumptions about the aspects of the
signal that attacker may exploit, i.e., they may not reveal all of the information the signal
may contain. Secondly, existing methods only model the system at architecture-level, i.e.,
associating a (leakage) value to individual instructions based on the ISA, and ignore the
micro-architecture activities such as pipeline stages, stall cycles, etc. on the signal. As
we will show in this paper, this can lead to significant inaccuracy, mainly because the
model, by staying at the ISA-level, neglects to account for how that instruction interacts
with other instructions and the underlying hardware. Thirdly, by neglecting the impact
of micro-architecture, these methods implicitly assume that the entire hardware design is
a single source of information, and then only model the EM emanations based on this
single source. Such an assumption can lead to large inaccuracies since different micro-
architecture components (e.g., cache, register-file, etc.) generate different electromagnetic
waves with different polarization and/or phase, and hence, they may have constructive or
destructive impacts on each other and the overall received signal.
To address these challenges, in this work we take a different approach. We develop a
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simulator, EMSim, that is able to simulate the EM side-channel signals cycle-by-cycle us-
ing the detailed micro-architectural model of the device. We then quantitatively assess the
accuracy of simulator-generated signals by comparing them to the EM signals collected
while an actual processor executes the same program code, and we further identify how
much accuracy suffers when key micro-architectural features and hardware behaviors are
omitted from the simulation model. By using a systematic set of measurements, along with
regression-based parameter estimation and multiple-input-single-output (MISO) communi-
cation system modeling, we show that EMSim is able to produce an EM signal that closely
matches the actual signal, and it is robust against different sources of variability.
8.3 Experimental Methodology
Before describing how EMSim simulates side-channel signals, this section describes our
experimental methodology for obtaining EM signals generated by actual hardware, as this
information may help the reader better understand the discussion of EMSim.
8.3.1 Hardware and Measurement Setup
While signals can be collected from an actual off-the-shelf processor, such a processor
would be difficult to model in detail because many of its microarchtiectural details (of
even entire microarchitectrual blocks) are not publicly available, and unceratinty about
how well the model used in EMSim matches the actual miscroarchitecture would make
direct comparison of real and simulated signals difficult. Therefore, we implement a RISC-
V [224] processor on an FPGA (using Verilog), giving us full knowledge of the actual
microarchitecture of the processor.
We implement a 32-bit base RISC-V ISA [225] which provides a convenient ISA and
software toolchain “skeleton” suitable for resource-constrained design scenarios such as
embedded systems [224]. We also implement the multiplication/division extension (“M”)








Figure 8.1: Reconstructing the original signal using three different approaches. Using a
combination of a sinusoidal and an exponential function (f(t) in Equ. 8.5) can achieve the
best accuracy.
tensively tested the correctness of the processor’s implementation. The designed proces-
sor has five pipeline stages namely: Fetch, Decode, Execute, Memory, and
Writeback. The processor also has (i) a branch prediction unit with a 2-level predic-
tor [226] and a branch-target-buffer (BTB), (ii) a 32-entry 32-bit register-file, and (iii) a
32KB cache. Cache-hit takes one extra cycle and reading from memory takes extra 2 cy-
cles (in addition to the cache latency). However, these delays can be changed, e.g. to study
their effect on the side-channel signal.
Using the implemented processor, we then use a magnetic probe and a signal acquisition
device (an oscilloscope) to receive and record the EM signals (more details on §5).
8.3.2 Signal Acquisition
Capturing the emanated signal is the first step to model the signal. Unfortunately, measur-
ing the ideal emanated signal (i.e., not corrupted by additive channel white noise) is not
possible if only one-time-run of any instruction sequence is considered. One option is to
collect many one-time-run signals and take the average. The problem with this approach
is capturing synchronized signals, i.e., the starting points of captured signals may not cor-
respond to the same processing-time of the given instruction sequence. To address this
problem, we use a novel signal-processing method called “modulo operation” [227] to cre-
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ate a highly accurate estimate of the ideal emanated signal, i.e., to remove most of the noise
and distortion that was present in the actual signal due to under-sampling, synchronization,
noise, and other imperfections that are unavoidable during practical collection of signals.
The main parameters for the modulo operation are the number of clock cycles to execute
a given sequence,noc, the sampling-rate of the instrument, and the clock frequency of the
device. After having these parameters, the next step is to collect the emanated signal. For
that, a given sequence is executed several times (1000 times in our measurements). Each
set of measurements consists of a sequence of instructions (called sequence). The goal
is to retrieve the emanated signal for the sequence.
The next step is to utilize the modulo operation to map each received samples to average
these many measurements. Assuming Ts is the total time to execute the sequence once (i.e.,
Ts = noc× Tclk), it applies the following operation to the sampling time of each sample to
map each sample to its fundamental period:
∆m = mod(Tm, Ts), (8.1)
where Tclk is the clock time, ∆m is called the modular offset, and Tm is the sampling time
of mth sample. After obtaining the modular offsets for each sample, the modulo operation
takes the mean of the samples that have same modular offset, to produce the desired signal.
Further signal-processing techniques such as moving average, Gaussian filtering, etc., can
be applied to this generated signal to obtain smoother reference signals.
8.3.3 Signal Reconstruction
Simulating an analog signal can be considered a signal-processing reconstruction problem
where a continuous signal (i.e., EM in this case) needs to be determined from a sequence
of equally-spaced samples with sampling-rate T , where T is preferably much smaller than
Tclk. Such a signal can be ideally reconstructed using Whittaker-Shannon interpolation
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formula [228], however, it is well-known that such a method is not feasible in practice.
Instead, a popular method for signal reconstruction is zero-order hold (ZOH) technique
where a continuous signal, y, can be reconstructed from a sample sequence x[n], assuming




x[n]× rect(t− T/2− nT
T
). (8.2)
To improve the ZOH accuracy, in this paper we make an observation that switching
activity in a processor is synchronized to its clock and most of the switching happens right
after the positive/negative edge of the clock. Thus, instead of using a rectangular function
(which implies that activity is evenly spread over a cycle), a decaying function can be used:
f1(t) = e
−θtu(t), (8.3)
where θ is a positive normalization factor that changes the width of the signal, and u(t) is




x[n]× e−θ(t−nT ) × u(t− nT ). (8.4)
However, we observed that the received signal is also exposed to oscillations with de-
creasing magnitude. To meet the requirements for both oscillations and decreasing ampli-
tude, combining sinusoidal with exponential can increase the accuracy further:
f(t) = sin(2πt/T0)× e−θt × u(t), (8.5)
where T0 is the periodicity of the sinus function. Again, substituting rect() in Equ. 8.2 by
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)e−θ(t−nT )u(t− nT ). (8.6)
In Figure 8.1, we plot a measured signal and its reconstructions with these options. We
observe that f(t) explains the behavior of the received signal much better. Thus, by finding
x[n] for each cycle and using Equ. 8.6, the analog side-channel signal can be modeled.
8.4 EMSim Modeling
8.4.1 Overview
Fundamentally, EM side-channel signals are created due to bit-flips at the transistor-level [229,
38]. In principle, all transistors and metal-layer interconnect components contribute to the
signal, thus the signal could be modeled using all transistors and on-chip wires as predictor
variables, which should be highly accurate but is practically infeasible. As a result, the
main challenge in model-building is to select (or discard) potential predictors in a system-
atic manner, to achieve a trade-off where feasibility (or even efficiency) is achieved without
a major sacrifice in accuracy.
To achieve a simple yet accurate model, existing methods are mainly focused on indi-
vidual instructions and their operands, and they attribute an “average” behavior to each of
the instructions, rather than model its cycle-by-cycle effect on the processor’s hardware. In
effect, these methods model a simplified one-instruction-at-a-time implementation, essen-
tially ignoring pipeline effects and other important aspects of the micro-architecture.
To more accurately simulate EM signals, we model micro-architectural components as
independent sources of EM emanations and then further group these units in each pipeline
stage as an individual source. We used pipeline stages as the sources mainly because we
observed that each instruction has different footprint in each cycle, and the side-channel
generated at each cycle is a combination of these activities in ALL stages. Using this
150
methodology, we model a multi-input (pipeline stages), single-output (EM signal) system
(MISO).
Leveraging this approach, the challenges are a) how to model the signal for individual
sources, and b)how to properly combine the signals generated by each source to accurately
form the side-channel signal.
8.4.2 Signal Amplitude for Individual Sources
In practice, there are two contributors in creating EM side-channel signals for each pipeline
stage. The first group of contributors, which we call instruction-dependent activities, are
caused by the switching activities of micro-architectural units (e.g., register-file, ALU, etc.)
that are utilized in that stage (e.g., whether the register-file is being written or not).
The second group, data-dependent activities, are created due to bit-flips on the data-
bus, address-bus, and any other registers that hold operand’s values. These bit-flips are
independent from the instruction-type but are dependent to the previous state of the bus. In
the following, we will describe how we independently measure each of these two groups.
Instruction-Dependent Activities. To independently measure these groups, we first mini-
mize the effect of the data-dependent activities by setting all the operands, addresses, and
immediate values to zero. This approach enables us to measure the baseline signal for each
stage which is only created by the switching activities of the micro-architectural units used
in that stage.
After decoupling the data-related activities from the signal, the second challenge is to
minimize the effects of other stages on the generated EM signal. Recall that we mentioned
ALL pipeline stages contribute to the overall signal, however, ideally we want to be able
to measure the effect of each stage separately so that we can use them as the basic-blocks
to reconstruct the overall signal. To achieve that, we use NOP 1 instruction as the baseline
1In our core, NOP is implemented as “ADD r0, r0, r0”. Given that r0 is hardwired to 0, this instruction

















Figure 8.2: The signal amplitude for an ADD as it progress in the pipeline (while all other
instructions are NOP). The actual signal is shown in light color (green). Darker color (black)
shows the simulated signal when considering each pipeline stage as a separate source (top),
and when considering the entire processor as a single source (bottom), and the largest
differences between the two are pointed out using red ellipses.
since it has the minimum possible switching activity, and then create NOP → inst →
NOP instruction sequence (for all instructions), while operands for inst are all set to r1
(and r1 = 0). Using this method, no data/operand-dependent bit-flips are created, but
register-file, ALU, etc. may be used (depending on the instruction type). We then measure
the signal amplitude for all instructions and every pipeline stages. We call this baseline
hardware amplitude or A.
Figure 8.2 shows how the (actual) EM signal (shown in green/light color) changes as
an ADD instruction progresses through the pipeline while all the other instructions are NOP.
Using Equ. 8.6 and NOP→ inst→ NOP instruction sequence, we used our simulator to
generate the signal. Further, to show why individual stages should be modeled separately,
Figure 8.2 (bottom) shows the simulated signal when the “average” amplitude is used for
all stages. As can be seen, failing to model each stage individually (as used in previous
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work [221]) can lead to significant inaccuracies in some stages (note that using max instead
of average also leads to similar inaccuracies).
Data-Dependent Activities. Once the baseline amplitude is measured, the next step is to
find how this amplitude changes as the number of bit-flips changes due to value/operand
used in the instruction and the previous state of the bus/register. Intuitively, the more bit-
flips, the higher the amplitude should be thus we define activity-factor, α, as a scaling
factor to the baseline activity, A. To find α, we first treat each bit-flip equally, and assume
that each bit-flip has similar effect on the signal amplitude. We then calculate α as:




where flipsnew is the total number of flips for the current instruction, flipsbase is the total
number of flips when previous instruction is NOP, and flips total is the maximum possible
number of flips for the current instruction. Using this equation, we then define A′ = α×A,
and use it to simulate the signal. Figure 8.3 (bottom) shows the original signal (shown in
light green), and the simulated signal using this approach (shown in black) for the simi-
lar NOP→ inst→ NOP instruction sequence discussed in the previous section. As can
be seen in the figure (bottom), this “averaging” modeling can not accurately predict the
amplitude of the signal which indicates that not all the bit-flips have the similar impact on
the amplitude. Our further investigation confirmed this theory. Particularly, we found that
flips in the output of the ALU and memory have the most significant impacts on the signal.
We believe this difference is mainly due to the different physical parameters of transistors
and/or lengths of the connecting wires.
Using this observation, to systematically calculate the activity factors, we use a linear
regression model:
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Figure 8.3: Effect of the activity factor on the amplitude. The actual signal shown in green.
The simulation is shown in black when activity factor is modeled using a linear regression
model (top) and when an average activity is used (bottom).
where T is a vector of transition bits across all the existing registers in the targeted pipeline
stage, δ and ε are the vector of scalar intercept and error terms respectively, and c is the
vector of activity factors to be predicted by the model. As mentioned before, α is the
scaling factor for the baseline amplitude, A, thus α = Ameas/Asimul. Note that to find
T , a detailed micro-architecture model is needed to track all the bit-flips for every gate in
the processor (except cache/memory). However, to significantly reduce the complexity and
simulation time, the size of T can be reduced using the step-wise regression method [230]
where, iteratively, the size of the fitted model (i.e., α and T in our case) is reduced using
standard statistical metrics such as F-tests [230]. In other words, since not all the bit-flips
have statistically significant impact on the emanated signal, the non-contributing factors
can/should be removed from the model. In our processor, using this method we managed
to reduce the size of T by more than 65%.
Figure 8.3 (top) shows the simulated signals when the linear regression (LR) model



















Figure 8.4: An example of how individual sources (pipeline stages) are combined to form
the final signal. Top: how the actual EM signal looks like when the instructions are executed
in isolation (NOP, inst, NOP). Bottom: The actual EM signal when the instruction
sequence is NOP, ADD, SHIFT, NOP (i.e., a combination of multiple instruction in
the pipeline).
significantly improved the simulation accuracy.
8.4.3 Multi-Input Modeling
Once the signal amplitude for individual sources are calculated, the next step is to combine
the signals generated by these individual sources to create the simulated EM signal. In
principle, the generated EM signal is the superposition of individual waves thus depending
on each source’s phase, the superposition of each pair can be either constructive or de-
structive. Using this fact, the signal can be approximated as a linear combination of these
individual sources where the coefficients may vary between ±1, depending on the phases.
Due to the complex nature of the generated EM signals, accurately modeling each and
every source mathematically is significantly time-consuming and often infeasible in prac-
tice. To tackle this problem and find coefficients for each source, a model-fitting approach
can be used. We use a linear-regression model to find (predict) the overall EM signal.
Specifically, we use:
X = δs + (αA)×M + εs, (8.9)
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where αA is the vector of individual sources amplitudes (α is the activity factor and A
is the baseline amplitude), δ and ε are the intercept and error vectors, M is the predicted
coefficients, and X is the final amplitude which will be used in Equ. 8.6.
Figure 8.4 shows an example of how two individual sources are combined in each cycle
to form the final signal. Figure 8.4 (top) shows ADD and SHIFT instructions when they
are executed in isolation (i.e., NOP, inst, NOP), and Figure 8.4 (bottom) shows how
the final signal looks like when the executed sequence is NOP, ADD, SHIFT, NOP.
Specifically, cycle 6 is when the ADD instruction is in WB stage and SHIFT is in MEM, and
the resulting signal is a linear combination of these two sources. Note that to find M , we
need to measure all the possible combinations of the entire instructions in the ISA, however,
as we will show in Section 5, the number of required measurements can be significantly
reduced using standard clustering algorithms.
8.5 Modeling Micro-Architectural Events
The last step of simulating an EM side-channel signal is adding the signatures of different
micro-architectural events to the signal. We particularly add the signatures of the following
three events to the signal:
Pipeline Stall. Stalling is a common event in a processor which prevents successor in-
structions from advancing in the pipeline and preserves the instruction and operands in the
stalled stages. Due to this preservation no bit-flips occur in the stalled stages. In addition,
to save power, a control signal is typically used to disable (e.g., through power-gating)
hardware components in the stalled stages. As a result, stalling typically has a dramatic
impact on the switching activities of the stalled stages and, consequently, results in a sig-
nificant reduction in the amplitude of the generated side-channel signals. Figure 8.5 shows
the effect of stalling on the signal where a MUL instruction has stalled the pipeline for eight


















Figure 8.5: Effect of stalls on the signal. The actual signal shown in green, while simu-
lated signals are shown in black when modeling pipeline stalls (top) and not modeling it
(bottom).
the figure, not properly simulating stalls (bottom) results in a significant deviation from the
original signal (shown in light green).
Note that stalling does not have any impact on prior instructions thus they still gener-
ate side-channel signals as they advance through the pipeline. As a result, during stall the
received side-channel signal is only generated by the instructions in the non-stalled stages
(if any). To properly model stalling, the simulator should be able to detect when stalls are
happening (using the micro-architecture model), and ignores the signals generated by the
stalled stages during the stall phase. In our model, this is done by setting the amplitudes of
stalled stages to zero in Equ. 8.9.
Cache miss. Similar to pipeline stalls, due to a data-dependency, cache miss can also cause
stalls. In our design, accessing the cache stalls the pipeline for one cycle. Further, cache
miss and access to the memory causes extra two stall cycles. These two signals and their
157
Figure 8.6: Effect of cache-miss (left) and cache-hit (right) on the signal. Miss causes two
extra stall cycles. The actual signal (light blue) and simulated signals (black) with (top)
and without (bottom) modeling cache misses are shown.
differences are shown in Figure 8.6. As can be seen in the figure, two extra stall cycles
(total of three) can be seen in LD instruction. Similar to stalls, the cache activity should be
properly simulated using the micro-architecture model. Figure 8.6 illustrates how without
properly modeling the cache misses the simulated signal will be deviated from the original
signal (bottom left).
Misprediction. In addition to stalls, we observed that branch misprediction also has no-
ticeable impact on the side-channel signals. Depending on the pipeline design, the correct
outcome of a branch instruction can be resolved after a few cycles (2 cycles in our de-
sign), and if a misprediction is detected, the processor has to flush the incorrectly fetched
instructions, and begin executing the correct ones after that. In order to do that, proces-
sors typically substitute the incorrect instructions with NOP instructions. It is expected
that executing these bubble instructions temporarily changes the side-channel signals since
they change the switching activities of each stage. Figure 8.7 shows the received EM sig-
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Figure 8.7: Effect of misprediction (right) on the signal. It causes two instructions being
flushed from the pipeline and hence affect the signal in those cycles.
Similar to pipeline-stall, using the micro-architecture model, mispredictions can be de-
tected and simulated in our simulator. It is important to mention that we also studied the
impact of using different branch-predictors on the side-channel signals (e.g., always not-
taken, 2-level, g-share, etc.) and we did not observe any statistically significant difference
between these predictors mainly because they have relatively small switching activities
(especially for low-end processors).
It is also important to mention that we tested the effect of other micro-architectural
events such as data-forwarding on the signal and did not observe any significant difference
in the presence and/or absence of them. Also note that, as we mentioned before, in this
paper, we limited the modeling to bare-metal, and left system-level activities modeling
such as interrupts, exceptions, context-switch, etc., and advanced power-saving methods
(e.g., DVFS, power gating, etc.) to future work.
8.6 Evaluations
We divide our evaluations into two main parts. First to show the correctness, accuracy,
and robustness of our simulator, we present our experimental evaluations on how well
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Cluster Type Inst. No. Inst.
1 ALU ADD,XOR,JAL, ... 13
2 Shift SLLI,SRT, SRA, ... 10
3 MUL/DIV MUL, DIV, REM, ... 8
4 Load LB, LW, LH, ... 5
5 Store SB, SH, SW 3
6 Cache LB, LW, LH, ... 5
7 Branch BEQ, BLT, BGE, ... 6
Table 8.1: RISC-V (R32IM) instruction-set and their cluster used in this paper.
the simulated signal matched with the original side-channel signal generated by the target
hardware for ALL possible combinations of the instructions. We then explore the impact of
variations such as manufacturing, environmental, etc. on the accuracy of EMSim.
The second part of our evaluations (to be presented in §7.7) is focused on the EMSim
use-cases and its application in different domains such as security, debugging, etc.
8.6.1 Evaluating Model Accuracy
Setup. We implemented a RISC-V based processor on a Terrasic DE0-CV board with an
Altera Cyclone-V FPGA [231] with 50 MHz clock-rate. To record side-channel signals, we
used a Keysight digital oscilloscope (DSOS804A), with 1 GHz bandwidth and 10 GSa/s
rate. We further studied the effect of changing the sampling-rate on the accuracy and found
that similar accuracy can be achieved with much lower sampling-rate (about 200 MSa/s
in our measurements). As a result, similar results can be achieved using a less expensive
device (e.g., TBS1032B Tektronix Digital Oscilloscope [232] costs around $300) and/or
a high sampling-rate device can be used for modeling devices with faster clock-rates. To
receive EM signals, we used a magnetic probe [89], placed 5 cm above the FPGA. Signal
processing is done in Matlab2017-b and the simulator is implemented in standard C++ pro-
gramming language.
Model Building. In §7.3, we discussed that in order to fit a model, ALL possible combi-
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nations of instructions should be measured (i.e., about three hundred million combinations
in RISC-V ISA). Clearly such a requirement makes the model building extremely time-
consuming in practice. However, intuitively, we expect instructions with similar behaviors
(e.g., ALU-type, memory-type, etc.) have similar side-channel signals since they share
identical hardware activities. Using this intuition, we used the hierarchical agglomerative
algorithm [233] with the cross-correlation as the distance metric to cluster instructions with
similar EM pattern into a same cluster. We found that RISC-V ISA can be clustered into 7
categories (when the operands are similar) where a single instruction in each category can
be a representative of all instructions in that category.
These categories are shown in Table 8.1. Using this table, we then used only a rep-
resentative instruction of the cluster for model building which, in turn, reduce the model
building complexity significantly. In our setup, the number of measurements was reduced
from 300 million to only 16 thousands. Note that while the clustering algorithm did not use
the micro-architecture model as a prior knowledge, the clusters confirmed that instructions
with similar micro-architecture activities should be clustered in a same group.
Metric. To measure how well the simulated signals “match” with the real signals, we
leverage normalized cross-correlation as our metric. To compute that, we first normalize
both signals, real and simulated, to have similar average. We then divide each signal to
individual clock cycles, and then compare each cycle (between the simulated and the real
signals) using cross-correlation as the distance metric. We then define accuracy as the
average of this cross-correlation across all cycles for all measurements (i.e., we were able
to match the waveform in this degree across all possible instruction sequences). Note that
we specifically used this approach to show how well the time-domain signal matches with
the original signal instead of relying on a specific leakage metric such as Hamming weight.
However, to show the usefulness and versatility of our tool, those results will be shown in
the next section.
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Benchmark. To prove that our approach provides accurate simulated signals for ALL pos-
sible instruction combinations thus can be applicable to ANY complex program that uses
the mixture of the implemented ISA (R32IM), we created a microbenchmark using all pos-
sible combinations of the representative instructions shown in Table 8.1. Particularly, for
a 5-stage pipeline and 7 distinct clusters, there are 75 = 16807 possible combinations that
can appear together (in the pipeline) in a cycle. We created a program to generate all these
combinations with random operands. We then manually modified branch instructions and
assigned the target address and branch condition to create loops with random instruction
and iteration sizes. To limit the execution time, we then randomly put these instructions
into groups of 1024 combinations (i.e., 5120 instructions in each group which were exe-
cuted one after another similar to a real program). To cover all the combinations, 17 of
such groups were needed (no two groups were similar). We then executed these randomly-
generated groups on the processor normally, and recorded the real and simulated signals.
To further prove the validity and correctness of our simulator, we also randomly created
another 17 groups, this time from all instructions in the ISA and not just the representatives.
Results. Using these 34 groups/applications described above, we then compared the simu-
lated signals with the actual ones using the our metric defined earlier. Each group/applica-
tion takes about 9000 cycles to finish on average. The execution-time varied depending on
the instructions used and microarchitectural events.
Figure 8.8 shows the simulated and actual EM-side-channel signals for one of the
groups tested in our evaluation (for clarity, only the first 50 cycles are shown in the fig-
ure). As can be seen from the figure, the simulated signal matches the real signal with high
accuracy. We found that, on average, EMSim has about 94.1% accuracy in simulating










Figure 8.8: A comparison between the signal generated by a real hardware (top) and the
simulated signal (bottom) in EMSim.
8.6.2 Manufacturing Variability
To investigate the impact of manufacturing variability on the model’s accuracy, i.e., to de-
termine if training is needed for each physical instance of a (same) device, we repeated
our measurements for three physical instances of the Terrasic development board. We then
compared the signals received form each device using the normalized correlation method.
We observed that, for each cycle, the signals for board #2 and #3 are slightly shifted (com-
pared to the board #1), mainly due to the slight shift in the actual clock frequency of the
boards. We found that such a shift has no statistically significant impact on the accuracy.
In general, it is important to mention that while a shift in the clock frequency could
cause the side-channel signal to be scaled in each cycle, we observed that this scaling has
(almost) the same impact (in terms of shape and amplitude) on all the instructions thus,
effectively, makes the true mutual information unchanged.
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8.6.3 Board Variability
To study the effect of board variability, mainly the effect of CMOS technology and board
design on the signals, and further evaluate the model accuracy on boards with different
manufacturing conditions, we used two other boards: a Terrasic DE1 board with an Altera
Cyclone-II FPGA [234] and a Digilent ARTY board with a Xilinx Artix-35T FPGA [235]
(both clocked at 50MHz). We then repeated the measurements described in §8.6.1 for
these two new boards and found that, using the same processor design and applications,
to correctly model the signal both A and c parameters (cf. Equ. 8.9 in §8.4) should be
retrained to achieve the similar accuracy. Other parameters such as M remained the same
since the position of the antenna and the physical and logic design of the processor stays
the same. We envision that for different designs, the baseline amplitude and activity factors
should be re-trained (only once) and then can be included by the developers as a library
(similar to that of for other properties such as power, timing, etc.).
8.6.4 Effects of Distance
Transferring the ideas from communication theory literature, to find the effect of the dis-
tance (i.e., the position of the probe and its distance to the center of board) on each source,
a parameter, called loss-coefficient or β, can be considered as the channel coefficient of
a flat-fading channel. Here, we need to note that, regardless of the position of the probe,
the baseline amplitude, A, can not be measured solely because we do not have any control
on the power distribution of the board for each instruction at each pipeline stage. Hence,
the resulting signal power is always a combination of the actual signal amplitude and the
corresponding loss coefficient (i.e., Aβ). However, to deal with this problem, we choose
the probe’s location at the center of the processor as the base point, and define β0 as the
loss coefficient at this point. Further denoting A0 is the actual emanated signal amplitude,
we assume the amplitude of the signal can be written as A = A0β0 with respect to the base
point. Therefore, with these assumptions, β is assumed to be one for all the measurements
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Figure 8.9: Effect of distance on the signal amplitude. For both figures, the plots with
darker color correspond to reconstructed signal, and the other ones correspond to the orig-
inal signal.
done in this paper.
To further investigate the effect of β on the amplitude, we measured the signal (with
the same input trace) at a different location, and compared the results with the base case.
Figure 8.9 illustrates the effect of the antenna location on the loss coefficient factor β.
Here, the training signals for the reconstruction are obtained from the base measurement,
and the figure at the bottom is obtained by neglecting the effect of β (i.e., β = 1) during the
simulation. The figure at the top is generated by solving the same linear regression model
given in Equ. 8.9, this time by substituting A by Aβ, where β is not constrained to one any
more (whileA is the signal obtained in the base case). We can conclude that considering the
effect of β is crucial to explain the changes due to antenna location since better correlation
and root mean square results are obtained with the adjusted β. Note that, adjusting the
β is only required during the model building (i.e., during measurements if the position of
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the probe changes), however, the user of the tool does not require to change/adjust β for
his/her leakage estimation and can use the base case or numerous cases (depending on the
availability) to obtain an “average” leakage estimation, or “worst” case for β = 1.
8.7 Practical Use-Cases for EMSim
This section describes several example use cases for EMSim’s ability to accurately simulate
side-channel signals.
8.7.1 Side-Channel Leakage Estimation
An important step for defending against side-channel attacks (SCA) is estimating how
much (sensitive) information can be possibly leaked (through a specific or set of side-
channels) during the execution of an application. To estimate this leakage, different metrics
can be used. Particularly, for EM side-channels the state-of-the-art methods are Test Vector
Leakage Assessment (TVLA) [236, 237] and Signal Available to Attacker (SAVAT) [36]
methodologies.
Due to the lack of simulation tools, to properly calculate these metrics, several actual
measurements should be performed. Unfortunately, these measurements often require so-
phisticated equipment and experts with various skills which, in turn, makes them expensive
and difficult in practice. Using our approach, however, we show that EMSim is capable of
generating highly-accurate simulated signals which can be used to calculate these metrics
precisely which eliminates the need for an actual measurement infrastructure.
The following describes how EMSim can be used to model TVLA and SAVAT. It is
important to mention that unlike prior work [221, 222, 238, 239], EMSim is NOT limited
to a specific metric or analysis, and it can be used for ANY analysis based on the EM signal.
Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA). This metric is based on T-test, a statistical test
which determines if there is a significant difference between the means of two groups. In
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LDM LDC NOP ADD MUL DIV
R S R S R S R S R S R S
LDM 0.02 0 3.71 3.91 5.34 5.32 5.24 5.20 5 5.02 4.98 4.98
LDC 3.72 3.91 0.04 0 0.81 0.85 0.74 0.74 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.23
NOP 5.35 5.32 0.8 0.86 0.01 0 0.08 0.1 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.69
ADD 5.24 5.20 0.74 0.75 0.07 0.1 0.03 0 0.98 1.05 1.03 1.1
MUL 4.98 5.01 0.22 0.21 0.66 0.68 0.94 1 0.03 0 0.04 0.01
DIV 4.97 4.99 0.21 0.21 0.65 0.68 1.05 1.13 0.03 0.01 0.02 0












Figure 8.10: AES-128 leakage assessment using TLVA methodology on the measured/ac-
tual signal (top) and the simulated signal (bottom).
the context of SCA, TLVA shows how much the side-channel signal (e.g., EM) is correlated
with specific values in the code. The values can be either some known intermediate nodes
(e.g., the output of Sbox in AES) or more generally, some fixed (or semi-fixed) input param-
eters of a specific function. If the metric exceeds a threshold (i.e., a confidence value in the
statistical test), it indicates that there is a (potential) leakage for an SCA such as DPA [240,
241], template attacks [198], etc.
To compare the accuracy of TLVA metric based on the measured vs. simulated signals,
we ran AES-128 on our RISC-V processor. We then used our setup described in §8.6.1, to
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measure the signal. Figure 8.10 shows these measurements for the real signal (top) and the
simulated signal (bottom). As can be seen from the figure, the TLVA metric based on the
simulated signal is highly matched with the real measurement and follows the same pattern
(and values) as the actual one (i.e., no-activity→high→low→no→medium sequence).
Signal Available to Attacker (SAVAT). This metric measures the side-channel signal cre-
ated by a specific single-instruction difference in program execution, i.e., the amount of
signal made available to an attacker who wishes to decide whether the program has exe-
cuted instruction/event A or instruction/event B.
To measure this metric, Callan et al. [36] developed a microbenchmark which creates a
controlled alternation between A and B instructions many times. Such alternation creates a
periodic signal with period tp = tA+ tB, where for the half of the period A is executing and
for the other half B. Such a periodic activity can then be observed in the frequency domain
as a spike at fp = 1/tp. The key insight is that the corresponding energy of the spike (i.e.,
area under the curve) indicates how different A and B are from each other (in terms of side-
channel signals) hence reveals how much signal would be available to an attacker when the
difference between two samples is whether A was executed or B.
To compute SAVAT in both real measurements and simulated signals, we implemented
the microbenchmark proposed by Callan et al. [36], and used the setup explained in §8.6.1
to collect the signals. Table 8.2 shows SAVAT values in our processor for 6 pairs of instruc-
tions. As can be seen, the values retrieved from simulations are highly matched with the
values computed using the real measurements. SAVAT can then be utilized to reveal the
information leakage capacity of the system [242].
8.7.2 Application to Debugging/Profiling
While so far we have shown how EMSim can be utilized to accurately model EM side-
channel signals and thus can be used for leakage estimation during developing secure soft-
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ware, in this section, we present another potentially useful use-case of EMSim and show
how hardware designers and computer architects can also leverage this framework during
hardware development.
Given that EMSim can accurately model the system for each pipeline stage and each
micro-architecture event, it can potentially be used as a debugging tool in the chip-design
flow such as a debugging tool for finding design bugs in post-place-and-route stage and/or
for finding manufacturing bugs/defects in post-fabrication. In contrary with signal model-
ing, in this scenario, the signals simulated by the simulator can be assumed as the “ground-
truth” or “expected” signal where the signals emanated by the hardware have to be matched
to these reference models. A deviation from the reference model obtained by the simula-
tions indicates that there is an unwanted change/error in the hardware.
The main advantage of this approach compared to existing standard testing methods is
that the proposed approach is zero-overhead and does not require any testing infrastructure
on the system which, in turn, saves a significant amount of area and reduces complexity.
To further demonstrate the feasibility of this approach, Figure 8.11 shows a scenario
where there is a bug in designing a multiplier in the Execution stage. The multiplier is
designed such that it calculates the result of multiplying two 16-bits operands in three cy-
cles where the majority of the activity (i.e., writing the output register, etc.) takes place
in the last (third) cycle. However, as seen from the figure, the amplitude of the measured
signal (top) in the third cycle of the execution (shown in a red circle) is significantly lower
than that of in the simulation (bottom). Further investigation reveals that instead of prop-
erly multiplying two 16-bits data, the designed multiplier only uses the lower half (i.e.,
8-bit data) of each operand and ignores the upper half of those inputs hence results in a
significantly lower activity factor and thus much smaller signal strength.
It is important to mention that this method, fundamentally, relies on the signal detection
granularity (i.e., how fine-grained changes can be detected), thus it may not be useful in













Figure 8.11: A case-study to show how EMSim can be used for debugging. The measured
signal (top) does not match with the reference model obtained by the simulation model
(bottom) which indicates that there is a potential error/issue in the hardware.
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8.8 Prior Work
Much work has been done to characterize particular analog side-channels [243, 244, 245,
223] and prevent attacks that use them [49, 246, 217, 39, 47, 247, 248], either by removing
the tie between sensitive information and the side-channel signal, or by trying to make
the signal more difficult to measure. However, such work mostly focuses on preventing
a particular attack in a specific piece of code and are less focused about the relationship
between the hardware, software, and the side-channel signal.
Strategies for quantifying potential side channel exposure at the micro-architectural and
architectural levels are still an open problem. Existing work proposed different methods
and/or metrics to estimate the leakage either for a specific type of side-channel (e.g., cache,
power, EM, etc.) or alternatively, as a generic framework to estimate the overall leakage
for any given side-channel.
Side-Channel Vulnerability Factor (SVF) [217] measures how the side-channel signal
correlates with high-level execution patterns (e.g., program phase transitions). While this
metric allows overall assessment of the “leakiness” of a particular system and application
over a given side-channel, it provides limited insight to 1) computer architects about which
architectural and microarchitectural features are the strongest leakers, and to 2) software
developers about how to reduce the side-channel leakiness of their code.
To address these limitations, the SAVAT (Signal Available to Attacker) metric was pro-
posed, along with practical methods to measure SAVAT in practice [36, 218, 219, 220].
SAVAT measures the side-channel signal (particularly EM and power from laptops) cre-
ated by a specific single-instruction difference in program execution, i.e., the amount of
signal made available to a potential attacker who wishes to decide whether the program has
executed instruction/event A or instruction/event B. These measurements can be used to de-
termine the potential for information leakage when execution of individual instructions or
even sections of code depend on sensitive information. Unfortunately, SAVAT only quanti-
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fies the overall difference between two specific instructions, but ignores the time at which
these differences occur and how they are afected by other instructions in the program.
Similar to SAVAT, McCann et al. [221] proposed a modeling technique capable of
producing a leakage metric at instruction-level for power (and/or EM) side-channel signals
on ARM M0/M4 cores. To estimate the leakage for individual instructions, the proposed
method only requires knowledge about different characteristics of the system at ISA-level
such as data-dependent effects of neighboring instructions in a sequence, register effects,
bit-flips, etc. Like SAVAT, that method provides interesting insights about possible sources
of leakage, but ignores the effects of micro-architecture events such as cache miss, branch
mis-prediction, etc. on the signal. As we show in this paper, that may lead to making wrong
conclusions about the leakage model of the software/system.
Very recently, Gorman et al. [249] designed MESC, an architectural framework for
modeling electromagnetic emanations from a core. MESC takes into account the layout
and the switching activity of a process, and accounts for the effects of shielding and envi-
ronmental noise. While this work provides accurate results for different cores with different
layout, MESC also provides no information about micro-architecture events which could
lead to some non-negligible inaccuracies.
Another related work to EMSim is the method proposed by Barenghi and Pelosi [222]
where the leakage for individual instructions was calculated by measuring the power con-
sumption between two consecutive cycles and employing the Pearson correlation coeffi-
cient between the two measurements. To calculate the leakage, in addition to leveraging
the ISA-level information, pipeline model was also used. However, the framework did not
consider any micro-architecture events, nor pipeline stalls and only accounts the number of
cycles that takes for each instruction to execute. It also did not model the individual effect
of each stage on the others and the overall signal. In this work, however, we took a more
systematic and accurate approach by considering different micro-architecture events and
hardware effects.
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Also related to this work are work on leveraging EM signals for profiling [183, 127,
250, 213, 186, 185, 129]. EMPROF [250] analyzes the system’s EM emanations to iden-
tify processor stalls that are associated with last-level cache (LLC) misses. Compared to
these frameworks, instead of leveraging the existing EM side-channel signal for profiling,
our work takes a more holistic approach and systematically models the underlying rela-
tion between the software and hardware and provides insights on how and why these EM
side-channel signals are created due to a variety of micro-architectural and hardware activ-
ities. Using this approach, EMSim can be used for a variety of purposes beyond only for
program/memory profiling (e.g., hardware modeling, leakage estimation, compiler devel-
opment, etc.).
Another body of work related to this paper are the cycle-accurate models/tools to sim-
ulate power and/or microarchitecture [200, 201, 202, 203, 147, 92, 204, 205]. While these
models can accurately model the power consumption at each cycle, they are different from
this work and hence may not be a proper tool for simulating EM side-channel signals for
two main reasons: First, while these methods do consider the activity factor to calculate
power, they often treat all the bit-flips equally. However, as shown in this paper, depend-
ing on the design, not all flips equally contribute to the overall signal. Ignoring this fact
can lead to inaccurate modeling (see Figure 8.3). Second, depending on the architecture,
different stages might have different effect on each other and the overall signal. Without
properly modeling these effects, the overall signal can not be modeled (see Figure 8.9).
More indirectly related to our work are methods for instruction tracking/intrusion de-
tection based on side-channel signals [251, 105, 252, 253]. These methods often use differ-
ent signal processing methods (e.g., Markov Model, Statistical tests, etc.) and/or machine
learning techniques to find the most likely executed instruction based on the side-channel
trace. While they are effective in providing a non-intrusive, zero-overhead method for
profiling/intrusion detection, they are not designed to model the signal and/or provide any
information or insight about how these signals are generated.
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8.9 Conclusions
This Chapter presented EMSim, an approach that enables simulation of the EM side-channel
signals cycle-by-cycle using a detailed micro-architectural model of the device. Our evalu-
ation of EMSim finds that its simulation-derived signals closely matches signals measured
from real hardware. To gain further insight, we also experimentally identified how the ac-
curacy of the simulated signals degrades when key micro-architectural features and other
hardware behaviors are omitted from the simulation model.
We envision a variety of uses for EMSim. For hardware, software, and compiler devel-
opers, it allows EM leakage to be quantified without having to build actual hardware and/or
actually measure signals. More importantly, it allows simulated signals to be broken down
and attributed to specific parts of the hardware and software. Furthermore, when hardware
prototypes are available, significant discrepancies between the signal generated by EMSim
and actual EM emanations can be used to identify where the actual design differs from the
simulated microachitecture, which can be used to debug the hardware and/or to refine the
simulation model to more closely match the hardware.
We believe that EMSim can be extended to more complex processors by using a similar
multi-input-single-output methodology, where each pipeline stage acts as a single source.
For out-of-order processors, we expect higher baseline hardware amplitude for each stage
as the hardware of each stage becomes more complex. We also expect different values for
activity factors and coefficients for individual stages. Further, since an OoO processor has
more shared units, to accurately model the signal, these shared units should be carefully
simulated and their signals added to each cycle. Nonetheless, since the root cause of cre-
ating side-channel signals are bit-flips at the gate-level, we do not expect any fundamental
modeling difference between in-order and OoO designs.
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
9.1 Summary
This thesis investigated two important research questions regarding to the security of em-
bedded systems and the role of side-channels in their security.
The first question was “Can (and how) side-channel signals be used for useful pur-
poses?” To answer this question, we developed a novel method called Spectral Profiling
which leveraged analog-domain side-channels for monitoring a resource-constrained sys-
tem. The main idea behind this method was we can simplify signal analysis by knowing
this fact that most programs in embedded system domain tend to have repetitive phases.
We then developed a novel signal processing methodology to effectively monitor embed-
ded system with high accuracy.
Further, we showed how Spectral Profiling can be used in a variety of applications in-
cluding profiling, intrusion detection, and establishing trust. We showed this method is
quite powerful even in noisy environment. We believe the contributions presented in the
first part of this thesis can significantly improve the security of resource-constrained de-
vices where limitations (e.g., lack of infrastructure, overheads, etc.) make them vulnerable
against adversaries.
The second question that we investigated was “how analog side-channel leakages can
be mitigated?” To answer that question, we made two main contributions. We first dis-
covered a new side-channel vulnerability on modern systems and showed how ignoring
security as a first-order factor can lead to severe vulnerabilities. Second, to fundamentally
address this problem, we developed a novel simulation tool which can estimate the analog
side-channel signals for any given software. Such a tool could be used by a developer at the
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design-stage of software and hence, can significantly reduce the vulnerability of the system
against analog side-channels.
9.2 Future Work
This decade has already seen a significant surge in the number of cyber-attacks. With the
exponential growth of computers in numbers and their ever-increasing importance in con-
trolling critical tasks, it is expected that cyber-security and data privacy become even more
serious problems in the next decade. To this end, understanding and properly modeling
side-channels become even more important tasks.
The largest opportunity for future work is the improvement and extension of the the
proposed simulation tool, EMSim. In this thesis we showed how EMSim can be used to
estimate side-channel signals for a relatively simple processor. However, such a tool can
be extended to cover a variety of systems and architectures. Specifically, it can be extended
to model out-of-order processors. Moreover, such a tool can even be extended beyond the
processor, and can model other important components in the system including the main
memory, I/O, etc., to provide a much accurate model about the system’s behavior.
Another possible future direction is extending the idea of Spectral Profiling to more
complex systems and applications. For example, an important extension to our method
is the ability to monitor multi-thread/multi-core systems where several application concur-
rently create side-channel signals. The critical step in creating such a framework is adding a
pre-proccesing unit which analyzes the input signal and successfully separate it into multi-
ple sources/cores (e.g., by using standard blind source separation techniques such as ICA).
The separated signal can then be fed into an existing framework (e.g., EDDIE, REMOTE,
etc.) for further analysis (e.g., malware detection).
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